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Religion and the 2004 Election: A Pre-election Analysis

Much has been said in recent years about the growing identification of religious conservatives — especially Evangelical Protestants — with the Republican Party and the corresponding affinity of a growing number of Mainline Protestants, minorities and secularists with the Democratic Party. A new survey, which gauges the political attitudes in 18 distinct American religious communities on a wide variety of issues, confirms those trends. But the survey also shows that the connections between religious beliefs and politics are far more complex than commonly assumed.

The Fourth National Survey of Religion and Politics, which was conducted in the spring of 2004, pays special attention to the diversity of opinion within the nation's three major religious traditions – Evangelical Christians, Mainline Protestants and white Roman Catholics – by comparing the views of traditionalists, centrists and modernists within each group. The results show that religious traditionalists, whether Evangelical, Mainline Protestant or Catholic, hold similar positions on issue after issue, and that modernists of these various traditions are similarly like-minded. The divisions between traditionalists and modernists are strongest on social issues such as abortion, school vouchers and gay marriage, but large majorities of both groups agree on many other issues, including the need for anti-poverty programs, strong environmental protection and gay rights.

The survey, co-sponsored by the Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life, was conducted by John C. Green, a political scientist at the University of Akron who has conducted similar polls in connection with the last three presidential elections. Green, who is director of the university's Ray C. Bliss Institute of Applied Politics, is considered one of the nation's foremost experts on the influence of religion on American politics. An explanation of the survey methodology can be found at the end of this report.

Other highlights of the survey include the following:

- Most Americans want politicians to address issues of faith, but they are sharply divided over whether religious groups should become directly involved in politics.
- A clear majority supports embryonic stem cell research, but religious groups are more divided on the issue of abortion. Overall, only a slim majority favors a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy in most circumstances.

- A solid majority supports traditional marriage over civil unions or same-sex marriage. At the same time, an even larger majority of those surveyed favor equal rights for gay people.
- On economic issues, Americans have little appetite for reducing government spending, but they narrowly approve of large tax cuts. But interestingly, a substantial majority would support tax increases to pay for anti-poverty programs. Almost two-thirds of Americans voice skepticism about free trade, and a large majority favors strong environmental regulation.
- The events of recent years have not led to increased support for isolationism in international affairs. Indeed, the number of Americans who believe this country should avoid foreign entanglements has dropped 7 percentage points since 2000. What's more, nearly three-fourths of voters believe the U.S. should cooperate with international organizations rather than taking the lead in keeping peace. However, a sizeable majority (62%) also supports the concept of preemptive war.

Party Loyalties

At first glance, the standing of Republicans and Democrats does not appear to have changed much since 1992. Twelve years ago, Democrats held a modest 41%-to-37% edge, and today the margin is an almost identical 42%-to-38% in their favor. (Table 3) But beneath the surface, there has been a steady realignment of religious constituencies. The change is most marked among Evangelical Protestants. In 1992, this group, which represents about one-fourth of the U.S. population, favored Republicans 48%-to-32%. But it now leans Republican 56%-to-27%. Republicans also are approaching parity with the Democrats among Catholics, who once were a heavily Democratic constituency. The Democratic margin has shrunk from 43%-to-38% in 1992 to 44%-to-41% today.

Democrats, on the other hand, have made inroads among Mainline Protestants, who once were a core Republican constituency. In 1992, Democrats trailed Republicans 32%-to-50% among this group, but today the margin has narrowed to 39%-to-44%. (Table 3) Democrats also have widened their support among Latino Catholics, who now favor Democrats by a 61%-to-15% margin; among Jewish voters, who support Democrats 68%-to-21%; and among a diverse group of religiously unaffiliated voters, who lean Democratic 43%-to-27%.

The realignment among major religious constituencies has been paralleled by realignment *within* each of the three major religious traditions. Today, Evangelical Protestants, Mainline Protestants and Catholics each have three distinct factions: *traditionalists*, who are characterized by a high level of orthodox belief, attend church very regularly and are eager to preserve traditional beliefs and practices in a changing world; *modernists*, who subscribe to heterodox beliefs, attend church less frequently and are eager to adopt modern beliefs and adapt practices to changing conditions; and *centrists*, who fall between those two groups.

Traditionalists are far more likely to say their religious beliefs shape their political thinking than are modernists: fully 81% of traditionalist Evangelicals express this view, for instance, compared to just 12% of modernist Catholics and 15% of modernist Mainline Protestants. (Table 6) Overall, 39% of Americans say religion is important in shaping their political thinking, 24% say it is somewhat important and 37% say it is unimportant.

Some 68% of Americans say it is important to have a president with strong religious beliefs. (Table 4) And only 37% say they get uncomfortable when candidates discuss their faith.

In light of these patterns, it should come as no surprise that both President Bush and his Democratic rival, Senator John Kerry, are reaching out to religious voters. Both candidates might be walking a fine line, however, if they seek the active involvement of organized religious groups in promoting their candidates: some 47% of Americans, including majorities of all modernist groups, believe organized religious groups should stay out of politics. (Table 5)

Liberal or Conservative?

Overall, some 35% of Americans classify themselves as “conservative,” compared to 22% who say they are “liberal” (the remaining 43% call themselves “moderates”). (Table 27) That represents a three percentage point increase in the number of conservatives since 1992, which, in turn, reflects a 13-point jump in the number of Evangelical Protestants who consider themselves conservative. (Table 29)

But the increase in the number of self-identified conservatives is not always mirrored in public attitudes toward specific policies. For instance, only 26% believe government spending should be reduced, compared to 40% who would hold it at current levels and 34% who advocate more spending. (Table 9)

Likewise, the margin in favor of tax cuts is a narrow 48%-to-45%. (Table 9) Traditionalist Evangelicals and traditionalist Catholics are most likely to take the conservative position and support tax cuts, while modernists of all three major White Christian traditions (as well as atheists and agnostics) are more likely to oppose them. Surprisingly, Latino Protestants and, to a lesser extent, Latino Catholics and Black Protestants tend to side with those favoring tax cuts, even though big majorities of all three strongly oppose cuts in government spending.

Support for tax cuts doesn’t mean voters want less government in all cases. By a 55%-to-27% margin, for example, voters favor strong regulation to protect the environment, with strong majorities in every group except Black Protestants, who are evenly divided on the issue. (Table 10)

While Americans don’t appear to be calling for a dramatic change in current tax or spending policies, they do appear disenchanted with one long-standing pillar of economic policy — free trade. By a margin of 53%-to-30%, they disagree with the statement, “Free trade is good for the economy even if it means the loss of some U.S. jobs.” (Table 10) The issue appeared to divide Evangelical traditionalists and modernists, but opposition was fairly uniform in the other

major traditions. The strongest support for free trade came from Jews (48%-to-33%) and from atheists and agnostics (44%-to-42%).

Abortion, Stem Cells and Gay Marriage

Culture wars divide virtually every religious group in America, but not every issue is a battleground. While there continue to be deep divisions over abortion, for instance, there is a fairly broad consensus that embryonic stem cell research should not be prohibited. And while disagreements over same-sex marriage or civil unions are substantial, there is widespread support for gay rights.

While “pro-choice” advocates (those who would impose, at most, just “some limits”) outnumber “pro-life” advocates (people who believe abortion should always be illegal or that there should be “many limits”) by a narrow 52%-to-48% margin, there has been an eight-point gain for pro-life positions since 1992. (Tables 20, 21) Behind those figures lies a sharp division between traditionalists and modernists in each of the three major Christian traditions. Among Evangelical Protestants, for instance, traditionalists are overwhelmingly pro-life (84%-to-16%), while modernists favor the pro-choice position (63%-to-37%). (Table 20) A split also occurs among traditionalist and modernist Catholics and Mainline Protestants, although Catholics as a whole are more “pro-choice” than Evangelical Protestants, and Mainline Protestants are more “pro-choice” still. At the same time, strong majorities of Latino Protestants, Latino Catholics and Black Protestants favor the “pro-life” positions. Non-Christians and people without formal religious affiliations tend to be “pro-choice.”

The sharp divisions over abortion do not extend to embryonic stem cell research. On this issue, a solid majority — 51%-to-32% — opposes a ban. (Table 22) While traditionalists are more likely than modernists to favor a ban, groups are far less polarized on this issue than on abortion. And majorities of only two of the 18 groups studied favor a ban: traditionalist Evangelicals and traditionalist Catholics.

Just as voters see abortion and embryonic stem cell research differently, they also make distinctions between non-traditional marriage and gay rights. Overall, voters split 55%-to-45% in favor of the proposition that marriage should only be allowed between men and women. But people agree with the statement “Homosexuals should have the same rights as other Americans” by a 57%-to-28% margin. (Table 23)

The strongest advocates of traditional marriage are traditionalist Evangelicals, followed closely by other Christians, Black Protestants and Latino Protestants. The biggest supporters of same-sex marriage are atheists and agnostics, Jews, modernist Catholics, modernist Mainline Protestants and modernist Evangelical Protestants. Interestingly, granting full marriage rights to homosexuals has more adherents than only allowing civil unions, even though the latter often is seen as a compromise position: overall, 27% of survey respondents said they would accept same-sex marriage, compared to just 18% who favored civil unions. (Table 23)

Majorities of most groups support gay rights, including centrist and modernist Evangelicals, centrist and modernist Mainline Protestants, traditionalist, centrist and modernist Catholics as

well as Jews, Latino Catholics, people of other faiths, unaffiliated believers, secular people and atheists and agnostics.

The greatest opposition to gay rights comes from traditionalist Evangelicals, who oppose it by a 50%-to-36% margin. (Table 23) Support among Evangelical Protestants as a whole has grown by 10 percentage points since 1992, from 35% to 45%. (Table 24)

A plurality of Black Protestants (44%-to-40%) opposes gay rights, a major shift in attitudes from even four years ago, when 56% supported equal rights for homosexuals. (Tables 23, 24) The dramatic change may be surprising to some, given African-Americans' historic focus on civil rights as well as their general commitment to the Democratic Party. But many Black Americans are social conservatives and the recent controversy over same-sex marriage may have reduced their support for gay rights.

Social Welfare Issues

Religious communities are less divided on social welfare issues. A majority — 50%-to-35% — believes the government should do more to fight hunger and poverty, even if that would require increasing taxes on the middle class. (Table 12) Traditionalist Evangelicals are the only group in which a plurality opposes this proposition, and even among them the margin is a narrow 45%-to-40%. What's more, the idea of taxing the wealthy, rather than the middle class, wins overwhelming support from every religious group. Even traditionalist Evangelicals back it 55%-to-25%. Overall, nearly two-thirds of all Americans approve the concept. (Table 12)

Issues like abortion are more closely contested than social welfare issues in part because of the shifting allegiances of minorities. Latinos and Blacks tend to take the “conservative” view on life and family matters, but they are on the “liberal” side on questions of social welfare.

Overall, Americans disapprove of school vouchers by a 45%-to-39% margin. (Table 25) Traditionalist Evangelicals and traditionalist Catholics favor them, while modernist Evangelical Protestants, modernist Catholics, centrist and modernist Mainline Protestants, Jews, seculars, atheists and agnostics oppose them. But minorities were split on the issue of school vouchers. Latinos generally favor vouchers — Latino Protestants by a 51%-to-31% margin and Latino Catholics by an even larger 58%-to-22% margin. (Table 25) But Black Protestants are more ambivalent, splitting 43%-to-40% against vouchers.

Overall, 50% of Americans approve of providing public funds to faith-based groups, while 34% object. (Table 25) Latino and Black Protestants are particularly supportive, by margins of 62%-to-27% and 61%-to-23% respectively. Only modernist Mainline Protestants, non-Christians, secularists and atheists and agnostics disapprove. And posting the Ten Commandments in public places wins even wider support: 66% approve and 20% disapprove, with only non-Christians, secularists and atheists and agnostics objecting; interestingly, the margin among secularists is a narrow 44%-to-43% against. (Table 25)

Views on Foreign Affairs

Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the religious landscape has tilted away from isolationism. Some 48% now disagree with the statement, “The U.S. should mind its own business internationally and let other countries get along as best they can on their own.” Only 37% agree with the statement. (Table 15) That represents a 7 percentage point shift away from a net isolationist position just four years earlier. (Table 16)

Americans would like to work with other nations, but not if that means risking their own security. By a strong 74%-to-26% margin, they favor cooperating with international organizations to keep the peace, (Table 15) while at the same time approving of President Bush’s doctrine of preemptive war by the lopsided majority of 62% to 22%. (Table 17) Every major religious group agrees with the preemptive war concept by a substantial margin, with the strongest support coming from traditionalist and centrist Evangelicals and traditionalist Mainline Protestants. Atheists and agnostics oppose the preemptive war doctrine by a margin of 45%-40%. A majority of the entire sample (54%) also believes the U.S. has a special role to play in the world. (Table 15) Within the two major Protestant traditions, traditionalists are more likely than modernists to believe in American exceptionalism, but there is no such rift among Catholics.

Asked about foreign policy priorities other than security, a plurality (48%) emphasizes promoting human rights. (Table 19) Promoting economic development comes next at 29%, followed by promoting democracy, which 23% endorse. And among possible humanitarian goals of Americans abroad, a majority (66%) would give top priority to fighting AIDS. Unaffiliated believers, non-Christians, Black Protestants and Latinos were most likely to take this position, followed by atheists and agnostics, Jews, modernist Mainline Protestants, seculars and other Christians. Traditionalists in the three largest Christian traditions were less likely to give AIDS high priority.

Some 53% of all Americans listed famine relief as a high humanitarian priority. (Table 19) The patterns of support were similar to those for fighting AIDS, but at a generally lower level. Finally, 28% cited fighting religious persecution. On this issue, traditionalists scored higher than modernists in the three major Christian traditions.

A plurality (38%) disagreed with the proposition that the U.S. should support Israel over the Palestinians, while a slightly smaller group (35%) sided with the Jewish state. (Table 17) These numbers should not be read as an indicator of lack of overall support for Israel – a longtime U.S. ally – since the question posed dealt simply with the Palestinian issue and not broader issues, such as guaranteeing Israel’s security.

A Few Words on Methodology

The Fourth National Survey of Religion and Politics collected information from 4,000 randomly selected adults in March, April and May of 2004. The margin of error is plus or minus 2%. Among other things, the project showed that the American landscape is remarkably diverse, as Table 1 demonstrates.

To define the religious landscape, the first step was to categorize respondents according to their denominational affiliation. Latino Protestants and Catholics and Black Protestants were placed in separate categories, both because most congregations in America are ethnically or racially homogenous and because these groups are religiously and politically distinct.

A series of questions helped divide the three major religious communities into traditionalists, centrists and modernists. First, six belief measures (belief in God, belief in an afterlife, views of the Bible, the existence of the devil, evolution and the truth of all the world's religions) were combined into a single scale running from the most traditional to the most modern. Then, five measures of religious behavior (worship attendance, financial support of a congregation, private prayer, scripture reading and participation in small religious groups) and the salience of religion were combined in a single scale running from the lowest to the highest level of religious engagement.

Third, measures of religious identification were created for traditionalist and modernist religious movements. For Evangelical Protestants, traditionalists were those who claimed to be fundamentalist, Evangelical, Pentecostal or charismatic, and others who agreed on the need to preserve religious traditions. For Mainline Protestants, traditionalists were defined as those who claimed to be "traditional or conservative" or agreed on the need to preserve religious traditions. Modernists in all three major traditions were those who claimed to be liberal, progressive, ecumenical or mainline, and who agreed about the need to adapt religious beliefs and practices to the modern world.

The "unaffiliated" category, meanwhile, consists of three distinct groups: unaffiliated believers, who claim no religious affiliation but nonetheless reported a high level of religious belief; seculars, who claim no affiliation and reported only modest religious beliefs or practices; and atheists and agnostics, who respectively believe there is no God or who say they have no way of knowing about God.

Table 1. The Religious Landscape and Self-Identified Partisanship, Spring 2004

	Percent Population	Partisanship*		
		<i>Republican</i>	<i>Independent</i>	<i>Democratic</i>
ALL	100.0%	38%	20	42 = 100%
Evangelical Protestant	26.3	56%	17	27
<i>Traditionalist Evangelical</i>	<i>12.6</i>	<i>70%</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>20</i>
<i>Centrist Evangelical</i>	<i>10.8</i>	<i>47%</i>	<i>22</i>	<i>31</i>
<i>Modernist Evangelical</i>	<i>2.9</i>	<i>30%</i>	<i>26</i>	<i>44</i>
Mainline Protestant	16.0	44%	18	38
<i>Traditionalist Mainline</i>	<i>4.3</i>	<i>59%</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>31</i>
<i>Centrist Mainline</i>	<i>7.0</i>	<i>46%</i>	<i>21</i>	<i>33</i>
<i>Modernist Mainline</i>	<i>4.7</i>	<i>26%</i>	<i>20</i>	<i>54</i>
Latino Protestants	2.8	37%	20	43
Black Protestants	9.6	11%	18	71
Catholic	17.5	41%	15	44
<i>Traditionalist Catholic</i>	<i>4.4</i>	<i>57%</i>	<i>13</i>	<i>30</i>
<i>Centrist Catholic</i>	<i>8.1</i>	<i>34%</i>	<i>19</i>	<i>47</i>
<i>Modernist Catholic</i>	<i>5.0</i>	<i>38%</i>	<i>11</i>	<i>51</i>
Latino Catholic	4.5	15%	24	61
Other Christian	2.7	42%	36	22
Other Faiths	2.7	12%	33	55
Jewish	1.9	21%	11	68
Unaffiliated	16.0	27%	30	43
<i>Unaffiliated Believers</i>	<i>5.3</i>	<i>28%</i>	<i>37</i>	<i>35</i>
<i>Secular</i>	<i>7.5</i>	<i>29%</i>	<i>27</i>	<i>44</i>
<i>Atheist, Agnostic</i>	<i>3.2</i>	<i>19%</i>	<i>27</i>	<i>54</i>

* Partisan “leaners” included with Republicans and Democrats; minor party affiliation included with independents.

Source: Fourth National Survey of Religion and Politics, Bliss Institute University of Akron, March-May 2004 (N=4000).

Table 2. The Religious Landscape by Partisanship, Spring 2004*

		Republican	Independent	Democratic	
		<u>Majority Republican</u>			
Traditionalist Evangelical	70%	10		20	
Traditionalist Mainline	59%	10		31	
Traditionalist Catholic	57%	13		30	
<i>Evangelical Protestants</i>	56%	17		27	
		<u>Plurality Republican</u>			
Centrist Evangelical	48%	22		30	
Centrist Mainline	47%	20		33	
<i>Mainline Protestants</i>	44%	18		38	
Other Christians	42%	36		22	
		<u>Plurality Democratic</u>			
<i>Catholic</i>	41%	15		44	
ENTIRE SAMPLE	38%	20		42	=100%
Unaffiliated Believers	28%	37		35	
<i>Unaffiliated</i>	27%	30		43	
Latino Protestants	37%	20		43	
Modernist Evangelical	32%	24		44	
Seculars	29%	27		44	
Centrist Catholic	35%	19		46	
		<u>Majority Democratic</u>			
Modernist Catholic	37	11		52	
Atheist, Agnostic	19	27		54	
Other Faiths	12	33		55	
Modernist Mainline	23	21		56	
Latino Catholic	15	24		61	
Jewish	21	11		68	
Black Protestants	11	18		71	

* For ease of presentation, the groups are listed in order of Republican identification and then the order of Democratic identification.

Source: Fourth National Survey of Religion and Politics, Bliss Institute University of Akron, March-May 2004 (N=4000)

Table 3. Major Religious Traditions and Partisanship, 1992-2004*

	2004		2000		1996		1992		1992-2004	
	<i>Rep</i>	<i>Dem</i>	<i>Rep</i>	<i>Dem</i>	<i>Rep</i>	<i>Dem</i>	<i>Rep</i>	<i>Dem</i>	<i>Rep</i>	<i>Dem</i>
ENTIRE SAMPLES	38	42	39	42	41	42	37	41	+ 1	+ 1
Evangelical Protestant	56	27	51	33	53	33	48	32	+ 8	- 5
Mainline Protestant	44	39	50	33	49	34	50	32	- 6	+ 7
Black Protestant	11	71	12	74	15	80	10	77	+ 1	- 6
Roman Catholic	41	44	37	43	39	44	38	43	+ 3	+ 1
Latino Catholic	15	61	25	57	29	52	22	49	- 7	+12
Jewish	21	68	24	47	29	51	18	45	+ 3	+23
Unaffiliated	27	43	32	41	37	40	30	41	- 3	+ 2

*Independents omitted for ease of presentation; independents equal to 100 minus the sum of each pairs of numbers in a single year.

Source: National Surveys of Religion and Politics, Bliss Institute of Applied Politics 1992 (n=4001); 1996 (n=4034); 2000 (n=6000); 2004 (n=4000)

Table 4. The Religious Landscape and Religious Expression by Candidates, Spring 2004*

	Uncomfortable When Candidates Discuss Faith		Important that President have Strong Religious Beliefs	
	<i>Agree</i>	<i>Disagree</i>	<i>Agree</i>	<i>Disagree</i>
ENTIRE SAMPLE	37%	63	68%	32
Evangelical Protestant	24%	76	87%	13
<i>Traditionalist Evangelical</i>	<i>14%</i>	<i>86</i>	<i>97%</i>	<i>3</i>
<i>Centrist Evangelical</i>	<i>30%</i>	<i>70</i>	<i>83%</i>	<i>17</i>
<i>Modernist Evangelical</i>	<i>45%</i>	<i>55</i>	<i>60%</i>	<i>40</i>
Mainline Protestant	35%	65	71%	29
<i>Traditionalist Mainline</i>	<i>22%</i>	<i>78</i>	<i>94%</i>	<i>6</i>
<i>Centrist Mainline</i>	<i>30%</i>	<i>70</i>	<i>76%</i>	<i>24</i>
<i>Modernist Mainline</i>	<i>53%</i>	<i>47</i>	<i>40%</i>	<i>60</i>
Latino Protestants	31%	69	82%	18
Black Protestants	28%	72	85%	15
Catholic	40%	60	70%	30
<i>Traditionalist Catholic</i>	<i>25%</i>	<i>75</i>	<i>93%</i>	<i>7</i>
<i>Centrist Catholic</i>	<i>39%</i>	<i>61</i>	<i>74%</i>	<i>26</i>
<i>Modernist Catholic</i>	<i>54%</i>	<i>46</i>	<i>43%</i>	<i>57</i>
Latino Catholic	40%	60	73%	27
Other Christian	26%	74	78%	22
Other Faiths	61%	39	47%	53
Jewish	67%	33	25%	75
Unaffiliated	54%	46	28%	72
<i>Unaffiliated Believers</i>	<i>40%</i>	<i>60</i>	<i>48%</i>	<i>52</i>
<i>Secular</i>	<i>56%</i>	<i>44</i>	<i>24%</i>	<i>76</i>
<i>Atheist, Agnostic</i>	<i>72%</i>	<i>28</i>	<i>6%</i>	<i>94</i>

*All rows sum to 100%. Agree=agree, strongly agree; disagree=disagree, strongly disagree; no opinion omitted for ease of presentation.

Source: Fourth National Survey of Religion and Politics, Bliss Institute University of Akron, March-May 2004 (N=4000)

Table 5. The Religious Landscape and Political Activity by Religious Groups, Spring 2004*

Groups	Organized Religious Groups		Organized Religious	
	Should Stand up for Beliefs		Should Stay out of Politics	
	<i>Agree</i>	<i>Disagree</i>	<i>Agree</i>	<i>Disagree</i>
ENTIRE SAMPLE	76%	24	47%	53
Evangelical Protestant	84%	16	35%	65
<i>Traditionalist Evangelical</i>	<i>90%</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>25%</i>	<i>75</i>
<i>Centrist Evangelical</i>	<i>81%</i>	<i>19</i>	<i>43%</i>	<i>57</i>
<i>Modernist Evangelical</i>	<i>73%</i>	<i>27</i>	<i>53%</i>	<i>47</i>
Mainline Protestant	76%	24	48%	52
<i>Traditionalist Mainline</i>	<i>87%</i>	<i>13</i>	<i>35%</i>	<i>65</i>
<i>Centrist Mainline</i>	<i>77%</i>	<i>23</i>	<i>49%</i>	<i>51</i>
<i>Modernist Mainline</i>	<i>63%</i>	<i>37</i>	<i>61%</i>	<i>39</i>
Latino Protestants	78%	22	40%	60
Black Protestants	89%	11	35%	65
Catholic	74%	26	52%	48
<i>Traditionalist Catholic</i>	<i>88%</i>	<i>12</i>	<i>38%</i>	<i>62</i>
<i>Centrist Catholic</i>	<i>73%</i>	<i>27</i>	<i>53%</i>	<i>47</i>
<i>Modernist Catholic</i>	<i>63%</i>	<i>37</i>	<i>64%</i>	<i>36</i>
Latino Catholic	76%	24	40%	60
Other Christian	63%	37	57%	43
Other Faiths	70%	30	60%	40
Jewish	63%	37	57%	43
Unaffiliated	63%	37	64%	36
<i>Unaffiliated Believer</i>	<i>72%</i>	<i>28</i>	<i>53%</i>	<i>47</i>
<i>Secular</i>	<i>59%</i>	<i>41</i>	<i>68%</i>	<i>32</i>
<i>Atheist, Agnostic</i>	<i>57%</i>	<i>43</i>	<i>74%</i>	<i>26</i>

*All rows sum to 100%. Agree=agree, strongly agree; disagree=disagree, strongly disagree; no opinion omitted for ease of presentation.

Source: Fourth National Survey of Religion and Politics, Bliss Institute University of Akron, March-May 2004 (N=4000)

Table 6. The Religious Landscape, Religion and Political Thinking, Spring 2004

Importance of religion to political thinking

	Important	Somewhat Important	Not Important	
ENTIRE SAMPLE	39%	24	37	= 100%
Evangelical Protestant	58%	21	21	
<i>Traditionalist Evangelical</i>	<i>81%</i>	<i>10</i>	<i>9</i>	
<i>Centrist Evangelical</i>	<i>41%</i>	<i>32</i>	<i>27</i>	
<i>Modernist Evangelical</i>	<i>21%</i>	<i>27</i>	<i>52</i>	
Mainline Protestant	32%	28	40	
<i>Traditionalist Mainline</i>	<i>56%</i>	<i>27</i>	<i>17</i>	
<i>Centrist Mainline</i>	<i>29%</i>	<i>30</i>	<i>41</i>	
<i>Modernist Mainline</i>	<i>15%</i>	<i>26</i>	<i>59</i>	
Latino Protestants	51%	25	24	
Black Protestants	57%	24	19	
Catholic	26%	34	40	
<i>Traditionalist Catholic</i>	<i>50%</i>	<i>31</i>	<i>19</i>	
<i>Centrist Catholic</i>	<i>22%</i>	<i>37</i>	<i>41</i>	
<i>Modernist Catholic</i>	<i>12%</i>	<i>32</i>	<i>56</i>	
Latino Catholic	40%	28	32	
Other Christian	54%	15	32	
Other Faiths	33%	17	50	
Jewish	33%	20	47	
Unaffiliated	13%	14	73	
<i>Unaffiliated Believers</i>	<i>23%</i>	<i>21</i>	<i>56</i>	
<i>Secular</i>	<i>7%</i>	<i>12</i>	<i>81</i>	
<i>Atheist, Agnostic</i>	<i>8%</i>	<i>9</i>	<i>83</i>	

Source: Fourth National Survey of Religion and Politics, Bliss Institute University of Akron, May-March 2004 (N=4000)

Table 7. Major Religious Traditions, Religion and Political Thinking, 1992-2004*

Importance of religion to political thinking

	2004		2000		1996		1992		1992-2004 Net Change	
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
ENTIRE SAMPLES	39	37	42	36	42	36	37	42	+ 2	- 5
Evangelical Protestant	58	21	59	20	59	23	51	25	+ 7	- 4
Mainline Protestant	32	40	37	37	37	36	30	42	+ 2	- 2
Black Protestant	57	19	64	19	66	13	58	24	- 1	- 5
Catholic	26	40	34	39	32	39	26	49	0	- 9
Latino Catholic	39	31	39	35	46	29	37	45	+ 2	-14
Jewish	33	40	37	48	44	37	48	39	-15	+ 1
Unaffiliated	13	73	17	66	19	63	22	71	- 9	+2

Legend: Yes=Religion important to political thinking; No=Religion not important to political thinking; "Somewhat important" omitted for ease of presentation but equal to 100 minus the sum of each pairs of numbers in a single year.

Source: National Surveys of Religion and Politics, Bliss Institute of Applied Politics 1992 (n=4001); 1996 (n=4034); 2000 (n=6000); 2004 (n=4000)

Table 8. The Religious Landscape and Issue Priorities, Spring 2004

	Economic, Welfare Issues	Foreign Policy	Cultural Issues	Political Process
ENTIRE SAMPLE	43%	30	20	7 =100%
Evangelical Protestant	35%	30	29	6
<i>Traditionalist Evangelical</i>	27%	27	40	6
<i>Centrist Evangelical</i>	40%	32	22	6
<i>Modernist Evangelical</i>	55%	29	11	5
Mainline Protestant	46%	33	13	8
<i>Traditionalist Mainline</i>	38%	34	22	6
<i>Centrist Mainline</i>	50%	35	9	6
<i>Modernist Mainline</i>	46%	30	11	13
Latino Protestants	35%	31	27	7
Black Protestants	46%	26	24	4
Catholic	47%	31	15	7
<i>Traditionalist Catholic</i>	39%	29	25	7
<i>Centrist Catholic</i>	51%	29	14	6
<i>Modernist Catholic</i>	50%	35	6	9
Latino Catholic	50%	26	19	5
Other Christian	35%	24	29	12
Other Faiths	52%	26	10	12
Jewish	42%	45	4	9
Unaffiliated	44%	30	15	11
<i>Unaffiliated Believers</i>	42%	31	20	7
<i>Secular</i>	46%	28	15	11
<i>Atheist, Agnostic</i>	43%	32	10	15

Source: Fourth National Survey of Religion and Politics, Bliss Institute University of Akron, May-March 2004 (N=4000)

Table 9. The Religious Landscape, Government Spending, and Tax Cuts, Spring 2004

	Govt. Spending:			Big Tax Cuts*		
	<i>Less</i>	<i>Same</i>	<i>More</i>	<i>Good</i>	<i>No Op</i>	<i>Bad</i>
ENTIRE SAMPLE	26%	40	34	48%	7	45
Evangelical Protestant	30%	41	29	57%	10	33
<i>Traditionalist Evangelical</i>	40%	39	21	67%	8	25
<i>Centrist Evangelical</i>	21%	44	35	50%	12	38
<i>Modernist Evangelical</i>	22%	37	41	41%	8	51
Mainline Protestant	28%	43	29	45%	8	47
<i>Traditionalist Mainline</i>	36%	41	23	44%	8	48
<i>Centrist Mainline</i>	30%	44	26	51%	9	40
<i>Modernist Mainline</i>	20%	43	37	37%	6	57
Latino Protestants	24%	36	40	52%	11	37
Black Protestants	19%	36	45	49%	6	45
Catholic	25%	40	35	46%	5	49
<i>Traditionalist Catholic</i>	30%	37	33	56%	3	41
<i>Centrist Catholic</i>	25%	37	38	49%	7	44
<i>Modernist Catholic</i>	22%	46	32	34%	4	62
Latino Catholic	16%	36	48	50%	8	42
Other Christian	28%	40	32	48%	7	45
Other Faiths	12%	43	45	31%	7	62
Jewish	19%	38	43	33%	5	62
Unaffiliated	25%	42	33	39%	6	55
<i>Unaffiliated Believers</i>	22%	36	42	45%	9	46
<i>Secular</i>	25%	47	28	39%	4	57
<i>Atheist, Agnostic</i>	32%	40	28	31%	6	63

*All rows sum to 100%. Agree=agree, strongly agree; disagree=disagree, strongly disagree; No Op=no opinion.

Source: Fourth National Survey of Religion and Politics, Bliss Institute University of Akron, May-March 2004 (N=4000)

Table 10. The Religious Landscape, Free Trade, and Environmental Regulation, Spring 2004

	Free Trade*			Environmental Regulation*		
	<i>Agree</i>	<i>No Op</i>	<i>Disagree</i>	<i>Agree</i>	<i>No Op</i>	<i>Disagree</i>
ENTIRE SAMPLE	30%	17	53	55%	18	27
Evangelical Protestant	34%	15	51	52%	17	31
<i>Traditionalist Evangelical</i>	41%	12	47	52%	14	34
<i>Centrist Evangelical</i>	29%	17	54	52%	18	30
<i>Modernist Evangelical</i>	21%	15	64	57%	21	22
Mainline Protestant	33%	20	47	61%	19	20
<i>Traditionalist Mainline</i>	35%	17	48	62%	15	23
<i>Centrist Mainline</i>	30%	22	48	56%	20	24
<i>Modernist Mainline</i>	35%	20	45	66%	20	14
Latino Protestants	21%	25	54	43%	24	33
Black Protestants	16%	15	69	39%	22	39
Catholic	32%	17	51	60%	18	22
<i>Traditionalist Catholic</i>	37%	17	46	53%	21	26
<i>Centrist Catholic</i>	29%	14	57	59%	18	23
<i>Modernist Catholic</i>	33%	22	45	69%	15	16
Latino Catholic	26%	18	56	47%	17	36
Other Christian	25%	25	50	58%	21	21
Other Faiths	26%	17	57	62%	18	20
Jewish	48%	19	33	67%	13	20
Unaffiliated	28%	14	58	56%	20	24
<i>Unaffiliated Believers</i>	17%	16	67	46%	20	34
<i>Secular</i>	30%	12	58	59%	18	23
<i>Atheist, Agnostic</i>	44%	14	42	66%	23	11

*All rows sum to 100%. Agree=agree, strongly agree; disagree=disagree, strongly disagree; No Op=no opinion.

Source: Fourth National Survey of Religion and Politics, Bliss Institute University of Akron, May-March, 2004 (N=4000)

Table 11. Major Religious Traditions and Economic Policies, 1996-2004

*Percent supporting less and more government spending**

	2004		2000		1996		1996-2004 Net Change	
	<i>Less</i>	<i>More</i>	<i>Less</i>	<i>More</i>	<i>Less</i>	<i>More</i>	<i>Less</i>	<i>More</i>
ENTIRE SAMPLE	26	36	32	20	45	17	- 19	+19%
Evangelical Protestant	30	30	40	20	53	12	- 23	+18%
Mainline Protestant	28	29	40	17	53	10	- 25	+19%
Black Protestant	19	45	25	33	34	38	- 15	+ 7%
Catholic	25	35	29	22	43	17	- 18	+18%
Latino Catholic	16	48	26	33	34	25	- 18	+23%
Jews	19	43	29	25	37	22	- 18	+21%
Unaffiliated	25	33	29	25	42	19	- 17	+14%

* The “same” level of government spending has been omitted for ease of presentation; this figure equals 100% minus the sum of the pairs of figures for each year.

Percent agree, strict environmental regulations

	2004	2000	1996	1992	1992-2004 Net Change
	ENTIRE SAMPLE	55%	52%	54%	54%
Evangelical Protestant	52%	45%	50%	50%	+ 2%
Mainline Protestant	61%	59%	57%	57%	+ 4%
Black Protestant	39%	43%	43%	43%	- 4%
Catholic	60%	54%	56%	56%	+ 4%
Latino Catholic	47%	51%	50%	50%	- 3%
Jews	67%	66%	71%	71%	- 4%
Unaffiliated	56%	55%	60%	60%	- 4%

Source: National Surveys of Religion and Politics, Bliss Institute of Applied Politics 1992 (n=4001); 1996 (n=4034); 2000 (n=6000); 2004 (n=4000)

Table 12. The Religious Landscape and Social Welfare Policy, Spring 2004*

	Fight Poverty, Tax Middle Class			Fight Poverty Tax Wealthy		
	<i>Agree</i>	<i>No Op</i>	<i>Disagree</i>	<i>Agree</i>	<i>No Op</i>	<i>Disagree</i>
ENTIRE SAMPLE	50%	15	35	62%	18	20
Evangelical Protestant	43%	17	40	55%	20	25
<i>Traditionalist Evangelical</i>	<i>40%</i>	<i>15</i>	<i>45</i>	<i>46%</i>	<i>21</i>	<i>33</i>
<i>Centrist Evangelical</i>	<i>45%</i>	<i>16</i>	<i>39</i>	<i>61%</i>	<i>18</i>	<i>21</i>
<i>Modernist Evangelical</i>	<i>54%</i>	<i>20</i>	<i>26</i>	<i>69%</i>	<i>20</i>	<i>11</i>
Mainline Protestant	52%	17	31	59%	17	24
<i>Traditionalist Mainline</i>	<i>51%</i>	<i>19</i>	<i>30</i>	<i>50%</i>	<i>21</i>	<i>29</i>
<i>Centrist Mainline</i>	<i>47%</i>	<i>18</i>	<i>35</i>	<i>57%</i>	<i>17</i>	<i>26</i>
<i>Modernist Mainline</i>	<i>61%</i>	<i>14</i>	<i>25</i>	<i>71%</i>	<i>14</i>	<i>15</i>
Latino Protestants	43%	20	37	57%	19	24
Black Protestants	53%	16	31	68%	18	14
Catholic	51%	15	34	63%	18	19
<i>Traditionalist Catholic</i>	<i>46%</i>	<i>14</i>	<i>40</i>	<i>52%</i>	<i>22</i>	<i>26</i>
<i>Centrist Catholic</i>	<i>49%</i>	<i>15</i>	<i>36</i>	<i>64%</i>	<i>19</i>	<i>17</i>
<i>Modernist Catholic</i>	<i>58%</i>	<i>16</i>	<i>26</i>	<i>70%</i>	<i>14</i>	<i>16</i>
Latino Catholic	50%	14	36	64%	16	20
Other Christian	41%	27	32	56%	23	21
Other Faiths	58%	5	37	73%	10	17
Jewish	65%	8	27	80%	11	9
Unaffiliated	57%	11	32	67%	15	18
<i>Unaffiliated Believers</i>	<i>54%</i>	<i>13</i>	<i>33</i>	<i>62%</i>	<i>16</i>	<i>22</i>
<i>Secular</i>	<i>57%</i>	<i>11</i>	<i>32</i>	<i>66%</i>	<i>18</i>	<i>16</i>
<i>Atheist, Agnostic</i>	<i>64%</i>	<i>9</i>	<i>27</i>	<i>78%</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>16</i>

*All rows sum to 100%. Agree=agree, strongly agree; disagree=disagree, strongly disagree; No Op=no opinion.

Source: Fourth National Survey of Religion and Politics, Bliss Institute University of Akron, May-March 2004 (N=4000)

Table 13. The Religious Landscape and Social Welfare Policy, Spring 2004*

	Government Help Minorities			Government Help Disadvantaged		
	<i>Agree</i>	<i>No Op</i>	<i>Disagree</i>	<i>Agree</i>	<i>No Op</i>	<i>Disagree</i>
ENTIRE SAMPLE	39%	18	43%	57%	19	24
Evangelical Protestant	31%	19	50	55%	18	27
<i>Traditionalist Evangelical</i>	<i>28%</i>	<i>18</i>	<i>54</i>	<i>52%</i>	<i>16</i>	<i>32</i>
<i>Centrist Evangelical</i>	<i>33%</i>	<i>19</i>	<i>48</i>	<i>57%</i>	<i>21</i>	<i>22</i>
<i>Modernist Evangelical</i>	<i>33%</i>	<i>20</i>	<i>47</i>	<i>62%</i>	<i>18</i>	<i>20</i>
Mainline Protestant	32%	21	47	52%	22	26
<i>Traditionalist Mainline</i>	<i>29%</i>	<i>23</i>	<i>48</i>	<i>56%</i>	<i>22</i>	<i>22</i>
<i>Centrist Mainline</i>	<i>29%</i>	<i>21</i>	<i>50</i>	<i>47%</i>	<i>23</i>	<i>30</i>
<i>Modernist Mainline</i>	<i>40%</i>	<i>20</i>	<i>40</i>	<i>55%</i>	<i>21</i>	<i>24</i>
Latino Protestants	58%	18	24	65%	14	21
Black Protestants	58%	16	26	60%	21	19
Catholic	37%	18	45	55%	19	26
<i>Traditionalist Catholic</i>	<i>36%</i>	<i>18</i>	<i>46</i>	<i>52%</i>	<i>18</i>	<i>30</i>
<i>Centrist Catholic</i>	<i>38%</i>	<i>16</i>	<i>46</i>	<i>59%</i>	<i>16</i>	<i>25</i>
<i>Modernist Catholic</i>	<i>34%</i>	<i>21</i>	<i>45</i>	<i>53%</i>	<i>22</i>	<i>25</i>
Latino Catholic	62%	18	20	60%	20	20
Other Christian	33%	21	46	52%	23	25
Other Faiths	49%	12	39	67%	12	21
Jewish	56%	9	35	72%	5	23
Unaffiliated	40%	17	43	62%	16	22
<i>Unaffiliated Believers</i>	<i>40%</i>	<i>16</i>	<i>44</i>	<i>62%</i>	<i>13</i>	<i>25</i>
<i>Secular</i>	<i>41%</i>	<i>17</i>	<i>42</i>	<i>62%</i>	<i>16</i>	<i>22</i>
<i>Atheist, Agnostic</i>	<i>38%</i>	<i>20</i>	<i>42</i>	<i>64%</i>	<i>19</i>	<i>17</i>

*All rows sum to 100%. Agree=agree, strongly agree; disagree=disagree, strongly disagree; No Op=no opinion.

Source: Fourth National Survey of Religion and Politics, Bliss Institute University of Akron, March-May 2004 (N=4000)

Table 14. Major Religious Traditions and Social Welfare Programs, 1992-2004

Percent Agree, Fight Poverty and Tax Middle Class

	2004	2000	1996	1992	1992-2004 Net Change
ENTIRE SAMPLE	50%	47%	51%	58%	- 8%
Evangelical Protestant	43%	42%	46%	54%	-11%
Mainline Protestant	52%	43%	43%	55%	- 3%
Black Protestant	53%	58%	70%	72%	-19%
Catholic	51%	48%	49%	60%	- 9%
Latino Catholic	50%	52%	66%	61%	-11%
Jews	65%	56%	62%	61%	+ 4%
Unaffiliated	57%	46%	54%	55%	+ 2%

Percent Agree, Government Help Minorities

	2004	2000	1996	1992	1992-2004 Net Change
ENTIRE SAMPLE	39%	38%	37%	43%	- 4%
Evangelical Protestant	31%	32%	30%	35%	- 4%
Mainline Protestant	32%	31%	30%	40%	- 8%
Black Protestant	58%	58%	67%	70%	- 12%
Catholic	37%	35%	34%	40%	- 3%
Latino Catholic	62%	58%	57%	63%	- 1%
Jews	56%	45%	53%	67%	-11%
Unaffiliated	40%	39%	34%	38%	+ 2%

Source: National Surveys of Religion and Politics, Bliss Institute of Applied Politics 1992 (n=4001); 1996 (n=4034); 2000 (n=6000); 2004 (n=4000)

Table 15. The Religious Landscape and Foreign Policy, Spring 2004

	U.S. Mind Own Business*			U.S. has Special Role*			To Keep the Peace, US:	
	Agree	No Op	Disagree	Yes	No Op	No	Take the Lead	Cooperate Intl Orgns.
ENTIRE SAMPLE	37%	15	48	54%	4	42	26%	74
Evangelical Protestant	34%	14	52	60%	5	35	35%	65
<i>Traditionalist Evangelical</i>	26%	13	61	69%	4	27	44%	56
<i>Centrist Evangelical</i>	40%	16	44	53%	5	42	30%	70
<i>Modernist Evangelical</i>	43%	12	45	45%	6	49	18%	82
Mainline Protestant	35%	17	48	53%	4	43	23%	77
<i>Traditionalist Mainline</i>	35%	17	48	59%	3	38	29%	71
<i>Centrist Mainline</i>	38%	16	46	52%	5	43	23%	77
<i>Modernist Mainline</i>	30%	19	51	48%	4	48	16%	84
Latino Protestants	41%	14	45	48%	6	46	31%	69
Black Protestants	43%	20	37	51%	5	44	23%	77
Catholic	35%	15	50	54%	3	43	23%	77
<i>Traditionalist Catholic</i>	32%	11	57	58%	2	40	30%	70
<i>Centrist Catholic</i>	40%	15	45	48%	4	48	25%	75
<i>Modernist Catholic</i>	31%	16	53	60%	2	38	15%	85
Latino Catholic	39%	15	46	57%	4	39	28%	72
Other Christian	26%	30	44	52%	10	38	22%	78
Other Faiths	40%	12	48	50%	4	46	14%	86
Jewish	17%	7	76	68%	5	27	27%	73
Unaffiliated	43%	13	44	45%	2	53	19%	81
<i>Unaffiliated Believers</i>	55%	11	34	43%	2	55	29%	71
<i>Secular</i>	41%	13	46	45%	1	54	16%	84
<i>Atheist, Agnostic</i>	30%	17	53	49%	2	49	11%	89

*All rows sum to 100%. Agree=agree, strongly agree; disagree=disagree, strongly disagree; No Op=no opinion.

Source: Fourth National Survey of Religion and Politics, Bliss Institute University of Akron, March-May 2004 (N=4000)

Table 16. Major Religious Traditions and Isolationism, 2000-2004

Percent agree, U.S. should mind own business abroad

	2004	2000	2000-2004 Net Change
ENTIRE SAMPLE	37%	44%	- 7%
Evangelical Protestant	34%	46%	-12%
Mainline Protestant	35%	39%	- 4%
Black Protestant	43%	48%	- 5%
Catholic	35%	39%	- 4%
Latino Catholic	39%	50%	-11%
Jews	17%	46%	-29%
Unaffiliated	43%	46%	- 3%

*Source: National Surveys of Religion and Politics, Bliss Institute of Applied Politics
2000 (n=6000); 2004 (n=4000)*

Table 17. The Religious Landscape, Preemptive War, and Israel, Spring 2004*

ENTIRE SAMPLE	U.S. Can Engage in Preemptive War			U.S. Support Israel over Palestinians		
	Agree 62%	No Op 16	Disagree 22	Agree 35%	No Op 27	Disagree 38
Evangelical Protestant	72%	15	13	52%	23	25
<i>Traditionalist Evangelical</i>	78%	12	10	64%	18	18
<i>Centrist Evangelical</i>	70%	15	15	45%	26	29
<i>Modernist Evangelical</i>	50%	24	26	28%	37	35
Mainline Protestant	62%	16	22	33%	30	37
<i>Traditionalist Mainline</i>	70%	14	16	43%	28	29
<i>Centrist Mainline</i>	68%	16	16	34%	34	32
<i>Modernist Mainline</i>	47%	19	34	22%	26	52
Latino Protestants	63%	12	25	37%	30	33
Black Protestants	54%	24	22	24%	32	44
Catholic	63%	15	22	31%	26	43
<i>Traditionalist Catholic</i>	65%	15	20	43%	26	31
<i>Centrist Catholic</i>	66%	15	19	30%	24	46
<i>Modernist Catholic</i>	57%	15	28	23%	29	48
Latino Catholic	59%	20	21	25%	36	39
Other Christian	52%	21	27	33%	27	40
Other Faiths	51%	9	40	22%	8	70
Jewish	57%	11	32	75%	13	12
Unaffiliated	57%	12	31	20%	27	53
<i>Unaffiliated Believers</i>	65%	11	24	19%	30	51
<i>Secular</i>	59%	12	29	23%	26	51
<i>Atheist, Agnostic</i>	40%	15	45	15%	23	62

*All rows sum to 100%. Agree=agree, strongly agree; disagree=disagree, strongly disagree; No Op=no opinion.

Source: Fourth National Survey of Religion and Politics, Bliss Institute University of Akron, March-May 2004 (N=4000)

Table 18. Major Religious Traditions and Support for Israel over Palestinians, 1992-2004

Percent agree and disagree, U.S. should support Israel over the Palestinians

	2004		2000		1996		1992		1992-2004 Net Change	
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
ENTIRE SAMPLES	35	39	29	33	31	38	28	37	+ 7	+ 2
Evangelical Protestant	52	25	38	27	37	35	39	29	+13	- 4
Mainline Protestant	33	38	27	32	30	36	24	36	+ 9	+ 2
Black Protestant	24	44	22	38	25	47	21	47	+ 3	- 3
Catholic	31	43	22	35	29	38	21	39	+10	+ 4
Latino Catholic	25	39	24	42	27	40	26	39	- 1	0
Jewish	75	12	66	22	82	3	83	7	- 8	+ 5
Unaffiliated	20	53	24	38	23	44	21	45	- 1	+ 8

Legend: Yes=agree U.S. should support Israel over the Palestinians; No=disagree U.S. should support Israel over the Palestinians; no opinion excluded for ease of presentation; no opinion equal to 100 minus the sum of each pairs of numbers in a single year.

Source: National Surveys of Religion and Politics, Bliss Institute of Applied Politics 1992 (n=4001); 1996 (n=4034); 2000 (n=6000); 2004 (n=4000)

Table 19. The Religious Landscape and Foreign Policy Goals, Spring 2004

	Security Aside, the best Foreign Policy Goals is:*			U.S. Should Give High Priority to:**		
	<i>Human Rights</i>	<i>Economic Development</i>	<i>Promote Democracy</i>	<i>Fight AIDS</i>	<i>Famine Relief</i>	<i>Religious Persecution</i>
ENTIRE SAMPLE	48%	29	23	66%	53%	28%
Evangelical Protestant	47%	24	29	58%	49%	37%
<i>Traditionalist Evangelical</i>	46%	22	32	53%	46%	43%
<i>Centrist Evangelical</i>	45%	26	29	61%	49%	33%
<i>Modernist Evangelical</i>	54%	30	16	68%	65%	32%
Mainline Protestant	46%	29	25	63%	53%	21%
<i>Traditionalist Mainline</i>	43%	28	29	61%	57%	30%
<i>Centrist Mainline</i>	43%	28	29	61%	46%	21%
<i>Modernist Mainline</i>	53%	31	16	68%	58%	14%
Latino Protestants	57%	23	20	76%	51%	37%
Black Protestants	52%	29	19	81%	66%	33%
Catholic	47%	30	23	63%	52%	24%
<i>Traditionalist Catholic</i>	48%	24	28	59%	51%	36%
<i>Centrist Catholic</i>	40%	35	25	60%	50%	19%
<i>Modernist Catholic</i>	56%	26	18	72%	57%	22%
Latino Catholic	42%	31	27	77%	61%	24%
Other Christian	51%	30	19	63%	52%	24%
Other Faiths	51%	34	15	82%	59%	33%
Jewish	46%	33	21	69%	49%	37%
Unaffiliated	49%	31	20	71%	51%	19%
<i>Unaffiliated Believers</i>	48%	30	22	81%	50%	26%
<i>Secular</i>	51%	29	20	67%	52%	17%
<i>Atheist, Agnostic</i>	47%	39	14	70%	49%	13%

*Row sums to 100%.

** Row does not sum to 100%.

Source: Fourth National Survey of Religion and Politics, Bliss Institute University of Akron, May-March 2004 (N=4000)

Table 20. The Religious Landscape and Abortion, Spring 2004

	Abortion should be:			
	<i>Always Illegal</i>	<i>Legal in few Circumstances</i>	<i>Legal in many Circumstances</i>	<i>Legal and up to Woman to decide</i>
ENTIRE SAMPLE	15%	33	17	35
Evangelical Protestant	24%	45	12	19
<i>Traditionalist Evangelical</i>	32%	52	7	9
<i>Centrist Evangelical</i>	19%	40	16	25
<i>Modernist Evangelical</i>	7%	30	19	44
Mainline Protestant	6%	29	21	44
<i>Traditionalist Mainline</i>	8%	45	16	31
<i>Centrist Mainline</i>	7%	30	22	41
<i>Modernist Mainline</i>	2%	12	24	62
Latino Protestants	22%	40	15	23
Black Protestants	21%	33	14	32
Catholic	13%	35	17	35
<i>Traditionalist Catholic</i>	26%	51	6	17
<i>Centrist Catholic</i>	12%	36	20	32
<i>Modernist Catholic</i>	3%	18	25	54
Latino Catholic	18%	39	17	26
Other Christian	35%	38	10	17
Other Faiths	3%	18	21	58
Jewish	0%	16	24	60
Unaffiliated	7%	20	20	53
<i>Unaffiliated Believers</i>	13%	33	19	35
<i>Secular</i>	5%	16	19	60
<i>Atheist, Agnostic</i>	0%	9	25	66

Source: Fourth National Survey of Religion and Politics, Bliss Institute University of Akron, March-May 2004 (N=4000)

Table 21. Major Religious Traditions and Abortion, 1992-2004

*Percent, Pro-Life positions**

	2004	2000	1996	1992	1992-2004 Net Change
ENTIRE SAMPLE	48%	47%	45%	40%	+ 8%
Evangelical Protestant	69%	66%	60%	56%	+13%
Mainline Protestant	35%	38%	33%	33%	+ 2%
Black Protestant	54%	49%	43%	46%	+ 8%
Catholic	48%	50%	50%	40%	+ 8%
Latino Catholic	57%	52%	41%	47%	+10%
Jews	16%	24%	24%	20%	- 4%
Unaffiliated	27%	31%	29%	21%	+ 6%

** Ban and many limitations on abortion.*

Source: National Surveys of Religion and Politics, Bliss Institute of Applied Politics 1992 (n=4001); 1996 (n=4034); 2000 (n=6000); 2004 (n=4000)

Table 22. The Religious Landscape, Stem Cell Research, and Death Penalty, Spring 2004

	Ban Research on Stem Cells*			Life Prison for Death Penalty*		
	<i>Agree</i>	<i>No Op</i>	<i>Disagree</i>	<i>Agree</i>	<i>No Op</i>	<i>Disagree</i>
ENTIRE SAMPLE	32%	17	51	34%	15	51
Evangelical Protestant	40%	17	43	26%	15	59
<i>Traditionalist Evangelical</i>	<i>50%</i>	<i>15</i>	<i>35</i>	<i>25%</i>	<i>13</i>	<i>62</i>
<i>Centrist Evangelical</i>	<i>34%</i>	<i>20</i>	<i>46</i>	<i>26%</i>	<i>16</i>	<i>58</i>
<i>Modernist Evangelical</i>	<i>22%</i>	<i>15</i>	<i>63</i>	<i>32%</i>	<i>20</i>	<i>48</i>
Mainline Protestant	25%	18	57	33%	19	48
<i>Traditionalist Mainline</i>	<i>33%</i>	<i>20</i>	<i>47</i>	<i>36%</i>	<i>21</i>	<i>43</i>
<i>Centrist Mainline</i>	<i>28%</i>	<i>18</i>	<i>54</i>	<i>27%</i>	<i>18</i>	<i>55</i>
<i>Modernist Mainline</i>	<i>12%</i>	<i>15</i>	<i>73</i>	<i>39%</i>	<i>18</i>	<i>43</i>
Latino Protestants	35%	22	43	37%	13	50
Black Protestants	47%	20	33	49%	17	34
Catholic	32%	15	53	32%	15	53
<i>Traditionalist Catholic</i>	<i>51%</i>	<i>16</i>	<i>33</i>	<i>40%</i>	<i>15</i>	<i>45</i>
<i>Centrist Catholic</i>	<i>32%</i>	<i>15</i>	<i>53</i>	<i>27%</i>	<i>13</i>	<i>60</i>
<i>Modernist Catholic</i>	<i>15%</i>	<i>14</i>	<i>71</i>	<i>34%</i>	<i>16</i>	<i>50</i>
Latino Catholic	33%	20	47	44%	14	42
Other Christian	34%	27	39	32%	18	50
Other Faiths	18%	8	74	41%	11	48
Jewish	9%	7	84	49%	6	45
Unaffiliated	19%	16	65	32%	14	54
<i>Unaffiliated Believers</i>	<i>33%</i>	<i>18</i>	<i>49</i>	<i>30%</i>	<i>13</i>	<i>57</i>
<i>Secular</i>	<i>14%</i>	<i>16</i>	<i>70</i>	<i>31%</i>	<i>14</i>	<i>55</i>
<i>Atheist, Agnostic</i>	<i>5%</i>	<i>14</i>	<i>81</i>	<i>39%</i>	<i>14</i>	<i>47</i>

*All rows sum to 100%. Agree=agree, strongly agree; disagree=disagree, strongly disagree; No Op=no opinion.

Source: Fourth National Survey of Religion and Politics, Bliss Institute University of Akron, Spring 2004 (N=4000)

Table 23. Religious Landscape, Marriage, and Gay Rights, Spring 2004

	For Marriage Favor:*			Support Gay Rights*		
	<i>Traditional Marriage</i>	<i>Civil Unions</i>	<i>Same-sex Marriage</i>	<i>Agree</i>	<i>No Op</i>	<i>Disagree</i>
ENTIRE SAMPLE	55%	18	27	57%	15	28
Evangelical Protestant	75%	13	12	45%	15	40
<i>Traditionalist Evangelical</i>	89%	8	3	36%	14	50
<i>Centrist Evangelical</i>	67%	16	17	50%	15	35
<i>Modernist Evangelical</i>	42%	24	34	63%	19	18
Mainline Protestant	47%	27	26	60%	19	21
<i>Traditionalist Mainline</i>	72%	18	10	44%	24	32
<i>Centrist Mainline</i>	44%	29	27	62%	17	21
<i>Modernist Mainline</i>	29%	33	38	73%	15	12
Latino Protestants	71%	9	20	47%	15	38
Black Protestants	72%	10	18	40%	16	44
Catholic	48%	22	30	64%	16	20
<i>Traditionalist Catholic</i>	71%	18	11	51%	17	32
<i>Centrist Catholic</i>	52%	19	29	59%	18	23
<i>Modernist Catholic</i>	20%	29	51	83%	12	5
Latino Catholic	52%	14	34	61%	17	22
Other Christian	77%	8	15	41%	17	42
Other Faiths	30%	20	50	68%	13	19
Jewish	16%	29	55	82%	7	11
Unaffiliated	31%	19	50	73%	11	16
<i>Unaffiliated Believers</i>	58%	10	32	57%	13	30
<i>Secular</i>	23%	24	53	79%	11	10
<i>Atheist, Agnostic</i>	7%	21	72	89%	7	4

*All rows sum to 100%. Agree=agree, strongly agree; disagree=disagree, strongly disagree; No Op=no opinion.

Source: Fourth National Survey of Religion and Politics, Bliss Institute University of Akron, May-March 2004 (N=4000)

Table 24. Major Religious Traditions and Gay Rights, 1992-2004

Percent agree, homosexuals should have same rights ad other Americans

	2004	2000	1996	1992	1992-2004 Net Change
ENTIRE SAMPLE	57%	60%	56%	51%	+ 6%
Evangelical Protestant	45%	43%	42%	35%	+10%
Mainline Protestant	60%	62%	57%	55%	+ 5%
Black Protestant	40%	56%	65%	59%	-19%
Catholic	64%	67%	61%	57%	+ 7%
Latino Catholic	61%	72%	73%	56%	+ 5%
Jews	82%	74%	70%	68%	+14%
Unaffiliated	73%	71%	64%	57%	+16%

Source: National Surveys of Religion and Politics, Bliss Institute of Applied Politics 1992 (n=4001); 1996 (n=4034); 2000 (n=6000); 2004 (n=4000)

Table 25. The Religious Landscape, Religion and Public Life, Spring 2004

	Support School Vouchers*			Support Funds for Faith-based Groups*			Support Posting of Ten Commandments*		
	<i>Agree</i>	<i>No Op</i>	<i>Disagree</i>	<i>Agree</i>	<i>No Op</i>	<i>Disagree</i>	<i>Agree</i>	<i>No Op</i>	<i>Disagree</i>
ENTIRE SAMPLE	39%	16	45	50%	16	34	66%	14	20
Evangelical Protestant	44%	15	41	57%	16	27	83%	9	8
<i>Traditionalist Evangelical</i>	51%	13	36	59%	13	28	91%	5	4
<i>Centrist Evangelical</i>	41%	17	42	58%	18	24	82%	11	7
<i>Modernist Evangelical</i>	28%	16	56	45%	17	38	56%	14	30
Mainline Protestant	29%	15	56	44%	19	37	68%	13	19
<i>Traditionalist Mainline</i>	37%	14	49	60%	14	26	80%	13	7
<i>Centrist Mainline</i>	30%	15	55	46%	21	33	76%	12	12
<i>Modernist Mainline</i>	18%	15	67	29%	21	50	44%	14	42
Latino Protestants	51%	18	31	62%	11	27	67%	20	13
Black Protestants	40%	17	43	61%	16	23	67%	20	13
Catholic	42%	16	42	49%	15	36	67%	14	19
<i>Traditionalist Catholic</i>	52%	18	30	61%	15	24	83%	12	5
<i>Centrist Catholic</i>	44%	15	41	46%	15	39	68%	17	15
<i>Modernist Catholic</i>	32%	16	52	43%	15	42	52%	12	36
Latino Catholic	58%	20	22	59%	18	23	55%	24	21
Other Christian	37%	20	43	41%	23	36	60%	15	25
Other Faiths	36%	13	51	41%	9	50	41%	14	45
Jewish	42%	3	55	37%	7	56	34%	8	58
Unaffiliated	32%	15	53	36%	15	49	44%	15	41
<i>Unaffiliated Believers</i>	41%	16	43	48%	15	37	57%	17	26
<i>Secular</i>	29%	16	55	36%	16	48	43%	13	44
<i>Atheist, Agnostic</i>	22%	13	65	16%	16	68	25%	12	63

*All rows sum to 100%. Agree=agree, strongly agree; disagree=disagree, strongly disagree; No Op=no opinion.

Source: Fourth National Survey of Religion and Politics, Bliss Institute University of Akron, March-May 2004 (N=4000)

Table 26. Major Religious Traditions, Vouchers, and Faith-based Programs, 2000-2004

Percent Agree, School Vouchers

	2004	2000	2000-2004 Net Change
ENTIRE SAMPLE	39%	42%	- 3%
Evangelical Protestant	44%	46%	- 2%
Mainline Protestant	29%	33%	- 4%
Black Protestant	40%	50%	-10%
Catholic	42%	45%	- 3%
Latino Catholic	58%	52%	+ 6%
Jews	42%	37%	+ 5%
Unaffiliated	32%	34%	- 2%

Percent Agree, Faith-based Programs

	2004	2000	2000-2004 Net Change
ENTIRE SAMPLE	50%	45%	+ 5%
Evangelical Protestant	57%	44%	+13%
Mainline Protestant	44%	37%	+ 7%
Black Protestant	61%	65%	- 4%
Catholic	49%	45%	+ 4%
Latino Catholic	59%	58%	+ 1%
Jews	37%	35%	+ 2%
Unaffiliated	36%	37%	- 1%

Source: National Surveys of Religion and Politics, Bliss Institute of Applied Politics 2000 (n=6000); 2004 (n=4000)

Table 27. The Religious Landscape and Self-Identified Ideology, Spring 2004

	<i>Conservative</i>	<i>Moderate</i>	<i>Liberal</i>	
ENTIRE SAMPLE	35%	43	22	=100%
Evangelical Protestant	55%	31	14	
<i>Traditionalist Evangelical</i>	<i>66%</i>	<i>25</i>	<i>9</i>	
<i>Centrist Evangelical</i>	<i>48%</i>	<i>36</i>	<i>16</i>	
<i>Modernist Evangelical</i>	<i>30%</i>	<i>39</i>	<i>31</i>	
Mainline Protestants	34%	46	20	
<i>Traditionalist Mainline</i>	<i>49%</i>	<i>38</i>	<i>13</i>	
<i>Centrist Mainline</i>	<i>37%</i>	<i>43</i>	<i>20</i>	
<i>Modernist Mainline</i>	<i>15%</i>	<i>56</i>	<i>29</i>	
Latino Protestants	32%	44	24	
Black Protestants	27%	48	25	
Catholic	33%	47	20	
<i>Traditionalist Catholic</i>	<i>54%</i>	<i>39</i>	<i>7</i>	
<i>Centrist Catholic</i>	<i>29%</i>	<i>49</i>	<i>22</i>	
<i>Modernist Catholic</i>	<i>21%</i>	<i>50</i>	<i>29</i>	
Latino Catholic	25%	47	28	
Other Christian	44%	47	9	
Other Faith	10%	46	44	
Jewish	19%	35	46	
Unaffiliated	20%	48	32	
<i>Unaffiliated Believers</i>	<i>26%</i>	<i>49</i>	<i>25</i>	
<i>Secular</i>	<i>21%</i>	<i>48</i>	<i>31</i>	
<i>Atheist, Agnostic</i>	<i>10%</i>	<i>46</i>	<i>44</i>	

Source: Fourth National Survey of Religion and Politics, Bliss Institute University of Akron, March-May 2004 (N=4000)

Table 28. The Religious Landscape by Ideology, Spring 2004

	Conservative	Moderate	Liberal	
	<u>Majority Conservative</u>			
Traditionalist Evangelical	66%	25	9	
<i>Evangelical Protestant</i>	55%	31	14	
Traditionalist Catholic	54%	39	7	
	<u>Majority Conservative or Moderate</u>			
Traditionalist Mainline	49%	38	13	
Centrist Evangelical	48%	36	16	
Other Christian	44%	47	9	
Centrist Mainline	37%	43	20	
ENTIRE SAMPLE	35%	43	22	=100%
Modernist Evangelical	30%	39	31	
	<u>Majority Moderate</u>			
Modernist Catholic	21%	50	29	
Modernist Mainline	15%	56	29	
	<u>Majority Moderate or Liberal</u>			
<i>Mainline Protestants</i>	34%	46	20	
<i>Catholic</i>	33%	47	20	
Latino Protestants	32%	44	24	
Centrist Catholic	29%	49	22	
Black Protestants	27%	48	25	
Unaffiliated Believers	26%	49	25	
Latino Catholic	25%	47	28	
Secular	21%	48	31	
<i>Unaffiliated</i>	20%	48	32	
	<u>Plurality Liberal</u>			
Jewish	19%	35	46	
Other Faith	10%	46	44	
Atheist, Agnostic	10%	46	44	

Source: Fourth National Survey of Religion and Politics, Bliss Institute University of Akron, March-May 2004 (N=4000)

Table 29. Major Religious Traditions and Self-Identified Ideology, 1992-2004

	2004		2000		1996		1992		1992-2004 Net Change	
	Cons	Lib	Cons	Lib	Cons	Lib	Cons	Lib	Cons	Lib
ENTIRE SAMPLE	35	22	33	21	34	18	32	22	+ 3	- 0
Evangelical Protestant	55	14	49	15	45	13	42	16	+13	- 2
Mainline Protestant	34	20	34	21	35	15	35	18	- 1	+ 2
Black Protestant	27	25	26	25	27	24	23	31	+ 4	- 6
Catholic	33	20	31	18	32	19	30	21	+ 3	- 1
Latino Catholic	25	28	22	21	30	24	26	32	- 1	- 4
Jews	19	46	15	49	15	29	15	37	+ 4	+ 9
Unaffiliated	20	32	24	39	24	21	25	25	- 5	+ 7

Legend: Cons=conservative; Lib=liberal; moderate omitted for ease of presentation; moderate equal to 100% minus the sum of each pair of numbers in a single year.

Source: National Surveys of Religion and Politics, Bliss Institute of Applied Politics 1992 (n=4001); 1996 (n=4034); 2000 (n=6000); 2004 (n=4000)

Table 30. Defining the Religious Landscape: Measures of Religion

ENTIRE SAMPLE	Worship Attendance:			View of God:			View of Tradition:		
	<i>Regular</i>	<i>Often</i>	<i>Rarely</i>	<i>Personal</i>	<i>Impersonal</i>	<i>Unsure</i>	<i>Preserve</i>	<i>Adapt</i>	<i>Adopt</i>
	43%	32	25	40%	41	19	45%	40	15
Evangelical Protestant									
Traditionalist Evangelical	87%	11	2	89%	11	0	78%	18	2
Centrist Evangelical	36%	41	23	60%	37	3	48%	43	9
Modernist Evangelical	23%	46	31	12%	56	32	30%	42	28
Mainline Protestant									
Traditionalist Mainline	59%	33	8	75%	24	1	61%	35	4
Centrist Mainline	33%	45	22	28%	55	17	33%	53	14
Modernist Mainline	19%	46	35	4%	58	38	3%	62	35
Latino Protestants	63%	31	6	57%	33	10	57%	29	14
Black Protestants	57%	33	10	54%	44	2	43%	38	19
Catholic									
Traditionalist Catholic	87%	11	2	56%	44	0	65%	32	3
Centrist Catholic	45%	36	20	34%	59	7	29%	55	16
Modernist Catholic	21%	49	30	4%	56	40	3%	66	31
Latino Catholic	47%	41	12	35%	55	10	44%	31	25
Other Christian	57%	28	15	43%	43	14	63%	28	9
Other Faiths	40%	35	25	12%	62	26	37%	43	20
Jewish	24%	49	27	10%	45	45	37%	46	17
Unaffiliated									
Unaffiliated Believers	9%	33	58	15%	70	15	NA	NA	NA
Secular	1%	20	79	2%	28	70	NA	NA	NA
Atheist, Agnostic	1%	16	83	0%	5	95	NA	NA	NA

Legend: Worship attendance: “regular”: weekly or more; “often”: 1-2 a month; few times a year; “rarely”: seldom or never; View of God: “Personal”: God is a person; “Impersonal”: God is a spirit or force; “Unsure”: not sure or doesn’t believe in God; View of Tradition: “Preserve”: strive to preserve beliefs/practices; “Adapt”: strive to adapt beliefs/practices to new times; “Adopt”: strive to adopt new beliefs/practices; NA: Not asked.



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