



Times Mirror  
Center for  
The People &  
The Press

***N E W S Release***

1875 Eye Street, N.W., Suite 1110  
Washington, D.C. 20006  
202 293-3126

FOR RELEASE: WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 27, 1993 A.M.

## **The Russians Rethink Democracy**

### **The Pulse of Europe II**

***FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:***

Andrew Kohut, Director  
Robert C. Toth, Project Director  
Carol Bowman, Research Director  
Times Mirror Center for The People & The Press  
202/293-3126

# THE RUSSIANS RETHINK DEMOCRACY

As their standard of living goes from bad to worse and uncertainty about the future increases, the Russian people have soured on democracy.

By a margin of 51% to 31% Russians say they now favor a strong leader, rather than a democratic form of government to solve their country's problems. Only 17 months ago, as the Soviet Union was collapsing, a comparable *Times Mirror Center* poll found just the opposite division of opinion - 39% of Russians favored a strong hand at the helm and 51% wanted a democratic solution to their nation's daunting problems.

The slide toward authoritarianism, in a nuclear-armed nation that remains potentially the most dangerous to the United States, is manifested in a number of ways in the survey and in a series of focus groups conducted throughout European Russia in November. The polling found a growing disillusionment with the Russian parliament, declining interest in politics and no signs that the people feel increased political empowerment in post Soviet Russia.

*"We need a strong power," said Herman, 58, an elected Moscow politician, in a discussion of the issue, "like Andropov (one-time KGB chief and briefly the Soviet leader a decade ago), a person with a good character, strict... I think that blood will probably be shed. There may be no other alternative. There must be some radical change (in government), but people will not go to the polls for new elections. We held elections in the Dmitrovsky district and only 30% of the voters came. People no longer believe in anything."*

*"Either someone with a huge stick comes in the near future to drive us back again to our stalls, or we will have ten to twenty years of confusion," said Maxim, 21, an unemployed St. Petersburg youth.*

Democracy also eroded in Ukraine and Lithuania, but not nearly so severely as in Russia, according to independently conducted opinion polls in each of the three former Soviet Republics. Majorities in both of these smaller nations still prefer democracy (50% in Ukraine, 67% in Lithuania) to a strong leader, but by smaller margins than in 1991.

The surveys in all three countries detected increasing uncertainty about the future, fueled by sustained disillusionment with current conditions and sagging optimism about the future. In Russia fewer than one in twenty rate their life situation positively and only one in three expect a somewhat better life within the next five years. Support for a return to authoritarianism was sharply higher among Russian citizens who expressed discontent with current conditions and had little expectation that their lives would get better over the next five years.

The poll also found increased hostility in Russia toward a free market economy, another condition that would favor emergence of a strong leader there. Lithuanians have also soured somewhat on the pace of economic reform but much less so than Russians. Ukrainians, in contrast, want to move faster toward free markets.

The fresh look at Russia, Ukraine and Lithuania was conducted late last year as a follow-on companion to the comprehensive *"Pulse of Europe"* survey by Times Mirror in May, 1991, which covered West and East/Central Europe as well as the former Soviet republics. In

the interim, the Russians have lived through an aborted coup, and all three peoples have been undergoing economic chaos, political turmoil, and national rebirth as independent countries.

The new survey comes as the Russians prepare for an April referendum that will decide their new Constitution and Ukrainians prepare to vote on a new Basic Law this spring. Lithuanians, for their part, begin a novel experiment of being ruled by their former communist (albeit nationalistically inclined) bosses, this time freely elected.

### **DEMOCRACY ERODES**

The current poll finds a precipitous fall in support for the parliament. In the spring of 1991, 45% of Times Mirror's sampling said they thought the Russian Parliament was having a good influence on "the way things were going in the country". A mere 17% subscribe to that view now. Over this same period the percentage of people expressing strong disinterest in politics rose from 19% to 37%. Perhaps as significantly, the recent survey recorded no meaningful increase in the percentage of people thinking that voting gives them a say in how their government runs things (52% currently, compared to 47%, May '91).

***"Democracy surely has been discredited here," said Sergei, 55, a Russian parliamentarian in Moscow who belongs to the moderate "Free Russia" party. "Whether dictatorship or democracy, it all depends on how fast we can rehabilitate democracy."***

***"The word 'democracy' has almost become a curse word," said Boris, 42, an independent member of the St. Petersburg city council. "Equated with continued dissolution of society," another politician added.***

***"In five years, there will be no change for the better, at least not if this structure calling itself democracy remains in power. These democrats are pure mafia," said Vera, 40, chairman of the Women's Party. "We surely would all like to live in a democratic society, but we live in an unpredictable country. We may wake up tomorrow and have a totally new government and even a new Motherland." Her 1991 euphoria has totally collapsed. Then she told a Times Mirror group: "We are having a wonderful time now... It is the spirit of freedom we have at last breathed in that makes it wonderful, being born as though anew. We are living through a most splendid moment."***

Looking back, most Russians and Ukrainians (52% for both) still disapprove of the "political and economic changes" begun several years ago, and by virtually the same proportions as in 1991.

***"There have been changes all right, but toward tyranny!" exclaimed Tatyana, 55, a Moscow pensioner.***

Most Lithuanians, in contrast, still approve the changes, which brought them long-sought independence, but at a significantly lower level (64% now, compared to 73% in 1991).

Hostility to free markets has increased among some Russians. Those who feel free markets are developing too fast, plus those who disapprove outright of this reform, total 37%,

up from 30% in 1991. Of particular concern is the radical drop in support for economic reform among Russian youth under 25 years of age: in 1991, 60% said the pace too slow, but only 37% now hold that view.

Ukrainians want faster movement to democracy and particularly toward free markets. Those fearing democracy was moving too quickly have more than halved (from 15% to 6%). Those fearing free markets were coming too fast were halved (from 25% to 12%), while those who complain the development is too slow increased significantly (from 39% to 48%). Ukraine lags Russia in economic reform, however, and greater disaffection with both democracy and free markets may appear in the future if the speedier movement toward free markets, as promised by the new prime minister, Leonid Kuchma, brings greater hardship.

Democracy remains the overwhelming preference of Lithuanians, but its supporters have dwindled somewhat, from 79% in 1991 to 67% now. At the same time, sentiment for a strong leader has increased, from 15% to 26%. Lithuanians, always more immune to Communist ideology than their Slavic neighbors, judge the pace of democratic and free market development essentially the same as they did in 1991.

### ***YELTSIN RUNS AHEAD OF DEMOCRACY***

President Boris Yeltsin enjoys more support than democracy in Russia. His favorability rating, while down from the heady post-coup period, is essentially unchanged (at 54%) from May, 1991. Among respondents who support democracy, most favor Yeltsin (70%). However, authoritarian forces in Russia apparently do not see in Yeltsin the strong hand they would prefer. Yeltsin's favorability rating is only 45% among those who want an autocratic solution to Russia's problems.

Russians who favor a return to a strong leader have no one particularly in mind and sometimes qualify their autocratic sentiments with expressions, on the one hand, of opposition to overt dictatorship and, on the other, a vague hope that a strong leader might emerge democratically.

***Across the spectrum of views, typical was that of Naum, a 62-year-old Moscow geologist: "I'm against the kind of strong-arm rule we had under Stalin, against exterminating people, but a certain power should undoubtedly exist that would curb the utter lawlessness we are witnessing now."***

The erosion of democracy occurred broadly across the Russian population, but mostly among men and among individuals with higher education. These groups had been most supportive of multi-party pluralism in 1991, and despite their growing disillusionment, they remain the greatest supporters now. Support for an authoritarian figure, however, was substantially greater among women and rural Russians. Women favor a strong leader over democracy by two to one. Rural Russians favor a strong leader almost three to one.

(SEE TABLE ON PAGE 16)

Other democratic and social institutions lost ground in all three new nations, including the courts and police as well as parliament. The church also lost support in the three states, even though professed belief in God rose steeply. Perhaps for political reasons, the view that the church was having a good influence fell by 15 percentage points in Ukraine, 10 percentage points in Lithuania and 5 percentage points in Russia.

### **UNCERTAINTY RISES**

A significant theme in the survey results is the increased uncertainty and apathy that permeates the former Soviet republics, striking even for the legendary passiveness of Russians.

*"I don't think about tomorrow, I am living my life day by day," said Marina, 26, a St. Petersburg engineer. "What's going to happen tomorrow? Maybe a civil war will start."*

*"I feel great dissatisfaction, concern and anxiety because I think that the changes which have taken place in this country have made our life much worse," said Sergei, 55, a former college professor who is now a member of the Russian parliament and Moscow city council. "My personal feeling of the entire situation is close to a nightmare. I surely try to counterbalance it all somehow, try to find a way out of the situation, restore my mental equilibrium, but it is very hard."*

The pervasive uncertainty was most evident in the increases in "no opinion" responses in the survey, particularly in Russia and Ukraine, compared to 1991. "No opinion" replies on whether a strong leader or democratic government was preferred almost doubled in the two Slavic states. They increased sharply in all three states on the pace of democratization.

The most remarkable sign of self-doubt came when asked whether their new societies should be one of two forms of capitalism or one of two forms of socialism: "no opinion" jumped two and a half times in Russia and Ukraine (to 36% and 38%, respectively) since 1991.

Such trends are consistent with societies in convulsion, when old systems collapse but no consensus on new governing structures has yet emerged. Although understandable and even predictable on that abstract level, however, the finding -- that more than one-third of the Russian and Ukrainian populations have no firm view on the shape of their new society -- indicates a potentially ominous vacuum in those countries at a time when democratic sentiment is in retreat and authoritarian sentiment on the rise.

Both capitalism and socialism (communism) have lost favor in Russia and Ukraine since 1991. Those who favor a society based on old-style communism, together with those wanting to live under a more democratic form of communism, have dropped from 46% to 32% in Russia, 37% to 28% in Ukraine. Those favoring modified capitalism as in Scandinavia, together with those wanting an American-style free market, dropped from 40% to 32% in Russia, and 49% to 34% in Ukraine. Lithuanians, in comparison, remain firmly, at 63%, for capitalism.

Polarization may be setting in among Russians and Ukrainians on this key issue of the kind of future society they want, with the population deserting the middle ground. In Russia, support for old-style communism remained at 10%, and those favoring American-style capitalism stayed essentially the same at 19%. But the two intermediate variants lost ground; support for

reformed communism fell from 36% to 22%, and support for welfare-oriented, Scandinavian-style capitalism fell from 23% to 13%. A similar pattern was found in Ukraine. Those who fell away from the moderate center in both nations swelled the "no opinion" rolls, from 14% in 1991 to 36% in Russia and from 14% to 38% in Ukraine.

In general, those favoring a democratic government were much more supportive of a capitalist than a socialist society in the future (48% to 28%), while those who want to rely on a strong leader to solve the country's problems were roughly split between capitalism and socialism (30% to 35%, respectively).

Within each country, distinct groups favoring socialism are apparent:

- In Russia, Pamyat supporters favoring communism outnumber those favoring capitalism 43% to 30%. But those supporting industrialist politician Volski are evenly split (39% vs. 40%) on a future society. Only 29% of Yeltsin's supporters are pro-socialist.

- In Ukraine, RUKH supporters are much more pro-capitalist than pro-socialist (50% vs. 22%), and more pro-capitalist than supporters of President Leonid Kravchuk, himself a former communist leader. Eastern Ukrainians, where ethnic Russians are concentrated, are more pro-socialist than western Ukrainians, who are overwhelmingly ethnic Ukrainians; the margin is 28% to 18%. Easterners are closely split between pro-socialists and pro-capitalists (28% vs. 30%), much as is Russia itself (32% vs. 32%).

- In Lithuania, supporters of the Democratic Labor Party -- essentially the reconstructed communists -- were significantly more pro-socialist than those supporting Sajudis (24% vs. 11%). But a strong majority (59%) of Labor backers nonetheless opted for capitalism, perhaps a reflection of the success of former communists in privatized businesses.

### ***CAPITALIST INROADS***

Despite the uncertainty and overall regrets about change, the surveys did show that capitalism had made some inroads in *all* three nations. This was seen particularly in the increased approval for "people who own businesses." Almost twice as many Russians now say businessmen and women have a (very and mostly) good influence (15% to 29%), and those saying business people have a bad influence were almost halved (from 57% to 33%). In broader terms, roughly equal portions of the Russian population are now for and against entrepreneurs, compared to 1991 when three times more people were opposed. In Ukraine the shift toward capitalism was also favorable.

***An enthusiastic if unlikely champion of free enterprise is Tatyana, 40, a Moscow housewife who had been a janitor until two months ago when, she said, "I became engaged in commerce, intermediary activities (such as organizing concerts). In ten days I earned more than my husband in a month... I have become active in political life... This year I realized that I will survive, I will find my place in life." When an older man complained he had no opportunity to find a better job, Tatyana told him not to leave his work but to "Buy cabbage, salt it, then sell it. But don't just sit there with your hands folded!"***

***Volodya, 36, an ordinary worker, expressed his new awareness of Soviet economic conditions: "I have just realized that one has to work, and that is all there is to it. Work hard and everything is going to be alright."***

Another sign of the attitudinal change found by the survey was the approval of foreign investors. In Russia, twice as many now say such investors have a good rather than bad influence. In Ukraine, the ratio is three to one. In Lithuania, more than four to one.

Increased acceptance of capitalists was evident across the board in Russia, but the shift is particularly stronger now among women, younger people (under 40), and those living in rural areas and villages. Pro-business sentiment on Russian farms has more than tripled.

(SEE TABLE ON PAGE 15)

While capitalism thus appears to have made deep inroads, the Communist legacy is holding firm in Russia on some important issues such as the ultimate socialist shibboleth, owning property and selling it at the price asked by the owner. Support for private land ownership and sale has fallen marginally in Russia, from 64% to 57%, and particularly among farmers and villagers, from 60% to 48%. In contrast, more than two-thirds of Ukrainians, and 95% of Lithuanians, support private ownership and sale.

#### ***MORE PESSIMISM, MORE RELIGIOUS FAITH***

Russians are just as depressed and anxious about their personal lives now as they were in May, 1991, while Ukrainians and Lithuanians are more disillusioned and fearful than before. The biggest single drop in self-assessment occurred in Lithuania. But looking ahead five years, the greatest decline in optimism was found in Russia and was particularly sharp compared to the immediate post-coup period in September, 1991. The feeling that life is beyond their control increased among Russians and Ukrainians. Fewer of them now believe that people succeed because of their ability and ambition; more feel it is "at other people's expense."

***"One doesn't know what is going to happen to us," complained Tatyana, 55, a Moscow economist. "It appears we are all just floating downstream," mused a St. Petersburg sociologist; "I feel helpless."***

But as if seeking greater solace, belief in God rose steeply in all three countries. In Russia, those saying they never doubt God's existence rose from 46% to 64%; in Ukraine, from 53% to 74%; and in Lithuania, from 57% to 72%. No single category of individuals -- whether gender, age, income, education, or region -- failed to register this greater profession of belief, with women and poor people saying most often that they never doubted His existence. In Russia the margins completely agreeing are almost two to one among the poor (45% vs. 25% wealthy) and women (49% vs. 25% men).

***Some saw this rise as partially a fad: "Before, most people said they were atheists, and now they say they are believers; it's a kind of fashion nowadays," said Valeri, 53, a leader of the Democratic Revival party in Ukraine. But several focus group members explained plaintively that they "need to believe in something."***

## **ETHNIC GULFS WIDEN**

Greater love for one's neighbor did not attend the increased belief in God if the neighbor belongs to another ethnic group or race, however. Quite the reverse. Compared to 1991, three times more Russians and Ukrainians, and almost six times more Lithuanians, now say they have little in common with other ethnic groups and races. Roughly one-third in each society (30% Russia, 35% Ukraine, 34% Lithuania) express this broad exclusivity now.

Among Russians, dislike for their former Soviet comrades in the Caucuses and the Asian republics remains high. Roughly half say they have (mostly or very) unfavorable opinions of Georgians (47%), Armenians (46%), and Azerbaijanis (50%), and more than one-third (35%) still have unfavorable views of Central Asians who are usually different racially. These "southern" peoples are often referred to as "market people" because they are usually engaged in trade.

***"One sometimes feels that absolutely all Chechens (a restive Caucasian people) and all Azerbaijanis are scum," admitted a Moscow legislator sadly. "We have been brought up with that attitude, even though we know it's wrong."***

***In Kiev, Nikolai, 61, one of the founders of the Ukrainian nationalist movement, RUKH, acknowledged "a certain dislike, economically and socially justified, toward the Caucasus ethnicities" because of their commercial activities. "There may also be some anti-semitism for which the Jewish people themselves must be to blame," he added.***

The unfavorability rating of Jews in Ukraine in fact dropped somewhat, from 22% to 13%, and remains essentially unchanged at 22% in Russia. (In comparison, 6% of Americans express such anti-semitic sentiments.) But a significant shift in attitudes toward Jews appeared in Lithuania, where the favorability level fell from 81% to 70% and unfavorable ratings rose from 10% to 16%. This may be partially a reaction to Jewish-led Western criticism of the broad pardoning by the independent Vilnius government of Lithuanians who had been branded "war criminals" by the Soviets, some because of anti-Soviet activity but some also because of collaboration with Germany in World War II, and partially the greater intolerance reported generally in the country following the vicious election campaign. But the anti-semitism has deeper roots in Lithuania, as a focus group discussion showed.

***"You can't say Jews are loved very much," began Juozas, a 45-year-old Vilnius worker, who had been an active Sajudis supporter two years ago but voted for the neo-communist Labor Party now. "There were quite a lot of Jews in the KGB, and they worked the system to get a lot of privileges."***

***"Almost all communists in our town were Jews," added Valerija, 70, a hospital worker.***

***"But now they deny all that," said Grazina, a 37-year-old economist.***

***All participants chorused denial when asked whether Lithuanians were anti-semitic.***



***"But if there is any ill disposition against them," Juozas then added, "this is connected with their wealth, ability to grow rich, to dodge."***

***"They are dodgy people," said Dalia, a 25-year-old hairdresser.***

***"They are able, thus they achieve more," protested Zita, 47, an economist.***

***"But one feels a kind of envy," Grazina said.***

***"At my work place, a Jew came as assistant manager and soon all superintendents and the general accountant were changed into Jews," said Danute, 61, an artist.***

***"Who was first to buy TV sets in our apartment house?" asked Juozas rhetorically. "They were Jews. We could not afford it but they could. They walked perfectly dressed and we were all shabby. That's why there was envy and anger."***

***But a Jewish shop manager who went to Israel is still remembered as "the best manager we ever had," said Grazina, "so it depends on each individual and his qualities."***

## **NATIONALISM**

Small signs of increasing nationalism appeared in Russia. Significantly more Russians now (36%, vs. 22% in 1991) say parts of neighboring countries really belong to them, for example. The Yeltsin government is under pressure to reclaim territories that had been historically Russian, especially the Crimea which was ceded to Ukraine only 30 years ago by Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev. Yeltsin is also urged to give aid to Serbians, who are Orthodox Slavs like Russians, by extreme Russian nationalists who see Serbian "ethnic cleansing" in Yugoslavia as a model for Russia to use in dealing with its minorities.

***"Problem number one is at home, rather than abroad," said a St. Petersburg engineer -- "putting down the conflict (civil war) in Tadjikistan, preventing the Afghan mudjahadeen from interfering there." He fears a de facto division of Russia into European and Asian sections as small nation-states along the Volga River declare independence.***

Russians are not anxious to intervene beyond their own borders, however. A bare plurality (46%) support the sending of Russian troops to protect any of the 25 million fellow Russians living in former Soviet republics; 40% are opposed.

***"Not for infringement of civil rights if no violence occurs," said Igor, a St. Petersburg politician, in supporting dispatch to help embattled countrymen, "only if human rights are violated."***

Neither Russians nor Ukrainians blame foreigners for their political and economic troubles today. Majorities in all three states blame their current leaders first, then their previous communist rulers, with Western institutions a very distant third.

## **UKRAINE**

In Ukraine, fewer overtly nationalistic signs were found by the survey. Fewer Ukrainians agreed (completely and mostly) that parts of neighboring countries really belonged to them now (18%, vs. 24% in 1991). But some rise in patriotic sentiment occurred, especially in western and central Ukraine, where nationalists are determined to create greater "national consciousness" by emphasizing their new-found distinctiveness from Russians and recalling historic injustices allegedly done them by "the Moscow colonizers."

*As a result, "inter-ethnic relations are beginning to deteriorate," said Valeri, 53, a Kiev economist. The squabbling has become a "confrontation," as he called it, between Eastern and Western Ukraine over nationalists' refusal to allow Russian to become the official second language of the country "even though 51% of the adult population of Ukraine prefer to speak Russian."*

East-West differences go beyond the socialist sentiment and language preference. The heavily Russianized eastern portion is much more pro-authoritarian than the west, 45% to 11%, and much less inclined to democracy (38% to 60%). Easterners were also less approving of the political and economic changes of recent years, more disillusioned with the Ukrainian parliament, less religious, less patriotic, and less inclined to say parts of neighboring territories belong to Ukraine. Not surprisingly, 99% of easterners have favorable views of Russians, compared to 84% of those in the western Ukraine.

## **LITHUANIA**

Non-Slavic Lithuania has become more like Russia and Ukraine over the past two years as harsh economic realities dominate. Most dramatically, Lithuanians recently rejected the splintered Sajudis movement which led them to independence and their current hardship. But the country remains less like its Slavic neighbors, more like Central Europeans, in outlook as well as culture.

Much more than Russians and Ukrainians, Lithuanians agree now that voting empowers them, giving them a say in government (87% now, 74% in 1991). Most feel human and civil rights are more respected now than before those changes, the opposite of their Slavic neighbors. Their view of the future five years ahead is more gloomy than it was in 1991, but among Lithuanians are many more optimists, and many fewer pessimists, than among Russians and Ukrainians.

The non-Lithuanian minority (under 20% of the total population) of Poles and Russians were as supportive of democracy as ethnic Lithuanians, but in other respects, the minorities have distinctly different voices. While 70% of Lithuanians rate the political and economic changes as positive, for example, only 41% of the non-Lithuanians do. Non-Lithuanians preferred socialism much more (25% vs. 14%), as well as the Democratic Labor (ex-communist) Party (61% vs. 37%).

Disaffection with failed economic policies of the badly splintered Sajudis, rather than minority support for the Labor Party, is widely accepted as the main reason for the recent change of Lithuania's government. Nonetheless, the fact that Lithuanians freely returned to power their

former, despised communist rulers -- because of their greater managerial experience and the better relations promised with Moscow's ex-communists -- may have a braking effect on the pace of economic and democratic change in East-Central Europe.

## **GAPS**

Major gender, generational, and rural-urban differences in attitudes were quite apparent in the survey results:

Women are more conservative than men, and less supportive of capitalism and democracy, although not more in favor of a strong leader. They are more suspicious of foreign investors, more in favor of press censorship, less optimistic about the future. They say "no opinion" more often than men on key issues such as the rate of democratic development (38% of Russian women vs. 27% men; 35% of Ukrainian women vs. 21% men; and 24% Lithuanian women vs. 17% men); and on the form of a future society (42% Russian women vs. 29% men; in Ukraine, 44% women vs. 32% men; in Lithuania, 26% women, 14% men). In all three countries, women said "no opinion" less than men on only two issues: the church and belief in God, and on both, women were more positive toward church and God.

*Said Ludmilla, a middle-aged Ukrainian engineer, when asked why fewer women were members of Parliament now compared to communist times: "It's natural. A woman has completely different problems -- children, husband, home, work. I cannot imagine what kind of woman can have time left over for politics... I always respected Margaret Thatcher but she was brought up and educated in a totally different environment."*

Unexpectedly, however, more Russian women than men (21% vs. 15%) feel they have made personal progress over the past five years. And Russian women were less apt than men to blame failure on outside forces. Fully 60% of Russian men but only 42% of women said successful people made progress at the expense of others.

Most youth in all societies strongly favor capitalism over socialism, with American-style capitalism preferred over Scandinavian-style capitalism except in Lithuania. Older Russians and Ukrainians (but not Lithuanians) favored one of two variants of communism. Ukrainian youth (under 25) are more optimistic than their seniors and also more optimistic than their Russian peers. They are less dubious about democracy than Russian youth and complain more than in 1991 that democratization is moving too slowly. Three in five Ukrainian youth want faster movement toward free markets, compared to 37% of Russians the same age.

*Teenagers are having severe problems adapting to the new world, according to Marina, a 26-year-old St. Petersburg woman with a younger sister. "I look at her and her friends and I think they are like us but more dumbfounded than we when we finished school... They were brought up by one system, but then, as they were turning 18, they were thrown into a totally different system. We adults can't help them because we have no experience living in this new system."*

In these three societies, finally, rural people are more conservative and express fewer opinions than their urban relatives, and are more suspicious of change than the usually wealthier, more educated city folk. This is particularly true in Russia. Support for a democratic form of government is only about half as great on farms and in villages (19%) compared to the Moscow region (Oblast: 35%) and only half as great as in those rural areas in 1991 (43%). Rural folk prefer a strong leader more than do residents in the Moscow region and the national average; and fully 25% of rural people have no opinion, compared to 16% in Moscow region, on the issue.

(SEE TABLE ON PAGE 16)

*"Ordinary people in the village where I spent this summer do not believe in anything," said Andrei, a post-graduate student in St. Petersburg. "They think they have been deceived and continue to be deceived. For them, nothing has changed."*

*Ludmilla, 54, a Moscow engineer, recounted a trip to the countryside to pick potatoes, beet roots and cabbage which "were not to be harvested anyway; the crops were abandoned in the field, killed by frost. But the belligerence of villagers ... was unbelievable, particularly one woman. There was absolutely nothing human in the eyes."*

Some positive signs appeared on the farm, nonetheless, such as a more tolerant attitude toward entrepreneurs. Approval (those saying mostly and very good influence) of people who own private businesses tripled in rural areas from a mere 7% in 1991 to 23% now (although still less than the 33% favorable rating in Moscow and environs), while disapproval dropped from 73% to 39%, which is even lower than for the Moscow region (43%). Support for the church, surprisingly, has dropped sharply in rural regions, from 75% to 59%, which is slightly lower than in the Moscow region (63%) and nationally (62%).

### **PRESS STANDING UP AND DOWN**

The favorable attitude toward radio and television rose substantially in Russia and Ukraine, with majorities in both states (53% and 51%, respectively) now saying the press has a (very or mostly) good influence. But paradoxically, there was substantially more sentiment both for and against greater censorship. Essentially half of the population of both nations oppose greater limits and controls on the media, while one-third want more constraints.

Favorable attitudes toward the media came from traditional sources. In Russia, it was found more among the reform-minded, i.e., supporters of former Acting Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar and President Yeltsin than among backers of conservative industrialist-politician Andrei Volski or Pamyat, the nationalist, anti-Semitic organization. Pro-censorship sentiment was highest among Pamyat supporters. In Ukraine, the press found its greatest support among younger persons, the better educated, the financially better off, city dwellers, and nationalist RUKH backers. But here, RUKH supporters expressed the most anti-censorship sentiment.

The Lithuanian picture was different. Approval of Lithuanian radio and television fell substantially, from 82% to 70%, probably reflecting the nasty election campaign just ended in

which the media was attacked for biased coverage. Greatest criticism (17% said very or mostly bad influence) came from supporters of the Democratic Labor Party, dominated by the former communists. Nonetheless, there was no significant change in attitude toward censorship. In fact, most opposition to greater constraints on the press came from Democratic Labor Party supporters (62%).

# MOVEMENT TOWARD FREE MARKET

(Q.205 - Russia)

	<i>Too Quickly Or Disapprove Of</i>		<i>Too Slowly</i>	
	<u>1991</u>	<u>1992</u>	<u>1991</u>	<u>1992</u>
<b>Total</b>	29	37	48	31
<b>Sex</b>				
Male	28	33	55	37
Female	31	41	43	27
<b>Age</b>				
<25	21	28	60	37
25-39	30	33	53	35
40-49	31	43	49	35
50-59	32	43	45	32
60-69	30	45	42	16
70+	39	42	23	21
<b>Education</b>				
High	24	36	59	40
Medium	30	35	46	36
Low	36	42	38	24
<b>Income<sup>1</sup></b>				
10141+ Rubles	30	30	50	41
<10141 Rubles	29	42	48	28
<b>Region</b>				
Moscow Oblast	26	38	48	34
St. Petersburg Oblast	41	39	44	31
Small/Mid-size City	36	37	45	33
Rural Area/Village	32	42	40	24
<b>Political Opinion (Favor)</b>				
Boris Yeltsin	24	26	57	41
Yegor Gaidar	N/A	25	N/A	49
Arkadi Volski	N/A	32	N/A	47

---

<sup>1</sup>In the 1991 survey, Income was divided between 701+ Rubles (High) and <701 Rubles (low).

# FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF OUR SOCIETY

(Q.215 - Russia)

	<i><b>Socialism</b></i>		<i><b>Capitalism</b></i>		<i><b>No Opinion</b></i>	
	<i><b>1991</b></i>	<i><b>1992</b></i>	<i><b>1991</b></i>	<i><b>1992</b></i>	<i><b>1991</b></i>	<i><b>1992</b></i>
<b>Total</b>	46	32	40	32	13	36
<b>Sex</b>						
Male	40	32	47	32	13	29
Female	51	39	35	26	14	42
<b>Age</b>						
< 25	29	22	58	51	13	28
25-39	36	26	47	39	17	35
40-49	42	34	48	38	11	29
50-59	54	42	33	17	13	41
60-69	70	33	21	13	9	54
70+	75	57	11	7	15	36
<b>Education</b>						
High	39	32	48	41	14	27
Medium	44	32	46	34	11	34
Low	56	34	29	22	15	44
<b>Income<sup>2</sup></b>						
10141+ Rubles	38	30	50	46	12	24
< 10141 Rubles	49	35	37	24	14	42
<b>Region</b>						
Moscow Oblast	41	49	48	35	11	16
St. Petersburg Oblast	53	26	41	22	7	52
Small/Mid-size City	46	30	40	35	14	35
Rural Area/Village	55	31	31	22	15	47
<b>Political Opinion (Favor)</b>						
Boris Yeltsin	36	29	54	38	10	33
Yegor Gaidar	N/A	30	N/A	44	N/A	26
Arkadi Volski	N/A	39	N/A	40	N/A	21

---

<sup>2</sup>In the 1991 survey, Income was divided between 701+ Rubles (High) and < 701 Rubles (low).

# INFLUENCE OF PEOPLE WHO OWN BUSINESSES

(Q.219b - Russia)

	<i>Very Good and Mostly Good Influence</i>		<i>1992 N</i>
	<i>1991<sup>3</sup></i>	<i>1992</i>	
<b>Total</b>	15	29	(1000)
<b>Sex</b>			
Male	20	31	(466)
Female	10	27	(534)
<b>Age</b>			
< 25	20	46	(216)
25-39	20	38	(288)
40-49	11	26	(143)
50-59	11	17	(157)
60-69	9	10	(151)
70+	9	13	(45)
<b>Education</b>			
High	18	32	(282)
Medium	14	35	(203)
Low	11	22	(410)
<b>Income<sup>4</sup></b>			
10141+ Rubles	18	37	(317)
<10141 Rubles	14	25	(618)
<b>Region</b>			
Moscow Oblast	16	33	(202)
St. Petersburg Oblast	19	25	(83)
Small/Mid-size City	14	28	(475)
Rural Area/Village	7	23	(247)
<b>Political Opinion (Favor)</b>			
Boris Yeltsin	19	35	(540)
Yegor Gaidar	N/A	46	(254)
Arkadi Volski	N/A	37	(239)

---

<sup>3</sup>In 1991, this survey question was phrased "people who own cooperatives" vs. "people who own enterprises" in 1992.

<sup>4</sup>In the 1991 survey, Income was divided between 701+ Rubles (High) and < 701 Rubles (low).



# HOW TO SOLVE COUNTRY'S PROBLEMS

(Q.227 - Russia)

	<i>Democratic Form Of Government</i>			<i>Strong Leader</i>		
	<u>1991</u>	<u>1992</u>	<u>Diff.</u>	<u>1991</u>	<u>1992</u>	<u>Diff.</u>
<b>Total</b>	51	31	-20	39	51	+12
<b>Sex</b>						
Male	58	37	-21	35	51	+16
Female	46	26	-20	42	52	+10
<b>Age</b>						
<25	59	40	-19	35	45	+10
25-39	56	34	-22	35	53	+18
40-49	62	28	-34	29	62	+33
50-59	41	24	-17	47	59	+12
60-69	40	23	-17	48	50	+2
70+	40	26	-14	44	28	-16
<b>Education</b>						
High	59	38	-21	33	53	+20
Medium	53	36	-17	38	48	+10
Low	42	23	-19	46	54	+8
<b>Income<sup>5</sup></b>						
10141+ Rubles	59	41	-18	32	48	+16
<10141 Rubles	49	27	-22	41	54	+13
<b>Region</b>						
Moscow Oblast	52	35	-17	38	49	+11
St. Petersburg Oblast	51	34	-17	40	51	+11
Small/Mid-size City	49	30	-19	39	54	+15
Rural Area/Village	43	19	-24	45	56	+11
<b>Political Opinion (Favor)</b>						
Boris Yeltsin	60	40	-20	33	42	+9
Yegor Gaidar	N/A	47		N/A	46	
Arkadi Volski	N/A	40		N/A	52	

---

<sup>5</sup>In the 1991 survey, Income was divided between 701+ Rubles (High) and <701 Rubles (low).

# BLAME FOR COUNTRY'S ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

(Q.313 - Russia)

	<u>Commu- nists</u>	<i>1st Choice Only</i> <u>Current Leaders</u>	<u>Western Institutions</u>
<b>Total</b>	32	46	1
<b>Sex</b>			
Male	36	46	1
Female	28	45	2
<b>Age</b>			
<25	40	39	1
25-39	34	46	1
40-49	34	53	0
50-59	27	48	2
60-69	24	46	3
70+	20	42	3
<b>Education</b>			
High	35	46	1
Medium	33	51	*
Low	29	44	2
<b>Income<sup>6</sup></b>			
10141+ Rubles	36	46	1
<10141 Rubles	29	46	2
<b>Region</b>			
Moscow Oblast	34	49	0
St. Petersburg Oblast	41	35	2
Small/Mid-size City	35	46	1
Rural Area/Village	20	49	2
<b>Political Opinion (Favor)</b>			
Boris Yeltsin	43	35	1
Yegor Gaidar	49	33	1
Arkadi Volski	47	40	1

---

<sup>6</sup>In the 1991 survey, Income was divided between 701+ Rubles (High) and <701 Rubles (low).

## DEFENSE OF RUSSIANS IN OTHER REPUBLICS BY RUSSIAN TROOPS

(Q.315 - Russia)

	<u>Favor</u>	<u>Oppose</u>
<b>Total</b>	46	40
<b>Sex</b>		
Male	54	34
Female	40	45
<b>Age</b>		
<25	55	30
25-39	47	40
40-49	49	43
50-59	40	45
60-69	41	42
70+	40	46
<b>Education</b>		
High	53	33
Medium	43	39
Low	43	45
<b>Income<sup>7</sup></b>		
10141+ Rubles	52	38
<10141 Rubles	43	42
<b>Region</b>		
Moscow Oblast	61	29
St. Petersburg Oblast	37	41
Small/Mid-size City	49	38
Rural Area/Village	36	50
<b>Political Opinion (Favor)</b>		
Boris Yeltsin	47	40
Yegor Gaidar	49	40
Arkadi Volski	46	44

---

<sup>7</sup>In the 1991 survey, Income was divided between 701+ Rubles (High) and <701 Rubles (low).

# LOSING INTEREST IN POLITICS

(Q.400d - Russia)

	<i>Completely Agree</i>	
	<u>1991</u>	<u>1992</u>
<b>Total</b>	19	37
<b>Sex</b>		
Male	15	33
Female	23	40
<b>Age</b>		
< 25	20	32
25-39	19	42
40-49	15	32
50-59	23	35
60-69	23	34
70+	15	42
<b>Education</b>		
High	18	34
Medium	23	34
Low	19	40
<b>Income<sup>8</sup></b>		
10141+ Rubles	18	32
<10141 Rubles	20	39
<b>Region</b>		
Moscow Oblast	16	36
St. Petersburg Oblast	28	48
Small/Mid-size City	16	34
Rural Area/Village	14	33
<b>Political Opinion (Favor)</b>		
Boris Yeltsin	16	36
Yegor Gaidar	N/A	30
Arkadi Volski	N/A	31

---

<sup>8</sup>In the 1991 survey, Income was divided between 701+ Rubles (High) and <701 Rubles (low).

# PARTS OF NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES REALLY BELONG TO US

(Q.400f - Russia)

## *Completely And Mostly Agree*

1991   1992

<b>Total</b>	22	36
<b>Sex</b>		
Male	23	40
Female	21	33
<b>Age</b>		
< 25	18	41
25-39	21	36
40-49	23	43
50-59	23	35
60-69	23	35
70+	29	23
<b>Education</b>		
High	20	40
Medium	18	37
Low	26	34
<b>Income<sup>9</sup></b>		
10141+ Rubles	22	39
< 10141 Rubles	22	36
<b>Region</b>		
Moscow Oblast	20	44
St. Petersburg Oblast	27	32
Small/Mid-size City	20	39
Rural Area/Village	27	33
<b>Political Opinion (Favor)</b>		
Boris Yeltsin	21	35
Yegor Gaidar	N/A	43
Arkadi Volski	N/A	41

---

<sup>9</sup>In the 1991 survey, Income was divided between 701+ Rubles (High) and < 701 Rubles (low).

# NEVER DOUBT THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

(Q.402a - Russia)

	<i>Completely Agree</i>	
	<u>1991</u>	<u>1992</u>
<b>Total</b>	22	38
<b>Sex</b>		
Male	16	25
Female	26	49
<b>Age</b>		
< 25	17	32
25-39	14	35
40-49	16	35
50-59	21	34
60-69	39	45
70+	42	67
<b>Education</b>		
High	17	25
Medium	18	34
Low	29	47
<b>Income<sup>10</sup></b>		
10141+ Rubles	14	25
<10141 Rubles	24	45
<b>Region</b>		
Moscow Oblast	19	33
St. Petersburg Oblast	26	41
Small/Mid-size City	13	34
Rural Area/Village	31	48
<b>Political Opinion (Favor)</b>		
Boris Yeltsin	19	41
Yegor Gaidar	N/A	36
Arkadi Volski	N/A	31

---

<sup>10</sup>In the 1991 survey, Income was divided between 701+ Rubles (High) and <701 Rubles (low).

# NOT MUCH IN COMMON WITH PEOPLE OF OTHER ETHNIC GROUPS

(Q.402b - Russia)

## *Completely And Mostly Agree*

	<i>1991</i>	<i>1992</i>
<b>Total</b>	11	30
<b>Sex</b>		
Male	12	31
Female	10	30
<b>Age</b>		
< 25	12	28
25-39	9	29
40-49	14	34
50-59	13	31
60-69	13	28
70+	6	34
<b>Education</b>		
High	8	30
Medium	12	29
Low	14	33
<b>Income<sup>11</sup></b>		
10141+ Rubles	11	34
< 10141 Rubles	11	29
<b>Region</b>		
Moscow Oblast	10	33
St. Petersburg Oblast	13	15
Small/Mid-size City	15	36
Rural Area/Village	9	22
<b>Political Opinion (Favor)</b>		
Boris Yeltsin	12	29
Yegor Gaidar	N/A	27
Arkadi Volski	N/A	24

---

<sup>11</sup>In the 1991 survey, Income was divided between 701+ Rubles (High) and <701 Rubles (low).

## **SURVEY METHODOLOGY**



Face-to-face personal interviews with representative samples of the adult public were conducted simultaneously in three former Soviet republics, Russia, Ukraine and Lithuania. The Russian and Ukrainian surveys were conducted by the Moscow-based opinion polling firm, ROMIR, LTD. The Lithuanian survey was conducted by the Sociological Laboratory of Vilnius University. Eight focus groups were also conducted in November 1992 as part of this study; 4 in Russia, 2 in Ukraine and 2 in Lithuania.

The Russian survey was designed to be representative of the adult population in the European part of Russia which embraces the territory from the Baltic to the Urals. The survey of 1000 Russians conducted November 1-15, 1992 is projectable to the 112 million adults, aged 15 and older living in this part of the Russian Republic.

The Russian sample was drawn to be representative of the eight administrative and economic regions of the European part of Russia. The number of respondents in each region was based on the proportions of its population in the population of the European part of the Russian Republic in general. A total of 106 primary sampling units were drawn from a sampling frame that was stratified by region and city size.

Training of field managers and interviewers was organized in Moscow (interviewers for Moscow city and Moscow region, field managers for Central-Black Earth region and Calmikiya); and in St. Petersburg (for field managers for North-Western region and North region).

The Russian and Ukrainian surveys were conducted under the direction of Dr. Elena Bashkirova, managing director of ROMIR Ltd.

The Ukrainian survey is based on 1400 personal interviews conducted November 1-15, 1992 with a representative sample of persons aged 15 & older. The Ukrainian sampling was carried out in 160 primary sampling units that were drawn from a sampling frame that was stratified by region and city size.

The Lithuanian sampling is based on a republic wide personal interview survey that embraced the adult population, aged 16 years and older, in all five ethnic regions of Lithuania.

The field interviewing was carried out in 100 primary sampling units by trained interviewers from the Sociological Laboratory of Vilnius University. Interviews were conducted in Lithuanian and Russian languages. Households were drawn on a "random route basis". One interview was conducted per household and age/sex quotas were used to select respondents within the household.

The sample of primary sampling units were drawn at random based on the latest Lithuanian Census data for sex, age, nationality, and urban-rural structure. A total of 1000 interviews were conducted, during the period Nov 1-11, 1992. The Lithuanian survey was conducted under the direction of Dr. Rasa Alishauskene.

***Earlier Polls***

The benchmark surveys were conducted in the Spring of 1991 by the same research organizations in each of the three former Soviet republics. The initial polling included over 100 questions and took 45 minutes to an hour to administer - 1136 interviews were conducted in Russia, 586 in the Ukraine and 506 in Lithuania. The current report also references a September 1991 poll of 1035 telephone interviews in Moscow and Leningrad that was conducted as a follow up subsequent to the demise of the August 1991 coup.

The margin of error attributable to sampling error for each of the three surveys is plus or minus three percentage points.

# **THE QUESTIONNAIRE**

**TIMES MIRROR CENTER FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS  
PULSE OF EUROPE II  
Russia, Ukraine & Lithuania  
November 1992**

Q.108 (HAND RESPONDENT CARD) Here is a ladder representing the "ladder of life." Let's suppose the top of the ladder represents the best possible life for you; and the bottom, the worst possible life for you. On which step of the ladder do you feel you personally stand at the present time?

	<u>RUSSIA</u>			<u>UKRAINE</u>		<u>LITHUANIA</u>	
	<u>May 1991</u>	<u>Sept. 1991<sup>12</sup></u>	<u>Nov. 1992</u>	<u>May 1991</u>	<u>Nov. 1992</u>	<u>May 1991</u>	<u>Nov. 1992</u>
High (8-10)	2	3	4	3	2	5	3
Average (5-7)	32	31	31	28	28	52	35
Low (0-4)	64	62	61	67	70	43	61
No Opinion	<u>2</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>*</u>	<u>*</u>	<u>1</u>
	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>
Mean Rating	3.7	3.5	3.7	3.7	3.5	4.6	4.0

Q.109 On which step would you say you stood five years ago?

	<u>RUSSIA</u>			<u>UKRAINE</u>		<u>LITHUANIA</u>	
	<u>May 1991</u>	<u>Sept. 1991</u>	<u>Nov. 1992</u>	<u>May 1991</u>	<u>Nov. 1992</u>	<u>May 1991</u>	<u>Nov. 1992</u>
High (8-10)	12	14	15	12	9	13	10
Average (5-7)	42	45	41	52	46	42	49
Low (0-4)	43	36	38	32	44	43	38
No Opinion	<u>3</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>
	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>
Mean Rating	4.8	4.9	5.0	5.2	4.8	4.9	5.0
Feel Personal Progress	21		18	16	19	38	26
Feel Personal Decline	57		53	64	61	43	56
Neither	<u>22</u>		<u>29</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>18</u>
	<u>100</u>		<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>

<sup>12</sup>Results based on interviews with 1035 respondents in Moscow and St. Petersburg from Sept. 1-3, 1991.

Q.110 Just as your best guess, on which step do you think you will stand in the future, say about five years from now?

	<u>RUSSIA</u>			<u>UKRAINE</u>		<u>LITHUANIA</u>	
	<u>May 1991</u>	<u>Sept. 1991</u>	<u>Nov. 1992</u>	<u>May 1991</u>	<u>Nov. 1992</u>	<u>May 1991</u>	<u>Nov. 1992</u>
High (8-10)	10	15	11	12	8	24	16
Average (5-7)	30	21	25	32	31	32	33
Low (0-4)	40	23	37	40	54	23	30
No Opinion	<u>20</u>	<u>41</u>	<u>27</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>21</u>	<u>21</u>
	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>
Mean Rating	4.3	5.1	4.2	4.6	4.0	5.9	5.3
Optimist	40		32	45	41	51	51
Pessimist	24		19	25	25	15	12
Neither	<u>36</u>		<u>49</u>	<u>30</u>	<u>34</u>	<u>34</u>	<u>37</u>
	<u>100</u>		<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>

Q.200 Overall, do you strongly approve, approve, disapprove or strongly disapprove of the political and economic changes that have taken place in our country over the past few years?

	<u>RUSSIA</u>		<u>UKRAINE</u>		<u>LITHUANIA</u>	
	<u>May 1991</u>	<u>Nov. 1992</u>	<u>May 1991</u>	<u>Nov. 1992</u>	<u>May 1991</u>	<u>Nov. 1992</u>
<u>Total Approve</u>	30	31	35	33	73	64
Strongly Approve	2	2	2	4	14	9
Approve	28	29	33	29	59	55
<u>Total Disapprove</u>	56	52	57	52	19	27
Disapprove	41	34	46	37	15	23
Strongly Disapprove	14	18	11	15	4	4
Don't Know	<u>14</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>9</u>
	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>

Q.203a Do you feel that democracy is developing too quickly, too slowly or at about the right pace?

	<u>RUSSIA</u>		<u>UKRAINE</u>		<u>LITHUANIA</u>	
	<u>May 1991</u>	<u>Nov. 1992</u>	<u>May 1991</u>	<u>Nov. 1992</u>	<u>May 1991</u>	<u>Nov. 1992</u>
Too quickly	21	14	15	6	17	10
Too slowly	40	31	44	45	32	29
About right	13	10	13	14	37	39
Disapprove of democracy (VOL)	5	12	5	7	1	1
No Opinion	<u>21</u> 100	<u>33</u> 100	<u>23</u> 100	<u>28</u> 100	<u>13</u> 100	<u>21</u> 100

Q.205 Do you think we are moving too quickly, too slowly or at the right pace to a free market?

	<u>RUSSIA</u>		<u>UKRAINE</u>		<u>LITHUANIA</u>	
	<u>May 1991</u>	<u>Nov. 1992</u>	<u>May 1991</u>	<u>Nov. 1992</u>	<u>May 1991</u>	<u>Nov. 1992</u>
Too quickly	20	24	25	12	20	26
Too slowly	48	32	39	48	37	33
About right	5	8	6	7	21	21
Disapprove of move to free market economy (VOL)	10	13	10	10	4	*
No Opinion	<u>17</u> 100	<u>23</u> 100	<u>20</u> 100	<u>23</u> 100	<u>18</u> 100	<u>20</u> 100

Q.215 There are many views about how our society should develop in the future. (HAND RESPONDENT CARD) Please tell me which of these views comes closest to your point of view?

	<u>RUSSIA</u>			<u>UKRAINE</u>		<u>LITHUANIA</u>	
	<u>May 1991</u>	<u>Sept. 1991</u>	<u>Nov. 1992</u>	<u>May 1991</u>	<u>Nov. 1992</u>	<u>May 1991</u>	<u>Nov. 1992</u>
<u>Our Society in the Future</u>							
A socialist society along the lines we have had in the past	10	6	10	10	8	3	2
A more democratic type of socialism	36	24	22	27	20	9	14
A modified form of capitalism such as found in Scandinavia <sup>13</sup>	23	30	13	26	15	38	39
A free market form of capitalism such as found in the US or Germany	17	20	19	23	19	29	24
No Opinion	<u>14</u> 100	<u>20</u> 100	<u>36</u> 100	<u>14</u> 100	<u>38</u> 100	<u>21</u> 100	<u>21</u> 100

Q. 218 Do you favor or oppose the right of the individual to own and sell property at the price he or she sets?

	<u>RUSSIA</u>		<u>UKRAINE</u>		<u>LITHUANIA</u>	
	<u>May 1991</u>	<u>Nov. 1992</u>	<u>May 1991</u>	<u>Nov. 1992</u>	<u>May 1991</u>	<u>Nov. 1992</u>
Favor	64	57	69	68	93	95
Oppose	28	27	20	23	5	3
Don't Know	<u>8</u> 100	<u>16</u> 100	<u>11</u> 100	<u>9</u> 100	<u>2</u> 100	<u>2</u> 100

<sup>13</sup>In May 1991, this response choice was worded slightly different, i.e., "A modified form of capitalism such as found in Sweden."

Q.219 (HAND RESPONDENT CARD) I'd like your opinion of some groups, organizations and institutions in Russia. For each that I read tell me which category on this card best reflects your opinion about the kind of influence the group is having on the way things are going in this country?

	RUSSIA		UKRAINE		LITHUANIA	
	May 1991	Nov. 1992	May 1991	Nov. 1992	May 1991	Nov. 1992
a. Radio & TV						
Very Good Influence	7	4	2	15	23	7
Mostly Good Influence	33	49	39	36	59	63
Mostly Bad Influence	16	7	15	5	6	10
Very Bad Influence	5	4	3	3	1	1
Neither Good or Bad (VOL)	7	10	10	11	1	9
Both Good and Bad (VOL)	29	18	28	18	5	3
No Opinion	<u>3</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>7</u>
	100	100	100	100	100	100
b. People who own businesses						
Very Good Influence	1	4	1	8	2	5
Mostly Good Influence	14	25	19	21	18	40
Mostly Bad Influence	26	16	35	11	40	22
Very Bad Influence	31	17	19	15	18	5
Neither Good or Bad (VOL)	7	8	5	10	7	8
Both Good and Bad (VOL)	13	12	12	10	6	3
No Opinion	<u>8</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>25</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>17</u>
	100	100	100	100	100	100



Q.219 con't....

	RUSSIA		UKRAINE		LITHUANIA	
	May 1991	Nov. 1992	May 1991	Nov. 1992	May 1991	Nov. 1992
c. The Parliament						
Very Good Influence	6	1	3	5	17	1
Mostly Good Influence	39	16	42	18	47	34
Mostly Bad Influence	13	20	20	17	14	40
Very Bad Influence	5	14	4	12	6	9
Neither Good or Bad (VOL)	9	14	7	15	1	2
Both Good and Bad (VOL)	13	11	13	12	10	4
No Opinion	15	24	11	21	5	10
	100	100	100	100	100	100
d. The church						
Very Good Influence	21	20	25	32	31	22
Mostly Good Influence	47	43	52	30	52	51
Mostly Bad Influence	3	2	4	2	4	10
Very Bad Influence	1	2	2	2	1	2
Neither Good or Bad (VOL)	11	11	4	10	4	6
Both Good and Bad (VOL)	5	6	5	6	1	2
No Opinion	12	16	8	18	7	7
	100	100	100	100	100	100
e. The police						
Very Good Influence	4	3	3	7	11	2
Mostly Good Influence	31	28	34	21	54	39
Mostly Bad Influence	19	13	22	11	11	25
Very Bad Influence	7	9	4	10	1	7
Neither Good or Bad (VOL)	12	19	8	19	6	10
Both Good and Bad (VOL)	15	12	18	11	3	2
No Opinion	12	16	11	21	14	15
	100	100	100	100	100	100

Q.219 con't....

	RUSSIA		UKRAINE		LITHUANIA	
	May 1991	Nov. 1992	May 1991	Nov. 1992	May 1991	Nov. 1992
f. The Judicial system						
Very Good Influence	3	2	1	6	6	1
Mostly Good Influence	24	21	27	18	55	32
Mostly Bad Influence	17	10	20	9	10	26
Very Bad Influence	7	8	5	9	1	9
Neither Good or Bad (VOL)	11	14	9	16	6	8
Both Good and Bad (VOL)	11	11	11	10	3	2
No Opinion	27	34	27	32	19	22
	100	100	100	100	100	100
g. Foreign investors						
Very Good Influence	*	9	*	13	*	9
Mostly Good Influence	*	27	*	21	*	41
Mostly Bad Influence	*	6	*	4	*	9
Very Bad Influence	*	8	*	6	*	2
Neither Good or Bad (VOL)	*	5	*	6	*	8
Both Good and Bad (VOL)	*	10	*	9	*	1
No Opinion	*	35	*	41	*	30
	100	100	100	100	100	100

Q.221 I'd like you to rate some different groups of people in Russia (Lithuania)<sup>14</sup> according to how you feel about them. For each group, please tell me whether your opinion is very favorable, mostly favorable, mostly unfavorable or very unfavorable?

	RUSSIA		LITHUANIA	
	May 1991	Nov. 1992	May 1991	Nov. 1992
<b>Russians</b>				
Very favorable	37	45	8	8
Mostly favorable	55	51	67	63
Mostly unfavorable	2	2	18	21
Very unfavorable	*	*	3	3
Don't know	<u>6</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>
	100	100	100	100
<b>People who live in Asian Republics</b>				
Very favorable	6	10	*	*
Mostly favorable	43	43	*	*
Mostly unfavorable	29	24	*	*
Very unfavorable	8	11	*	*
Don't Know	<u>14</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>*</u>	<u>*</u>
	100	100	*	*
<b>Georgians</b>				
Very favorable	6	9	*	*
Mostly favorable	39	35	*	*
Mostly unfavorable	32	29	*	*
Very unfavorable	14	18	*	*
Don't know	<u>9</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>*</u>	<u>*</u>
	100	100	1	*
<b>Jews</b>				
Very favorable	9	11	9	8
Mostly favorable	49	54	72	62
Mostly unfavorable	18	15	9	14
Very unfavorable	8	7	1	2
Don't know	<u>16</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>14</u>
	100	100	100	100

---

<sup>14</sup>The results for Ukraine are not listed as the question was not comparably administered there.

Q.221 con't...

	<u>RUSSIA</u>		<u>LITHUANIA</u>	
	<u>May</u> <u>1991</u>	<u>Nov.</u> <u>1992</u>	<u>May</u> <u>1991</u>	<u>Nov.</u> <u>1992</u>
<b>Lithuanians<sup>15</sup></b>				
Very favorable	9	9	27	25
Mostly favorable	52	48	68	69
Mostly unfavorable	18	17	3	4
Very unfavorable	9	10	0	1
Don't know	<u>12</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>
	100	100	100	100
<b>Armenians</b>				
Very favorable	6	8	*	*
Mostly favorable	37	36	*	*
Mostly unfavorable	33	27	*	*
Very unfavorable	13	19	*	*
Don't know	<u>11</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>*</u>	<u>*</u>
	100	100	*	*
<b>Azerbaijanis</b>				
Very favorable	6	8	*	*
Mostly favorable	35	32	*	*
Mostly unfavorable	34	29	*	*
Very unfavorable	13	21	*	*
Don't know	<u>12</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>*</u>	<u>*</u>
	100	100	*	*
<b>Ukrainians</b>				
Very favorable	19	15	8	8
Mostly favorable	65	67	70	64
Mostly unfavorable	6	7	6	9
Very unfavorable	1	3	1	1
Don't know	<u>9</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>18</u>
	100	100	100	100
<b>Moldovans</b>				
Very favorable	*	12	*	*
Mostly favorable	*	55	*	*
Mostly unfavorable	*	13	*	*
Very unfavorable	*	4	*	*
Don't know	<u>*</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>*</u>	<u>*</u>
	*	100	*	*

---

<sup>15</sup>In the November 1992 Russian survey, this response choice was "Baltic Peoples" to include Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians.

Q.221 con't...

	<u>RUSSIA</u>		<u>LITHUANIA</u>	
	<u>May</u> <u>1991</u>	<u>Nov.</u> <u>1992</u>	<u>May</u> <u>1991</u>	<u>Nov.</u> <u>1992</u>
Poles				
Very favorable	*	*	7	7
Mostly favorable	*	*	54	52
Mostly unfavorable	*	*	26	26
Very unfavorable	*	*	4	6
Don't know	*	*	<u>9</u>	<u>9</u>
	*	*	100	100
Belorussians				
Very favorable	*	*	9	8
Mostly favorable	*	*	62	63
Mostly unfavorable	*	*	13	11
Very unfavorable	*	*	1	1
Don't know	*	*	<u>15</u>	<u>17</u>
	*	*	100	100

Q.227      Some feel that we should rely on a Democratic form of government to solve our country's problems. Others feel that we should rely on a leader with a strong hand to solve our country's problems. Which comes closer to your opinion?

	<u>RUSSIA</u>			<u>UKRAINE</u>		<u>LITHUANIA</u>	
	<u>May</u> <u>1991</u>	<u>Sept.</u> <u>1991</u>	<u>Nov.</u> <u>1992</u>	<u>May</u> <u>1991</u>	<u>Nov.</u> <u>1992</u>	<u>May</u> <u>1991</u>	<u>Nov.</u> <u>1992</u>
Democratic form of government	51	53	31	57	50	79	67
Strong leader	39	35	51	30	29	15	26
No opinion	<u>10</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>13</u>	<u>21</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>7</u>
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Q.229 Some say that people who get ahead these days do so mainly at the expense of other people, others say that people who get ahead these days do so because they have more ability and ambition than other people - which comes closer to your point of view?

	<u>RUSSIA</u>		<u>UKRAINE</u>		<u>LITHUANIA</u>	
	<u>May 1991</u>	<u>Nov. 1992</u>	<u>May 1991</u>	<u>Nov. 1992</u>	<u>May 1991</u>	<u>Nov. 1992</u>
At other people's expense	46	50	44	51	39	42
Ability and ambition	38	31	37	29	50	50
No opinion	<u>16</u> 100	<u>19</u> 100	<u>19</u> 100	<u>20</u> 100	<u>11</u> 100	<u>8</u> 100

Q.301 Some people feel that in a democracy all political parties should be allowed even those that don't believe in the democratic system. Others feel that even in a democracy certain political parties should be outlawed. Generally, which position comes closer to your own view?

	<u>RUSSIA</u>			<u>UKRAINE</u>		<u>LITHUANIA</u>	
	<u>May 1991</u>	<u>Sept. 1991</u>	<u>Nov. 1992</u>	<u>May 1991</u>	<u>Nov. 1992</u>	<u>May 1991</u>	<u>Nov. 1992</u>
Allow all	32	46	34	40	35	51	41
Outlaw some	54	38	44	47	44	40	45
Can't say	<u>14</u> 100	<u>16</u> 100	<u>22</u> 100	<u>13</u> 100	<u>21</u> 100	<u>9</u> 100	<u>14</u> 100

Q.302 Would you approve or disapprove of placing greater constraints and controls on what newspapers print and tv and radio broadcast<sup>16</sup>?

	<u>RUSSIA</u>		<u>UKRAINE</u>		<u>LITHUANIA</u>	
	<u>May 1991</u>	<u>Nov. 1992</u>	<u>May 1991</u>	<u>Nov. 1992</u>	<u>May 1991</u>	<u>Nov. 1992</u>
Approve	24	34	19	31	27	25
Disapprove	66	49	70	51	66	61
Don't know	<u>10</u> 100	<u>17</u> 100	<u>11</u> 100	<u>18</u> 100	<u>7</u> 100	<u>14</u> 100

<sup>16</sup>This question was asked in May 1991 only with respect to what newspapers print and did not include "and tv and radio broadcast."

Q.313 Whom do you most blame for the economic conditions in your country today? Whom do you blame next?

	<u>RUSSIA</u>	<u>UKRAINE</u>	<u>LITHUANIA</u>
a. Communists			
Total	53	49	41
First Choice	31	36	24
Second Choice	22	13	17
b. Our nations leaders of today			
Total	73	67	71
First Choice	46	38	58
Second Choice	27	29	13
c. Western institutions			
Total	9	9	6
First Choice	1	2	*
Second Choice	8	7	6
d. Other <sup>17</sup>			
Total			44
First Choice	5	6	8
Second Choice	5	7	36
e. Don't know			
First Choice	17	19	10
Second Choice	33	37	26

Q.314 Are human and civil rights being respected much more, somewhat more, somewhat less, or much less now than before the 1989 revolution?

	<u>RUSSIA</u>	<u>UKRAINE</u>	<u>LITHUANIA</u>
Much more than before	4	4	10
Somewhat more than before	18	28	46
Somewhat less than before	17	17	19
Much less than before	21	20	4
No Opinion	<u>40</u>	<u>31</u>	<u>21</u>
	100	100	100

---

<sup>17</sup>In the Lithuanian survey, this choice was "Moscow" not "Other".

**ASK IN RUSSIA ONLY:**

Q.315 Should Russia send troops to other republics if necessary to protect Russians there?

- 46 Yes, should send troops
  - 40 No, should not send troops
  - 14 Don't know/No opinion
- 100



**Q.400 (HAND RESPONDENT CARD)** Now I am going to read you a series of statements that will help us understand how you feel about a number of things. For each statement, please tell me whether you completely agree with it, mostly agree with it, mostly disagree with it or completely disagree with it. The first one is ...

	<u>RUSSIA</u>		<u>UKRAINE</u>		<u>LITHUANIA</u>	
	May 1991	Nov. 1992	May 1991	Nov. 1992	May 1991	Nov. 1992
a. Voting gives people like me some say about how the government runs things						
Completely agree	13	22	13	21	35	49
Mostly agree	34	30	34	35	39	38
Mostly disagree	21	17	35	15	13	5
Completely disagree	22	14	12	13	7	2
Don't know	<u>10</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>6</u>
	100	100	100	100	100	100
b. Hard work offer little guarantee of success						
Completely agree	26	21	18	38	14	12
Mostly agree	36	30	43	26	17	33
Mostly disagree	24	26	29	17	30	33
Completely disagree	10	12	6	11	37	18
Don't know	<u>4</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>4</u>
	100	100	100	100	100	100
c. It is the responsibility of the state to take care of very poor people who can't take care of themselves						
Completely agree	70	65	69	77	68	75
Mostly agree	23	25	27	16	28	23
Mostly disagree	4	4	2	2	4	1
Completely disagree	1	1	1	2	*	1
Don't know	<u>2</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>*</u>	<u>*</u>
	100	100	100	100	100	100

Q.400 con't....

	RUSSIA		UKRAINE		LITHUANIA	
	May 1991	Nov. 1992	May 1991	Nov. 1992	May 1991	Nov. 1992
d. I am losing interest in politics						
Completely agree	19	37	13	40	16	23
Mostly agree	34	27	32	26	36	41
Mostly disagree	27	19	37	16	26	20
Completely disagree	14	7	12	9	20	11
Don't know	<u>6</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>5</u>
	100	100	100	100	100	100
e. I am very patriotic						
Completely agree	21	23	22	41	24	14
Mostly agree	39	34	40	27	39	37
Mostly disagree	20	19	20	12	22	27
Completely disagree	6	7	7	6	7	11
Don't know	<u>14</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>14</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>11</u>
	100	100	100	100	100	100
f. There are parts of neighboring countries that really belong to us						
Completely agree	10	19	8	7	24	12
Mostly agree	12	18	16	11	22	23
Mostly disagree	22	15	21	12	15	17
Completely disagree	26	11	23	31	19	24
Don't know	<u>30</u>	<u>37</u>	<u>32</u>	<u>39</u>	<u>20</u>	<u>24</u>
	100	100	100	100	100	100

**IN RUSSIA ASK:**

Q.401a (HAND RESPONDENT CARD) Now I'd like your opinion about some people and other things using this card. As I read from a list tell me which category best describes your overall opinion of the person, place or thing that I mention. First, how would describe your opinion of ...

	<u>Very Favorable</u>	<u>Mostly Favorable</u>	<u>Mostly Unfavorable</u>	<u>Very Unfavorable</u>	<u>Never Heard Of</u>	<u>DK</u>
a. Boris Yeltsin						
May 1991	12	43	28	10	*	7=100
September 1991	49	36	6	4	*	5=100
November 1992	8	46	24	14	*	8=100
b. Tsar Nicholas II						
May 1991	6	26	21	6	1	40=100
November 1992	6	31	11	6	3	43=100
c. Pamyat						
May 1991	3	10	19	28	14	26=100
November 1992	3	11	19	23	15	29=100
d. Yegor Gaidar						
November 1992	3	20	34	26	1	16=100
e. Alexander Rutskoi						
November 1992	10	44	16	6	4	20=100
f. Ruslan Khasbulatov						
November 1992	1	24	32	22	2	19=100
g. Arkady Vol'sky						
November 1992	2	19	12	6	29	32=100

**IN UKRAINE ASK:**

Q.401b. (HAND RESPONDENT CARD) Now I'd like your opinion about some people and other things using this card. As I read from a list tell me which category best describes your overall opinion of the person, place or thing that I mention. First, how would describe your opinion of ...

	<u>Very Favorable</u>	<u>Mostly Favorable</u>	<u>Mostly Unfavorable</u>	<u>Very Unfavorable</u>	<u>Never Heard Of</u>	<u>DK</u>
a. Boris Yeltsin						
May 1991	6	47	28	7	0	12=100
November 1992	4	34	32	15	*	15=100
b. Tsar Nicholas II						
May 1991	3	25	16	5	2	49=100
November 1992	7	25	10	5	5	48=100
c. Leonid Kravchuk						
November 1992	10	50	24	9	*	7=100
d. Leonid Kuchma						
November 1992	6	23	7	2	19	43=100
e. Vladislav Tchernovil						
November 1992	6	23	31	22	2	16=100
f. Ivan Pljutch						
November 1992	6	35	21	7	7	24=100
g. Rukh						
November 1992	5	22	26	28	*	19=100

**IN LITHUANIA ASK:**

Q.401c ((HAND RESPONDENT CARD) Now I'd like your opinion about some people and other things using this card. As I read from a list tell me which category best describes your overall opinion of the person, place or thing that I mention. First, how would describe your opinion of ...

	<u>Very Favorable</u>	<u>Mostly Favorable</u>	<u>Mostly Unfavorable</u>	<u>Very Unfavorable</u>	<u>Never Heard Of</u>	<u>DK</u>
a. Boris Yeltsin						
May 1991	12	66	11	4	0	7=100
November 1992	3	55	28	5	*	9=100
b. Vytautas Landesbergis						
May 1991	19	47	22	7	0	5=100
November 1992	12	35	37	11	*	5=100
c. Sajudis						
May 1991	9	51	21	8	1	10=100
November 1992	9	30	40	14	*	7=100
d. Aleksadras Abisala						
November 1992	8	54	20	5	1	12=100
e. LDLP (Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party)						
November 1992	6	36	29	18	*	11=100

Q.402

(HAND RESPONDENT CARD) Here are some statements on different topics. Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with each of these statements.

	<u>RUSSIA</u>		<u>UKRAINE</u>		<u>LITHUANIA</u>	
	<u>May</u> <u>1991</u>	<u>Nov.</u> <u>1992</u>	<u>May</u> <u>1991</u>	<u>Nov.</u> <u>1992</u>	<u>May</u> <u>1991</u>	<u>Nov.</u> <u>1992</u>
a. I never doubt the existence of God						
Completely Agree	21	39	28	49	28	44
Mostly Agree	25	25	25	25	29	28
Mostly Disagree	19	13	18	9	20	17
Completely Disagree	27	13	20	9	16	6
Don't Know	<u>8</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>5</u>
	100	100	100	100	100	100
b. I don't have much in common with people of other ethnic groups and races						
Completely Agree	4	17	3	26	3	14
Mostly Agree	7	13	7	9	3	20
Mostly Disagree	25	19	32	16	18	27
Completely Disagree	57	32	49	30	75	32
Don't Know	<u>7</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>7</u>
	100	100	100	100	100	100