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## Compared to '92, '96, '00

SWING VOTE SMALLER THAN USUAL, BUT STILL SIZABLE

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## Compared to '92, '96, '00

SWING VOTE SMALLER THAN USUAL, BUT STILL SIZABLE
There are considerably fewer swing voters now than at this point in the previous three presidential campaigns. But the swing vote, while smaller in relative terms, is still substantial and certainly large enough for a presidential candidate to win a big victory. Pew's most recent survey, conducted June 3-13, finds $21 \%$ of registered voters either undecided or, having expressed a preference, saying there is a chance they might change their mind.

That is about the same percentage that was still weighing its options at the end of the last presidential campaign. At this point four years ago, fully $32 \%$ of voters were not yet committed. In July 1996, the last election in which an incumbent president stood for reelection, $27 \%$ were open to
 persuasion; in May 1992, the comparable number was 31\%.

Within the swing group, $8 \%$ lean to Bush, $7 \%$ to Kerry, and $6 \%$ refused to lean to either candidate. The number of voters not yet solidly aligned behind Bush or Kerry has declined since February, when $29 \%$ were still not certain. In the current survey, committed voters are evenly divided between George Bush and John Kerry ( $40 \%$ Bush, 39\% Kerry).

An analysis by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press finds that swing voters come from almost all demographic categories. But they are distinguished from committed voters by their political moderation and by the fact that they have favorable opinions of both Bush and Kerry. A solid majority of swing voters (56\%) have a favorable view of Bush, while a comparable number ( $53 \%$ ) has a positive opinion

| Number of Swing Voters Dropping |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  | June |
| Registered voters |  | \% | \% |  |
| Certain Bush |  | 34 | 36 |  |
| Certain Kerry |  | 40 | 42 | 39 |
| Swing voters |  | 26 | 22 | 21 |
| Favor Bush |  | 11 | 9 |  |
| Favor Kerry | 10 | 9 | 8 |  |
| Pure undecided |  |  |  |  |
| February figures based on 1,898 registered voters in two surveys conducted 2/11-16 and 2/24-29. March figures based on 2,474 registered voters in two surveys conducted $3 / 17-21$ and $3 / 22-28$. May figures from $5 / 3-9(\mathrm{~N}=1,465)$. June figures from 6/3-13 ( $\mathrm{N}=1,426$ ). |  |  |  |  | of Kerry. Roughly a third (34\%) hold a positive view of both candidates, compared with only $7 \%$ of committed voters.

It is too early in the campaign to be able to identify likely voters with great precision. But the swing group makes up a somewhat smaller percentage of likely voters (17\%) than it does of the overall electorate ( $21 \%$ ). At this stage in the 2000 campaign, swing voters constituted roughly a quarter of likely voters (26\%).

The presidential candidates are increasingly targeting uncommitted voters living in so-called battleground states - those

| Swing Voters Not Negative |  |
| :--- | :---: |
| about the Candidates |  |
|  | $\%$ |
| Favorable to both | 34 |
| Unfavorable to Both | 13 |
| Fav. Bush not Kerry | 22 |
| Fav. Kerry not Bush | 19 |
| Other | $\underline{12}$ |
|  | 100 |
| Swing voters in June, 2004 | $(\mathrm{~N}=288)$ | that have been closely contested in recent elections or where neither candidate appears to have a safe lead this year. ${ }^{1}$ In these states, $22 \%$ of voters are uncommitted, about the same level as nationally. This small group of potentially pivotal voters currently constitutes just $9 \%$ of the overall electorate.

## Who Are the Swing Voters?

The profile of the uncommitted yields few clues about how they might break on Election Day. They are somewhat less engaged in the campaign: Only about one-in-five swing voters (21\%) say they have closely followed news about the campaign. That compares with $38 \%$ of Kerry voters and $32 \%$ of Bush voters. In addition, fewer swing voters say they have given a lot of thought to the campaign - just $40 \%$ have thought a lot about the election, compared with $60 \%$ of Bush voters and $67 \%$ of Kerry voters.

Roughly half of swing voters (47\%) approve of Bush's overall job performance, which is comparable to Bush's rating among certain voters (48\%). Majorities in both groups give Bush positive marks on handling terrorism ( $57 \%$ each). But swing voters are somewhat less likely than other registered voters to approve of Bush's management of the economy and his handling of the war in Iraq.

| Bush and Swing Voters |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Job approval | Swing --Certain Voters-- |  |  |  |
|  | Voters |  | Kerry | Bush |
|  | \% | \% | \% | \% |
| Approve | 47 | 48 | 4 | 92 |
| Disapprove | 34 | 47 | 90 | 4 |
| Don't know | 19 | $\underline{5}$ | $\underline{6}$ | 4 |
|  | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| Handling economy |  |  |  |  |
| Approve | 36 | 45 | 5 | 84 |
| Disapprove | 48 | 51 | 92 | 11 |
| Don't know | $\underline{16}$ | 4 | $\underline{3}$ | $\underline{5}$ |
|  | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| Handling Iraq |  |  |  |  |
| Approve | 34 | 45 | 3 | 87 |
| Disapprove | 48 | 51 | 93 | 10 |
| Don't know | 18 | 4 |  | $\underline{3}$ |
|  | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| Handling terrorism |  |  |  |  |
| Approve | 57 | 57 | 23 | 90 |
| Disapprove | 29 | 36 | 69 | 5 |
| Don't know | 14 | 7 | $\underline{8}$ | $\underline{5}$ |
|  |  |  | 100 | 100 |
| Based on data from June, 2004. |  |  |  |  |

[^0]Uncommitted voters tend to be more moderate in their political outlook than those who have settled on a candidate. In June, $49 \%$ described themselves as moderates, compared with $33 \%$ of committed voters. Similarly, $45 \%$ decline to identify with a party (including $38 \%$ who say they are independent), compared with just $26 \%$ among the committed. In the current survey, the swing vote group includes more Democrats than Republicans ( $36 \%$ vs. $18 \%$ ), but that balance has fluctuated greatly over the past few months, as might be expected with voters who do not have strong political preferences.

Swing voters are not especially different from the overall electorate demographically. More are Catholic and fewer are white evangelicals, but otherwise they are not distinctive.

Moreover, swing voters express almost precisely the same issue priorities as voters who say they have already made up their minds. Among swing voters, $32 \%$ pick the economy as the most important issue for the candidates to discuss; $31 \%$ of those certain of their choice say the same. Similarly, $22 \%$ of swing voters want to hear about Iraq, but so too do $21 \%$ of the

| Swing Voters Have No Standout Issue |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Most important | Swing voters | Certain voters |
| issue for campaign | \% | \% |
| Economy | 32 | 31 |
| Iraq situation/War | 22 | 21 |
| Terrorism/Security | 6 | 8 |
| Health care | 7 | 5 |
| Gas prices/Energy | 7 | 4 |
| Jobs/Unemployment | 3 | 6 |
| Based on data from June, | 2004. |  | committed voters.

## Partisans Locked In

Not surprisingly, ideologicallymotivated partisans are solidly behind their respective candidates - even more so than they were four years ago. Just 6\% of conservative Republicans today are considered swing voters, compared with $14 \%$ at this same time in the 2000 campaign. By comparison, a higher proportion of liberal Democrats are open to persuasion (17\%), but that is down six points since June 2000.

Independents are divided on the

| Independents More Settled Than in 2000 |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Conserv | Mod/Lib | Indep- | Cons/Mod | Liberal |
|  | Reps | Reps | $\underline{\text { endents }}$ | Dems | Dems |
| June 2000 | \% | \% | \% | \% | \% |
| Certain Bush | 83 | 59 | 30 | 10 | 4 |
| Certain Gore | 3 | 11 | 25 | 60 | 73 |
| Swing | $\underline{14}$ | $\underline{30}$ | $\underline{45}$ | 30 | $\underline{23}$ |
|  | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| June 2004 |  |  |  |  |  |
| Certain Bush | 92 | 61 | 35 | 8 | 2 |
| Certain Kerry | 2 | 13 | 37 | 69 | 81 |
| Swing | $\underline{6}$ | $\underline{26}$ | $\underline{28}$ | $\underline{23}$ | $\underline{17}$ |
|  | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| Change in |  |  |  |  |  |
| Swing | -8 | -4 | -17 | -7 | -6 | choice between Bush and Kerry, and significant numbers of independents are still uncommitted. Yet they also are far more decided, as

a group, than in 2000 . Four years ago, nearly half of independents ( $45 \%$ ) were undecided or said they might change their minds; today, fewer than three-in-ten (28\%) say this - a drop of 17 percentage points. Indeed, there are nearly as many swing voters among moderate and liberal Republicans as among independents.

## Battleground States

The battleground states in this year's election, while obviously very competitive, do not have a disproportionately high percentage of swing voters. Just $22 \%$ of voters in battleground states are undecided or still considering the other candidate. This is comparable to the number of swing voters in the firm Democratic (22\%) and Republican states (18\%).

The closely contested presidential race in

| Battleground Divided, Not More Uncertain |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | $\begin{gathered} \begin{array}{c} \text { Rep } \\ \text { states } \\ \% \end{array} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \begin{array}{c} \text { Dem } \\ \text { states } \end{array} \\ & \% \end{aligned}$ | Battleground |
| Certain Bush | 47 | 31 | 42 |
| Certain Kerry | 35 | 47 | 36 |
| Swing Voter | $\underline{18}$ | $\underline{22}$ | $\underline{22}$ |
|  | 100 | 100 | 100 |

Based on registered voters in June, 2004 battleground states ( $42 \%$ say they are certain to support Bush, $36 \%$ Kerry) is reflected in other evaluations as well. Battleground states are equally split with respect to the president's performance $-46 \%$ in those states approve while $44 \%$ disapprove. And this division is similar across most individual states within the battleground as well.

Of the major battleground states, people in Florida and Arizona are the most favorable in their evaluations of the president (49\% approve), while those in Michigan and Ohio are the most critical ( $42 \%$ and $41 \%$ approve, respectively), but no major battleground state is as supportive of the president as are residents of the red states, and none are as critical as residents of the blue states.

Similarly, residents of the major battleground states fall squarely between their counterparts in red and blue America with respect to the war in Iraq. A slim majority (54\%) says the war was the right decision, four percent fewer than in the red states, and five percent more than in the blue states. And again,

| Bush Job Approval in Battleground States |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { App- } \\ & \frac{\text { rove }}{\%} \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered}\text { Dis- } \\ \text { approve }\end{gathered}$ $\%$ | $\frac{\mathrm{DK}}{\%}$ | $\underline{\mathrm{N}}$ |
| Republican States | 51 | 40 | $9=100$ | (2555) |
| Democratic States | 39 | 51 | $10=100$ | (2401) |
| Battleground States | 46 | 44 | $10=100$ | (3440) |
| Florida | 49 | 41 | $10=100$ | (460) |
| Arizona | 49 | 43 | $8=100$ | (149) |
| Missouri | 47 | 44 | $9=100$ | (212) |
| Pennsylvania | 47 | 45 | $8=100$ | (414) |
| Washington | 46 | 43 | $11=100$ | (222) |
| Minnesota | 45 | 44 | $11=100$ | (174) |
| Wisconsin | 42 | 44 | $14=100$ | (198) |
| Michigan | 42 | 47 | $11=100$ | (283) |
| Ohio | 41 | 46 | $13=100$ | (377) |
| Based on combined data from surveys conducted among 8,396 adults from April through June, 2004. |  |  |  |  |

there is little variation across states within the battleground.

## Contested Constituencies

Bush and Kerry are running neck-and-neck in the overall horse race, and many groups are as closely contested as they were in 2000. Notably, independents divide almost evenly ( $47 \%$ Kerry, $45 \%$ Bush), as do high school graduates, middle-income voters, and women age 30-64.

White Catholics also continue to be a contested constituency - they divided almost evenly between Bush and Gore in 2000, and are split between Kerry ( $48 \%$ ) and Bush ( $47 \%$ ) today. But Kerry has closed the gap among the most observant Catholics. Four years ago, Bush won by a wide margin among white Catholics who attend church at least weekly (59\%39\%). Today, these more observant Catholics are divided evenly ( $47 \%$ each), as are their less-committed counterparts.

Hispanic voters lean toward Kerry (53\% vs. $41 \%$ ), but Bush is doing better in this key group than in 2000 when Gore won the Hispanic vote by a wide margin ( $62 \%-35 \%$ ). However, the president has made no inroads among African Americans, who favor Kerry by a $86 \%$ to $6 \%$ margin. Whites overall lean Republican by a $53 \%$ to $42 \%$ margin, virtually identical to the VNS exit poll in 2000.

While the exit poll showed few differences among age groups, both younger and older groups are leaning slightly toward Kerry today. In particular, voters under age 30 currently favor Kerry by a $56 \%$ to $41 \%$ margin. Gore won this group by a slim $48 \%$ to $46 \%$ margin four years ago.

| The Electoral Landscape |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| May-June RVs* |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | $\frac{\text { Kerry }}{\%}$ | $\frac{\mathrm{Oth} / \mathrm{DK}}{\%}$ | $\underline{\mathrm{N}}$ |
| TOTAL | 47 | 48 | $5=100$ | 2891 |
| Gender |  |  |  |  |
| Male | 50 | 46 | $4=100$ | 1371 |
| Female | 44 | 50 | $6=100$ | 1520 |
| Race/Ethnicity |  |  |  |  |
| White | 53 | 42 | $5=100$ | 2398 |
| Black | 6 | 86 | $8=100$ | 287 |
| Hispanic** | 41 | 53 | $6=100$ | 310 |
| Age |  |  |  |  |
| 18-29 | 41 | 56 | $3=100$ | 377 |
| 30-49 | 50 | 44 | $6=100$ | 1118 |
| 50-64 | 50 | 45 | $5=100$ | 800 |
| 65+ | 40 | 53 | $7=100$ | 566 |
| Education |  |  |  |  |
| Less than HS | 33 | 57 | $10=100$ | 166 |
| HS Graduate | 47 | 47 | $6=100$ | 866 |
| Some college | 52 | 44 | $4=100$ | 710 |
| College grad | 50 | 46 | $4=100$ | 700 |
| Post graduate | 42 | 54 | $4=100$ | 435 |
| Income |  |  |  |  |
| <\$20,000 | 34 | 60 | $6=100$ | 325 |
| \$20-\$30,000 | 32 | 63 | $5=100$ | 307 |
| \$30-\$50,000 | 49 | 47 | $4=100$ | 629 |
| \$50-\$75,000 | 56 | 41 | $3=100$ | 494 |
| \$75-\$100,000 | 55 | 40 | $5=100$ | 303 |
| \$100,000 + | 52 | 47 | $1=100$ | 415 |
| Party ID |  |  |  |  |
| Republican | 91 | 8 | $1=100$ | 925 |
| Democrat | 10 | 86 | $4=100$ | 997 |
| Independent | 45 | 47 | $8=100$ | 827 |
| Ideology |  |  |  |  |
| Conservative | 71 | 25 | $4=100$ | 1124 |
| Moderate | 39 | 55 | 6=100 | 1113 |
| Liberal | 15 | 80 | $5=100$ | 555 |
| Race/Religion |  |  |  |  |
| White Protestant | 62 | 34 | $4=100$ | 1324 |
| Attend weekly | 68 | 28 | $4=100$ | 659 |
| Less often | 56 | 39 | $5=100$ | 656 |
| White Catholic | 47 | 48 | $5=100$ | 512 |
| Attend weekly | 47 | 47 | $6=100$ | 264 |
| Less often | 48 | 48 | $4=100$ | 279 |
| Secular | 29 | 67 | $4=100$ | 298 |
| *Based on combined data from surveys conducted among 2,891 registered voters in May and June, 2004. **Because of small sample sizes, the Hispanic figures reported here are based on all surveys conducted from March through June of 2004, instead of May through June. |  |  |  |  |

Bush runs considerably stronger among people age 30-64 than he does among those younger and older, and this is the case among both men and women. There is only a modest gender gap overall at this stage of the election - men are $6 \%$ more supportive of Bush than are women. This gap is greatest among younger voters. Bush runs about even with Kerry among men under age 30 ( $47 \%$ vs. $51 \%$, respectively), while young women are strongly behind Kerry (by a $61 \%$ to $36 \%$ margin). Women between 30 and 64 are divided almost evenly

| Gender Gap Among Younger Voters |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | $\begin{gathered} \begin{array}{c} --M \\ \text { Bush } \end{array} \end{gathered}$ |  | Bush |  | Gender Gap* |
|  | \% | \% | \% |  |  |
| Total | 50 | 46 | 44 | 50 | +6 |
| 18-29 | 47 | 51 | 36 | 61 | +11 |
| 30-49 | 55 | 41 | 46 | 47 | +9 |
| 50-64 | 51 | 45 | 49 | 46 | +2 |
| 65+ | 40 | 54 | 40 | 52 | 0 |
| * Difference in support for Bush. <br> Based on combined data from surveys conducted among <br> 2,891 registered voters in May and June, 2004. |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  | between the candidates. Men and women age 65 and older lean toward Kerry, with virtually no difference between them.

## Religion Gap Narrowing

There are some signs that the linkage between religiosity and politics may have weakened slightly from 2000. While most people who attend church weekly continue to back Bush, and most who seldom or never attend support Kerry, the gap between these two groups has become smaller. In the 2000 exit polls, Bush beat Gore among regular church attenders by 20 points ( $59 \%$ to $39 \%$ ). Today, people who attend at least once a week still favor Bush, but by only a 10-point margin (52\% to $42 \%$ ).

At the other end of the spectrum a similar pattern is evident. In the last election, Gore held a $61 \%$ to $32 \%$ lead among voters who seldom or never attended church. Kerry has a smaller advantage among this group (56\%

## Religiosity Less Linked to Preferences

|  | Nov 2000 <br> Exit Polls |  | $\begin{gathered} \text { May-June } \\ 2004 \end{gathered}$ |  | Change* |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | $\frac{\text { Gore }}{\%}$ | $\frac{\text { Bush }}{\%}$ | $\frac{\text { Kerry }}{\%}$ |  |
| Every week | 59 | 39 | 52 | 42 | -7 |
| Occasionally | 44 | 53 | 45 | 51 | -1 |
| Seldom/Never | 32 | 61 | 38 | 56 | +6 |
| * Difference in su Based on combin registered voters | upport <br> ed data <br> in May | or Bush from sur and Jun | s cond <br> 04. | cted amo | ng 2,891 | to $38 \%$ ).

## SIZE OF THE SWING VOTE* 1992-2004

|  | -----May 1992----- |  |  | ----July 1996---- |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text {-----June 2000--- } \\ & \text { Cert. Cert. } \end{aligned}$ |  |  | ----June 2004--- |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Cert. Cert. <br> Bush Clinton Swing |  |  | Cert. Cert. <br> Dole Clinton Swing |  |  |  |  |  | Cert. Cert. <br> Bush Kerry Swing |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | Bush Gore Swing | '00-'04 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | \% | \% | \% |  |  |  | \% | \% | \% | \% | \% | \% | \% | \% | \% |  |
| Total | 35 | 34 | 31 | 34 | 39 | 27 | 35 | 33 | 32 | 40 | 39 | 21 | -11 |
| Sex |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Male | 36 | 36 | 28 | 38 | 34 | 28 | 40 | 29 | 31 | 41 | 40 | 19 | -12 |
| Female | 34 | 33 | 33 | 32 | 43 | 25 | 30 | 37 | 33 | 39 | 38 | 23 | -10 |
| Race |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| White | 38 | 31 | 31 | 39 | 34 | 27 | 39 | 28 | 33 | 47 | 33 | 20 | -13 |
| Non-white | 14 | 60 | 26 | 6 | 71 | 23 | 13 | 58 | 29 | 10 | 67 | 23 | -6 |
| Black | 8 | 67 | 25 | 2 | 77 | 21 | 4 | 70 | 26 | 4 | 79 | 17 | -9 |
| Hispanic** | 44 | 32 | 24 | 23 | 56 | 21 | 29 | 43 | 28 | 33 | 39 | 28 | 0 |
| Race and Sex |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| White Men | 40 | 33 | 27 | 42 | 30 | 28 | 44 | 25 | 31 | 47 | 35 | 18 | -13 |
| White Women | 37 | 28 | 35 | 37 | 37 | 26 | 34 | 31 | 35 | 46 | 32 | 22 | -13 |
| Age |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Under 30 | 40 | 24 | 36 | 27 | 40 | 33 | 37 | 29 | 34 | 36 | 42 | 22 | -12 |
| 30-49 | 34 | 36 | 30 | 36 | 38 | 26 | 33 | 32 | 35 | 42 | 36 | 22 | -13 |
| 50-64 | 32 | 42 | 26 | 34 | 40 | 26 | 36 | 34 | 30 | 43 | 38 | 19 | -11 |
| 65+ | 35 | 37 | 28 | 38 | 43 | 19 | 35 | 37 | 28 | 36 | 44 | 20 | -8 |
| Sex and Age |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Men under 50 | 38 | 33 | 29 | 37 | 34 | 29 | 39 | 27 | 34 | 42 | 38 | 20 | -14 |
| Women under 50 | 34 | 30 | 36 | 29 | 43 | 28 | 30 | 35 | 35 | 38 | 38 | 24 | -11 |
| Men 50+ | 32 | 42 | 26 | 39 | 35 | 26 | 41 | 31 | 28 | 39 | 43 | 18 | -10 |
| Women 50+ | 35 | 36 | 29 | 34 | 46 | 20 | 30 | 40 | 30 | 41 | 38 | 21 | -9 |
| Education |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| College Grad. | 39 | 32 | 29 | 37 | 35 | 28 | 35 | 35 | 30 | 41 | 40 | 19 | -11 |
| Some College | 34 | 30 | 36 | 29 | 40 | 31 | 39 | 28 | 33 | 43 | 36 | 21 | -12 |
| High School Grad. | 35 | 35 | 30 | 34 | 40 | 26 | 36 | 31 | 33 | 40 | 37 | 23 | -10 |
| < H.S. Grad. | 28 | 43 | 29 | 39 | 43 | 18 | 22 | 48 | 30 | 27 | 53 | 20 | -10 |
| Family Income |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| \$75,000+ | -- | -- | -- | 33 | 33 | 34 | 44 | 31 | 25 | 45 | 33 | 22 | -3 |
| \$50,000-\$74,999 | -- | -- | -- | 40 | 35 | 25 | 39 | 27 | 34 | 45 | 34 | 21 | -13 |
| \$30,000-\$49,999 | -- | -- | -- | 38 | 35 | 27 | 36 | 32 | 32 | 45 | 40 | 15 | -17 |
| \$20,000-\$29,999 | -- | -- | -- | 36 | 45 | 19 | 28 | 44 | 28 | 24 | 52 | 24 | -4 |
| <\$20,000 | -- | -- | -- | 24 | 51 | 25 | 24 | 40 | 36 | 32 | 49 | 19 | -17 |

* "Certain" voters are those who support a candidate and say they "definitely decided" NOT to vote for the opponent. "Swing" voters are those who are undecided or those who support a candidate but say "there is a chance" they might change their minds.
** The designation Hispanic is unrelated to the white-black categorization.
Question: Suppose there were only two major candidates for President and you had to choose between $\qquad$ (the Democrat) and $\qquad$ (the Republican), who would you vote for? Do you think there is a chance that you might vote for $\qquad$ in November, or have you definitely decided not to vote for him?

|  | -----May 1992---- |  |  | ----July 1996---- |  |  | ----June 2000--- |  |  | -----June 2004--- |  |  | Change <br> in <br> Swing <br> '00-'04 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Cert. Cert. <br> Bush Clinton Swing |  |  | Cert. Cert. Dole Clinton Swing |  |  | Cert. Cert. <br> Bush Gore Swing |  |  | Cert. Cert. <br> Bush Kerry Swing |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | \% | \% | \% | \% | \% | \% | \% | \% | \% | \% | \% | \% |  |
| Total | 35 | 34 | 31 | 34 | 39 | 27 | 35 | 33 | 32 | 40 | 39 | 21 | -11 |
| Region |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| East | 37 | 36 | 27 | 30 | 39 | 31 | 31 | 33 | 36 | 30 | 46 | 24 | -12 |
| Midwest | 30 | 38 | 32 | 31 | 41 | 28 | 35 | 33 | 32 | 39 | 38 | 23 | -9 |
| South | 38 | 32 | 30 | 38 | 37 | 25 | 37 | 34 | 29 | 47 | 34 | 19 | -10 |
| West | 36 | 30 | 34 | 37 | 40 | 23 | 36 | 30 | 34 | 39 | 41 | 20 | -14 |
| Religious Affiliation |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Total White Protestant | 45 | 26 | 29 | 46 | 30 | 24 | 46 | 24 | 30 | 53 | 27 | 20 | -10 |
| - Evangelical | -- | -- | -- | 54 | 26 | 20 | 57 | 19 | 24 | 61 | 22 | 17 | -7 |
| - Non-Evangelical | -- | -- | -- | 37 | 35 | 28 | 35 | 30 | 35 | 44 | 33 | 23 | -12 |
| White Catholic | 28 | 35 | 37 | 30 | 38 | 32 | 32 | 30 | 38 | 41 | 37 | 22 | -16 |
| Secular | 18 | 44 | 38 | 20 | 49 | 31 | 30 | 36 | 34 | 25 | 60 | 15 | -19 |
| Community Size |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Large City | -- | -- | -- | 20 | 58 | 22 | 25 | 43 | 32 | 32 | 49 | 19 | -13 |
| Suburb | -- | -- | -- | 38 | 36 | 26 | 35 | 36 | 29 | 40 | 38 | 22 | -7 |
| Small City/Town | -- | -- | -- | 36 | 36 | 28 | 37 | 28 | 35 | 40 | 37 | 23 | -12 |
| Rural Area | -- | -- | -- | 40 | 31 | 29 | 40 | 28 | 32 | 48 | 34 | 18 | -14 |
| Party ID |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Republican | 73 | 3 | 24 | 72 | 7 | 21 | 74 | 6 | 20 | 83 | 5 | 12 | -8 |
| Democrat | 11 | 67 | 22 | 4 | 80 | 16 | 8 | 64 | 28 | 6 | 73 | 21 | -7 |
| Independent | 32 | 26 | 42 | 27 | 32 | 41 | 30 | 25 | 45 | 35 | 37 | 28 | -17 |
| Party and Ideology |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Conservative Republican | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | 83 | 3 | 14 | 92 | 2 | 6 | -8 |
| Moderate/Liberal Rep. | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | 59 | 11 | 30 | 61 | 13 | 26 | -4 |
| Conservative/Mod. Dem. | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | 10 | 60 | 30 | 8 | 69 | 23 | -7 |
| Liberal Democrat | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- | 4 | 73 | 23 | 2 | 81 | 17 | -6 |
| Marital Status |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Married | 37 | 34 | 29 | 40 | 33 | 27 | 41 | 27 | 32 | 47 | 33 | 20 | -12 |
| Not Married | 33 | 35 | 32 | 25 | 49 | 26 | 27 | 41 | 32 | 31 | 46 | 23 | -9 |
| Labor Union |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Union Household | 24 | 48 | 28 | 27 | 42 | 31 | 27 | 40 | 33 | 24 | 53 | 23 | -10 |
| Non-Union Household | 37 | 31 | 32 | 36 | 38 | 26 | 36 | 32 | 32 | 44 | 36 | 20 | -12 |

## ABOUT THE SURVEYS

This report is based on the results of several surveys conducted by the Pew Research Center. These include the following:

- The June 2004 Voter Attitudes survey, based on telephone interviews conducted under the direction of Princeton Survey Research Associates International among a nationwide sample of 1,806 adults, 18 years of age or older, during the period June 3-13, 2004. For results based on the total sample, one can say with $95 \%$ confidence that the error attributable to sampling is plus or minus 2.5 percentage points. For results based on registered voters $(\mathrm{N}=1,426)$, the sampling error is plus or minus 3.0 percentage points.
- Combined samples of June 2004 and May 2004 surveys. The May 2004 survey is based on telephone interviews conducted under the direction of Princeton Survey Research Associates International among a nationwide sample of 1,800 adults, 18 years of age or older, during the period May 3-9, 2004. The combined sample totals 3,606 total adults, including 2,891 registered voters. Sampling error for registered voters in the combined MayJune surveys is plus or minus 2.0 percentage points.
- Analysis of public opinion in battleground states is based on the May and June surveys and three surveys conducted in April and May 2004. Total sample size for these five surveys is 8,396 . The total number of registered voters is 5,792.
- Comparisons are also made to voter surveys conducted in May $1992(\mathrm{~N}=1,065$ registered voters, margin of error $3.5 \%$ ), July 1996 ( $\mathrm{N}=928$ registered voters, margin of error 4.0\%), and June $2000(\mathrm{~N}=1,509$ registered voters, margin of error 3.0\%).

In addition to sampling error, one should bear in mind that question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can introduce error or bias into the findings of opinion polls.
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# PEW RESEARCH CENTER FOR THE PEOPLE \& THE PRESS <br> JUNE 2004 VOTER ATTITUDES SURVEY <br> FINAL TOPLINE <br> June 3-13, 2004 <br> $\mathrm{N}=1806$ 

Q. 1 Do you approve or disapprove of the way George W. Bush is handling his job as president? [IF DK

ENTER AS DK. IF DEPENDS PROBE ONCE WITH: Overall do you approve or disapprove of the way George W. Bush is handling his job as president? IF STILL DEPENDS ENTER AS DK]

June, 2004
May, 2004
Late April, 2004
Early April, 2004
Late March, 2004
Mid-March, 2004
February, 2004
Mid-January, 2004
Early January, 2004

| Approve | Disapprove | Don't know |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 48 | 43 | $9=100$ |
| 44 | 48 | $8=100$ |
| 48 | 43 | $9=100$ |
| 43 | 47 | $10=100$ |
| 47 | 44 | $9=100$ |
| 46 | 47 | $7=100$ |
| 48 | 44 | $8=100$ |
| 56 | 34 | $10=100$ |
| 58 | 35 | $7=100$ |

More specifically...
Q. 2 Do you approve or disapprove of the way George W. Bush is handling [INSERT ITEM, RANDOMIZE]

|  |  | Approve | Disapprove | DK/Ref. |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| a. | The economy | 43 | 50 | $7=100$ |
| b. | The situation in Iraq | 42 | 51 | $7=100$ |
| c. | Terrorist threats | 56 | 35 | $9=100$ |

ASK ALL:
Q. 7 Suppose there were only two major candidates for president and you had to choose between George W. Bush, the Republican and John Kerry, the Democrat [ROTATE]. Who would you vote for?
IF OTHER OR DK (3,9 IN Q.7) ASK:
Q.7a As of TODAY, do you LEAN more to [READ, ROTATE IN SAME ORDER AS Q.7]?

BASED ON REGISTERED VOTERS [N=1426]:

|  |  | $\begin{gathered} \text { Bush/ } \\ \text { Lean Bush } \end{gathered}$ | Kerry/ Lean Kerry | Other/ DK |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | June, 2004 | 48 | 46 | $6=100$ |
|  | May, 2004 | 45 | 50 | $5=100$ |
|  | Late March, 2004 | 46 | 47 | $7=100$ |
|  | Mid-March, 2004 | 43 | 52 | $5=100$ |
|  | Late February, 2004 | 44 | 48 | $8=100$ |
|  | Early February, 2004 | $4 \quad 47$ | 47 | $6=100$ |
|  | Early January, 2004 | 52 | 41 | $7=100$ |
|  | October, 2003 | 50 | 42 | $8=100$ |
| Selected Trends: | June, 2000 | 45 Bush | 46 Gore | $9=100$ |
|  | July, 1996 | 42 Dole | 53 Clinton | $5=100$ |
|  | May, 1992 | 46 Bush, Sr. | 43 Clinton | $11=100$ |
|  | May, 1988 | 40 Bush, Sr. | 53 Dukakis | $7=100$ |

## THOSE WHO DID NOT CHOOSE KERRY IN Q.7/7a, ASK:

Q. 10 Do you think there is a chance that you might vote for John Kerry in November, or have you definitely decided not to vote for him?

## BASED ON REGISTERED VOTERS [N=1426]:

|  |  | Chance might <br> vote for Kerry | Decided not to <br> vote for Kerry | Don't know/ <br> Refused |
| :--- | :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | June, 2004 | 10 | 41 | $3=54 \%$ |
|  | May, 2004 | 11 | 35 | $4=50 \%$ |
|  | Late March, 2004 | 13 | 37 | $3=53 \%$ |
|  | Mid-March, 2004 | 13 | 32 | $3=48 \%$ |
|  | Late February, 2004 | 13 | 36 | $3=52 \%$ |
|  | Early February, 2004 | 15 | 33 | $5=53 \%$ |
| Gore: | November, 2000 | 8 | 41 | $6=55 \%$ |
| Gore: | Late October, 2000 | 9 | 44 | $4=57 \%$ |
| Gore: | Mid-October, 2000 | 10 | 40 | $5=55 \%$ |
| Gore: | Early October, 2000 | 11 | 38 | $7=56 \%$ |
| Gore: | September, 2000 | 13 | 35 | $5=53 \%$ |
| Gore: | June, 2000 | 14 | 3 | 34 |
| Clinton: | July, 1996 | 8 | 36 | $6=54 \%$ |
| Clinton: | May, 1992 | 11 | 38 | $4=48 \%$ |
|  |  |  |  |  |

## THOSE WHO DID NOT CHOOSE BUSH IN Q.7/7a, ASK:

Q. 11 Do you think there is a chance that you might vote for George W. Bush in November, or have you definitely decided not to vote for him?

## BASED ON REGISTERED VOTERS [N=1426]:

|  | Chance might vote for Bush |  | Decided not to vote for Bush | Don't know Refused |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | June, 2004 | 9 | 41 | $2=52 \%$ |
|  | May, 2004 | 9 | 42 | $4=55 \%$ |
|  | Late March, 2004 | 11 | 40 | $3=54 \%$ |
|  | Mid-March, 2004 | 11 | 44 | $2=57 \%$ |
|  | Late February, 2004 | 10 | 43 | $3=56 \%$ |
|  | Early February, 2004 | - 10 | 41 | $2=53 \%$ |
| Bush: | November, 2000 | 8 | 44 | $7=59 \%$ |
| Bush: | Late October, 2000 | 10 | 41 | $4=55 \%$ |
| Bush: | Mid-October, 2000 | 12 | 40 | 5=57\% |
| Bush: | Early October, 2000 | 011 | 39 | $7=57 \%$ |
| Bush: | September, 2000 | 15 | 38 | $6=59 \%$ |
| Bush: | June, 2000 | 15 | 33 | 6=54\% |
| Dole: | July, 1996 | 15 | 40 | $3=58 \%$ |
| Bush, Sr: | May, 1992 | 8 | 40 | $5=53 \%$ |


[^0]:    1 States considered "battleground" in this analysis are: AZ, AR, FL, IA, LA, ME, MI, MN, MO, NV, NH, NM, OH, OR, PA, TN, WA, WV, WI.

