# Increased Public Support for the U.S. Arming Ukraine More Still Oppose Than Favor the U.S. Sending Arms to Kiev 

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# Increased Public Support for Arming Ukraine <br> More Still Oppose Than Favor the U.S. Sending Arms to Kiev 

As fighting continues in eastern Ukraine between government forces and Russianbacked rebels, the public has become more supportive of sending arms to the Ukrainian government and increasing sanctions on Russia.

More still oppose (53\%) than favor (41\%) the U.S. sending arms and military supplies to the Ukrainian government, but support for arming Ukraine is up 11 points since April 2014, when opposition outweighed support by about two-to-one ( $30 \%$ favored, $62 \%$ opposed).

At the same time, there is increased support for additional economic and diplomatic sanctions against Russia. Six-in-ten (60\%) favor the U.S. increasing sanctions on Russia, while $34 \%$ are opposed. Support for tougher sanctions against Russia has risen seven points from last April.

The latest national survey by the Pew Research Center, conducted Feb. 18-22 among 1,504 adults, finds the public is split over whether the U.S. should provide training to Ukrainian troops: $49 \%$ say they would favor this, while $46 \%$ are opposed.

Opinions about Russian President Vladimir Putin are very negative: $70 \%$ hold an unfavorable view of Putin - including 41\% with a very unfavorable view - compared with just $12 \%$ who view him favorably; $18 \%$ offer no


Survey conducted Feb. 18-22, 2015. PEW RESEARCH CENTER

## Broad Support for Tougher Sanctions Against Russia

Opinions about the U.S. ... (\%)
$\square$ Favor $■$ Oppose $\square$ DK


Survey conducted Feb. 18-22, 2015.
PEW RESEARCH CENTER
opinion of the Russian leader.

The situation involving Russia and Ukraine continues to register with the public: $39 \%$ say they have heard a lot about tensions between Russia and Ukraine while another $41 \%$ have heard a little; just $19 \%$ have heard nothing at all about the situation.

And most Americans (77\%) say what happens between Russia and Ukraine is either very important (30\%) or somewhat important (46\%) to the interests of the U.S. The share saying the conflict is very important to U.S. interests is lower than it was in July 2014 (48\%), shortly after a Malaysia Airlines plane was shot down over rebel-held territory in Ukraine but is about the same as in April of last year (31\%).

## Partisan Differences over Arming, Training Ukrainian Forces

Republicans are more likely than Democrats and independents to back the U.S. training Ukrainian troops and sending arms and military supplies to the Ukrainian government.

Overall, $51 \%$ of Republicans support the U.S. sending arms and military supplies to the Ukrainian government, while $45 \%$ are opposed. By contrast, Democrats ( $55 \%$ oppose, $40 \%$ favor) and independents ( $56 \%$ oppose, $38 \%$ favor) on balance oppose the U.S. taking these actions. Despite current differences in views, both Republicans and Democrats have become 14 points more likely to support the U.S. arming the Ukrainian government since last April.

Republicans (59\%) also are more likely than Democrats (48\%) or independents (46\%) to support the U.S. providing training to Ukrainian military troops.

There is no partisan divide when it comes to increasing economic and diplomatic sanctions on Russia. About equal percentages of Republicans (64\%), Democrats (62\%) and independents ( $60 \%$ ) support this action.

## Republicans More Supportive than Democrats of Aiding Ukrainian Forces

\% who favor the U.S. ...

|  | Total <br> $\%$ | Rep <br> $\%$ | Dem <br> $\%$ | Ind <br> $\%$ | Rep- <br> Dem <br> diff |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Training Ukrainian <br> troops | 49 | 59 | 48 | 46 | +11 |
| Sending arms to |  |  |  |  |  |
| Ukrainian gov't <br> Increasing | 41 | 51 | 40 | 38 | +11 |
| sanctions on <br> Russia | 60 | 64 | 62 | 60 | +2 |
| Survey conducted Feb. 18-22, 2015. |  |  |  |  |  |
| PEW RESEARCH CENTER |  |  |  |  |  |

## Demographic Divides in Views of Russia-Ukraine Situation

Across all three policy options included in the survey, young adults under 30 are among the least supportive of U.S. action. Just $33 \%$ of young adults favor sending arms to the Ukrainian government, compared with $52 \%$ of those 65 and older. And when it comes to both increased sanctions on Russia and training Ukrainian troops, about as many young adults oppose as favor U.S. action; among older adults, more favor than oppose the U.S. taking these steps.

Men (46\%) are more likely than women (35\%) to support the U.S. sending arms to Ukraine. Men also are more supportive of additional U.S. sanctions against Russia (65\% vs. $55 \%$ ).

## Young Adults Among Least Supportive of the U.S. Taking Action to Aid Ukraine, Punish Russia

\% who favor/oppose the U.S...

| Increasing sanctions on Russia |  | Training Ukrainian military troops |  | Sending arms/ military supplies to Ukraine |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Favor | Oppose | Favor | Oppose | Favor | Oppose |
| \% | \% | \% | \% | \% | \% |
| 60 | 34 | 49 | 46 | 41 | 53 |
| 65 | 30 | 53 | 44 | 46 | 50 |
| 55 | 37 | 45 | 47 | 35 | 57 |
| 47 | 48 | 44 | 52 | 33 | 63 |
| 60 | 32 | 47 | 45 | 37 | 55 |
| 66 | 30 | 51 | 45 | 45 | 50 |
| 68 | 26 | 56 | 39 | 52 | 43 |
| 74 | 23 | 53 | 43 | 44 | 50 |
| 60 | 35 | 52 | 43 | 44 | 51 |
| 51 | 40 | 44 | 50 | 36 | 57 |
| 78 | 18 | 69 | 27 | 63 | 34 |
| 54 | 42 | 41 | 55 | 32 | 63 |
| 18-22, 2015. Don't know responses not shown. |  |  |  |  |  |

Among the $30 \%$ of the public
that views the events between Russia and Ukraine as very important to the interests of the U.S., large majorities back increased sanctions against Russia (78\%), the U.S. training Ukrainian military troops (69\%) and the U.S. sending arms and military supplies to the Ukrainian government (63\%).

## Most View Putin Unfavorably

Views of Russian President Vladimir Putin are highly negative. Overall, 70\% hold an unfavorable view of Putin compared with $12 \%$ who view him favorably. About four-in-ten (41\%) say they hold a very unfavorable view of the Russian leader.

Putin is viewed unfavorably across all demographic groups. Comparable percentages of Republicans (76\%), Democrats (69\%) and independents ( $67 \%$ ) hold an unfavorable view of the Russian president. Among conservative Republicans and liberal Democrats, nearly identical percentages hold a very unfavorable view of Putin ( $51 \%$ and $53 \%$, respectively).

Young adults hold some of the least negative views of Putin. Among those ages 18-29, $57 \%$ view him unfavorably, while $20 \%$ view him favorably; $23 \%$ are unable to offer a rating. Among older adults, about 70\% or more view Putin unfavorably.

Opinions about Putin also differ by awareness of the situation in Ukraine. Among the nearly

Highly Negative Views of Vladimir Putin

|  | Favorable | Unfavorable <br> $\%$ <br> Never heard of/ <br> Can't rate (Vol.) <br> $\%$ |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Total | 12 | 70 | $18=100$ |
| Men | 13 | 74 | $14=100$ |
| Women | 11 | 66 | $23=100$ |
| 18-29 | 20 | 57 | $23=100$ |
| $30-49$ | 11 | 68 | $22=100$ |
| 50-64 | 11 | 75 | $14=100$ |
| 65+ | 8 | 79 | $13=100$ |
| College grad+ | 9 | 82 | $9=100$ |
| Some college | 11 | 68 | $20=100$ |
| HS or less | 15 | 61 | $24=100$ |
| Republican | 10 | 76 | $14=100$ |
| Democrat <br> Independent | 12 | 69 | $18=100$ |
| Heard about | 14 | 67 | $19=100$ |
| Russia-Ukraine <br> tensions |  |  |  |
| A lot (39\%) | 9 | 85 | $6=100$ |
| A little (41\%) | 12 | 69 | $19=100$ |
| Nothing at all <br> (19\%) | 19 | 39 | $41=100$ |

Survey conducted Feb. 18-22, 2015
Figures may not add to $100 \%$ because of rounding.
PEW RESEARCH CENTER four-in-ten (39\%) who have heard a lot about tensions between Russia and Ukraine, fully 85\% view Putin unfavorably. That compares with $69 \%$ among those who have heard a little about the tensions between the two countries ( $41 \%$ of the public); $19 \%$ of this group offer no opinion of Putin. Among the $19 \%$ who have heard nothing at all about this situation, $41 \%$ have no opinion of the Russian leader, $39 \%$ view him unfavorably, while $19 \%$ have a favorable impression.

## About the Survey

The analysis in this report is based on telephone interviews conducted February 18-22, 2015 among a national sample of 1,504 adults, 18 years of age or older, living in all 50 U.S. states and the District of Columbia ( 526 respondents were interviewed on a landline telephone, and 978 were interviewed on a cell phone, including 559 who had no landline telephone). The survey was conducted by interviewers at Princeton Data Source under the direction of Princeton Survey Research Associates International. A combination of landline and cell phone random digit dial samples were used; both samples were provided by Survey Sampling International. Interviews were conducted in English and Spanish. Respondents in the landline sample were selected by randomly asking for the youngest adult male or female who is now at home. Interviews in the cell sample were conducted with the person who answered the phone, if that person was an adult 18 years of age or older. For detailed information about our survey methodology, see http://www.pewresearch.org/methodology/u-s-survey-research/

The combined landline and cell phone sample are weighted using an iterative technique that matches gender, age, education, race, Hispanic origin and nativity and region to parameters from the 2013 Census Bureau's American Community Survey and population density to parameters from the Decennial Census. The sample also is weighted to match current patterns of telephone status (landline only, cell phone only, or both landline and cell phone), based on extrapolations from the 2014 National Health Interview Survey. The weighting procedure also accounts for the fact that respondents with both landline and cell phones have a greater probability of being included in the combined sample and adjusts for household size among respondents with a landline phone. The margins of error reported and statistical tests of significance are adjusted to account for the survey's design effect, a measure of how much efficiency is lost from the weighting procedures.

The following table shows the unweighted sample sizes and the error attributable to sampling that would be expected at the $95 \%$ level of confidence for different groups in the survey:

| Group | Unweighted <br> sample size <br> Total sample | Plus or minus ... <br>  <br> Republican |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| Democrat | 399 | 2.9 percentage points |
| Independent | 440 | 5.6 percentage points |

Sample sizes and sampling errors for other subgroups are available upon request.

In addition to sampling error, one should bear in mind that question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can introduce error or bias into the findings of opinion polls.

Pew Research Center is a nonprofit, tax-exempt 501(c)3 organization and a subsidiary of The Pew Charitable Trusts, its primary funder.

## PEW RESEARCH CENTER FEBRUARY 2015 POLITICAL SURVEY FINAL TOPLINE <br> FEBRUARY 18-22, 2015 $\mathrm{N}=1,504$

QUESTIONS 1-2, 5a-5b, 8, 11a-11d, 13, 16-18, 25-29, 51a HELD FOR FUTURE RELEASE
NO QUESTIONS 3-4, 6-7, 9-10, 12, 14-15, 19-24, 30-50

## ASK ALL:

Next,
Q. 51 Would you say your overall opinion of [INSERT NAME; RANDOMIZE] is very favorable, mostly favorable, mostly UNfavorable, or very unfavorable? How about [NEXT NAME]? [IF NECESSARY: Just in general, is your overall opinion of [NAME] very favorable, mostly favorable, mostly UNfavorable, or very unfavorable?] [INTERVIEWERS: PROBE TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN "NEVER HEARD OF" AND "CAN'T RATE."]
(VOL.) (VOL.)

| --------Favorable------- | $-----U n f a v o r a b l e------~$ | Never | Can't |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Total | Very Mostly | Total Very Mostly heard of rate/Ref |  |

b. Vladimir Putin

Feb 18-22, 2015
$12 \quad 2$
$10 \quad 70$
41
29
10
8
QUESTIONS 51c, 52-54, 56, 58F1-59F2, 62-63, 66-68, 70-71 HELD FOR FUTURE RELEASE
NO QUESTIONS 55, 57, 60-61, 64-65, 69, 72-73
ASK ALL:
Q. 74 How much, if anything, have you read or heard about tensions between Russia and Ukraine over territory in eastern Ukraine? Have you heard ... [READ IN ORDER]

| Feb 18-22 |  | $(U)$ <br> $\frac{2015}{39}$ |
| :---: | :--- | :---: |
| Apr 23-27 |  |  |
| 41 | A lot | $\frac{2014}{46}$ |
| 19 | A little | 34 |
| $*$ | Nothing at all | 20 |
|  | Don't know/Refused (VOL.) | $*$ |

ASK ALL:
Q. 75 In response to the situation involving Russia and Ukraine, would you favor or oppose the United States [INSERT ITEM; RANDOMIZE]? Would you favor or oppose the United States [NEXT ITEM]?

|  |  | Favor | Oppose | (VOL.) DK/Ref |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| a. | Increasing economic and diplomatic sanctions on Russia |  |  |  |
|  | Feb 18-22, 2015 | 60 | 34 | 6 |
|  | Apr 23-27, 2014 (U) | 53 | 36 | 11 |
| b. | Sending arms and military supplies to the Ukrainian government |  |  |  |
|  | Feb 18-22, 2015 | 41 | 53 | 6 |
|  | Apr 23-27, 2014 (U) | 30 | 62 | 8 |
| c. | Training Ukrainian military troops |  |  |  |
|  | Feb 18-22, 2015 | 49 | 46 | 5 |

ASK ALL:
Q. 76 How important to the interests of the United States is what happens between Russia and Ukraine [READ IN ORDER]?

| Feb 18-22 |  |  | $($ Jul 24-27 |
| :---: | :--- | :---: | :---: |
| $\frac{2015}{30}$ | Very important | $\underline{2014}$ | Apr 23-27 |
| 46 | Somewhat important | 48 | $\underline{2014}$ |
| 13 | Not too important | 35 | 31 |
| 7 | Not at all important | 8 | 36 |
| 3 | Don't know/Refused (VOL.) | 4 | 16 |
|  |  | 4 | 13 |
|  |  | 4 |  |

## NO QUESTIONS 77, 79

## QUESTIONS 78, 80 HELD FOR FUTURE RELEASE

## ASK ALL:

PARTY In politics TODAY, do you consider yourself a Republican, Democrat, or independent?
ASK IF INDEP/NO PREF/OTHER/DK/REF (PARTY=3,4,5,9):
PARTYLN
As of today do you lean more to the Republican Party or more to the Democratic Party?

|  | Republican | Democrat | Independent | (VOL.) | (VOL.) | (VOL.) | Lean <br> Rep | Lean Dem |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  | No | Other |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | preference | party | DK/Ref |  |  |
| Feb 18-22, 2015 | 24 | 31 | 38 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 18 | 17 |
| Jan 7-11, 2015 | 21 | 30 | 44 | 3 | 1 | 1 | 19 | 18 |
| Dec 3-7, 2014 | 24 | 31 | 39 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 17 | 17 |
| Nov 6-9, 2014 | 27 | 32 | 36 | 2 | * | 1 | 15 | 16 |
| Oct 15-20, 2014 | 24 | 33 | 38 | 4 | * | 1 | 13 | 17 |
| Sep 2-9, 2014 | 24 | 33 | 38 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 15 | 15 |
| Aug 20-24, 2014 | 24 | 31 | 37 | 4 | 1 | 4 | 15 | 16 |
| Jul 8-14, 2014 | 25 | 34 | 37 | 2 | 1 | 1 | 16 | 15 |
| Apr 23-27, 2014 | 24 | 30 | 41 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 18 | 17 |
| Jan 23-Mar 16, 2014 | 422 | 31 | 41 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 17 | 17 |
| Feb 14-23, 2014 | 22 | 32 | 39 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 14 | 17 |
| Yearly Totals |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2014 | 23.2 | 31.5 | 39.5 | 3.1 | . 7 | 2.0 | 16.2 | 16.5 |
| 2013 | 23.9 | 32.1 | 38.3 | 2.9 | . 5 | 2.2 | 16.0 | 16.0 |
| 2012 | 24.7 | 32.6 | 36.4 | 3.1 | . 5 | 2.7 | 14.4 | 16.1 |
| 2011 | 24.3 | 32.3 | 37.4 | 3.1 | . 4 | 2.5 | 15.7 | 15.6 |
| 2010 | 25.2 | 32.7 | 35.2 | 3.6 | . 4 | 2.8 | 14.5 | 14.1 |
| 2009 | 23.9 | 34.4 | 35.1 | 3.4 | . 4 | 2.8 | 13.1 | 15.7 |
| 2008 | 25.7 | 36.0 | 31.5 | 3.6 | . 3 | 3.0 | 10.6 | 15.2 |
| 2007 | 25.3 | 32.9 | 34.1 | 4.3 | . 4 | 2.9 | 10.9 | 17.0 |
| 2006 | 27.8 | 33.1 | 30.9 | 4.4 | . 3 | 3.4 | 10.5 | 15.1 |
| 2005 | 29.3 | 32.8 | 30.2 | 4.5 | . 3 | 2.8 | 10.3 | 14.9 |
| 2004 | 30.0 | 33.5 | 29.5 | 3.8 | . 4 | 3.0 | 11.7 | 13.4 |
| 2003 | 30.3 | 31.5 | 30.5 | 4.8 | . 5 | 2.5 | 12.0 | 12.6 |
| 2002 | 30.4 | 31.4 | 29.8 | 5.0 | . 7 | 2.7 | 12.4 | 11.6 |
| 2001 | 29.0 | 33.2 | 29.5 | 5.2 | . 6 | 2.6 | 11.9 | 11.6 |
| 2001 Post-Sept 11 | 30.9 | 31.8 | 27.9 | 5.2 | . 6 | 3.6 | 11.7 | 9.4 |
| 2001 Pre-Sept 11 | 27.3 | 34.4 | 30.9 | 5.1 | . 6 | 1.7 | 12.1 | 13.5 |
| 2000 | 28.0 | 33.4 | 29.1 | 5.5 | . 5 | 3.6 | 11.6 | 11.7 |
| 1999 | 26.6 | 33.5 | 33.7 | 3.9 | . 5 | 1.9 | 13.0 | 14.5 |
| 1998 | 27.9 | 33.7 | 31.1 | 4.6 | . 4 | 2.3 | 11.6 | 13.1 |
| 1997 | 28.0 | 33.4 | 32.0 | 4.0 | . 4 | 2.3 | 12.2 | 14.1 |
| 1996 | 28.9 | 33.9 | 31.8 | 3.0 | . 4 | 2.0 | 12.1 | 14.9 |
| 1995 | 31.6 | 30.0 | 33.7 | 2.4 | . 6 | 1.3 | 15.1 | 13.5 |
| 1994 | 30.1 | 31.5 | 33.5 | 1.3 | -- | 3.6 | 13.7 | 12.2 |
| 1993 | 27.4 | 33.6 | 34.2 | 4.4 | 1.5 | 2.9 | 11.5 | 14.9 |
| 1992 | 27.6 | 33.7 | 34.7 | 1.5 | 0 | 2.5 | 12.6 | 16.5 |

## PARTY/PARTYLN CONTINUED...

|  |  |  |  | (VOL.) (VOL.) |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  | No | Other | (VOL.) | Lean | Lean |
|  | Republican | Democrat | Independent | preference | party | DK/Ref | Rep | Dem |
| 1991 | 30.9 | 31.4 | 33.2 | 0 | 1.4 | 3.0 | 14.7 | 10.8 |
| 1990 | 30.9 | 33.2 | 29.3 | 1.2 | 1.9 | 3.4 | 12.4 | 11.3 |
| 1989 | 33 | 33 | 34 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 1987 | 26 | 35 | 39 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |

## ASK REPUBLICANS AND REPUBLICAN LEANERS ONLY (PARTY=1 OR PARTYLN=1):

TEAPARTY3
From what you know, do you agree or disagree with the Tea Party movement, or don't you have an opinion either way?

BASED ON REPUBLICANS AND REPUBLICAN LEANERS [N=679]:

Feb 18-22, 2015
Jan 7-11, 2015
Dec 3-7, 2014
Nov 6-9, 2014
Oct 15-20, 2014
Sep 2-9, 2014
Aug 20-24, 2014
Jul 8-14, 2014
Apr 23-27, 2014
Jan 23-Mar 16, 2014
Feb 14-23, 2014
Jan 15-19, 2014
Dec 3-8, 2013
Oct 30-Nov 6, 2013
Oct 9-13, 2013
Sep 4-8, 2013
Jul 17-21, 2013
Jun 12-16, 2013
May 23-26, 2013
May 1-5, 2013
Mar 13-17, 2013
Feb 13-18, 2013
Feb 14-17, 2013
Jan 9-13, 2013
Dec 5-9, 2012
Oct 31-Nov 3, 2012 (RVs)
Oct 4-7, 2012
Sep 12-16, 2013
Jun 28-Jul 9, 2012
Jun 7-17, 2012
May 9-Jun 3, 2012
Apr 4-15, 2012
Mar 7-11, 2012
Feb 8-12, 2012
Jan 11-16, 2012
Jan 4-8, 2012
Dec 7-11, 2011
Nov 9-14, 2011
Nov 9-14, 2011
Sep 22-Oct 4, 2011
Aug 17-21, 2011
Jul 20-24, 2011
Jun 15-19, 2011

| Agree | Disagree | No opinion either way |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 36 | 9 | 54 |
| 34 | 9 | 54 |
| 34 | 9 | 55 |
| 31 | 10 | 57 |
| 32 | 8 | 56 |
| 38 | 10 | 50 |
| 34 | 10 | 53 |
| 35 | 12 | 50 |
| 33 | 11 | 54 |
| 37 | 11 | 50 |
| 36 | 9 | 54 |
| 35 | 12 | 52 |
| 32 | 9 | 57 |
| 40 | 9 | 48 |
| 41 | 11 | 45 |
| 35 | 9 | 54 |
| 37 | 10 | 50 |
| 44 | 9 | 46 |
| 41 | 7 | 48 |
| 28 | 8 | 61 |
| 43 | 7 | 47 |
| 36 | 9 | 52 |
| 43 | 9 | 45 |
| 35 | 10 | 51 |
| 37 | 11 | 51 |
| 40 | 8 | 49 |
| 38 | 9 | 50 |
| 39 | 7 | 52 |
| 40 | 9 | 47 |
| 42 | 8 | 48 |
| 36 | 9 | 53 |
| 42 | 8 | 48 |
| 38 | 10 | 49 |
| 40 | 7 | 51 |
| 42 | 8 | 47 |
| 37 | 8 | 52 |
| 40 | 9 | 48 |
| 41 | 9 | 49 |
| 41 | 9 | 49 |
| 37 | 11 | 51 |
| 43 | 7 | 49 |
| 40 | 7 | 51 |
| 42 | 9 | 47 |
| 37 | 7 | 52 |

(VOL.)
Not Haven't
(VOL.) heard of/ heard of $\frac{\text { Refused }}{*}$ DK

| * | * | -- |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1 | 2 | -- |
| 2 | 1 | -- |
| 1 | 1 | -- |
| 2 | 2 | -- |
| 1 | 1 | -- |
| * | 2 | -- |
| 2 | 1 | -- |
| 1 | 1 | -- |
| 1 | 1 | -- |
| 1 | 1 | -- |
| 1 | * | -- |
| 1 | 1 | -- |
| 2 | 1 | -- |
| 2 | 1 | -- |
| 1 | 1 | -- |
| 2 | 1 | -- |
| 1 | 2 | -- |
| 1 | 3 | -- |
| 2 | 1 | -- |
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| 1 | 3 | -- |
| 1 | 2 | -- |
| 2 | 2 | -- |
| 1 | * | -- |
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| 1 | 3 | -- |
| 1 | 1 | -- |
| 2 | 1 | -- |
| 1 | 1 | -- |
| 1 | 2 | -- |
| 1 | 1 | -- |
| 2 | 1 | -- |
| 1 | 1 | -- |
| 1 | 1 | -- |
| 1 | 1 | -- |
| 2 | 1 | -- |
| * | 1 | -- |
| * | 1 | -- |
| 1 | 1 | -- |
| * | 1 | -- |
| * | 1 | -- |
| 1 | 1 | -- |
| 1 | 3 | -- |

## TEAPARTY3 CONTINUED...

Mar 30-Apr 3, 2011
Mar 8-14, 2011

| Agree | Disagree | No opinion either way |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 45 | 9 | 46 |
| 37 | 7 | 54 |
| 41 | 9 | 48 |
| 43 | 8 | 47 |
| 45 | 6 | 47 |
| 48 | 5 | 45 |
| 51 | 5 | 42 |
| 58 | 5 | 27 |
| 54 | 5 | 30 |
| 56 | 6 | 29 |
| 46 | 5 | 36 |
| 46 | 5 | 30 |
| 53 | 4 | 25 |
| 48 | 4 | 26 |

(VOL.)
Haven't heard of
*

Not
(VOL.) heard of/ $\frac{\text { Refused }}{1} \quad \frac{\text { DK }}{--}$ * --

Feb 22-Mar 1, 2011
Feb 2-7, 2011 ${ }^{1}$
Jan 5-9, 2011
Dec 1-5, 2010
Nov 4-7, 2010
Oct 27-30, 2010 (RVs)
Oct 13-18, 2010 (RVs)
Aug 25-Sep 6, 2010 (RVs)
Jul 21-Aug 5, 2010
Jun 16-20, 2010
May 20-23, 2010
Mar 11-21, 2010
48

## Key to Pew Research trends noted in the topline:

[^0]
[^0]:    1
    In the February 2-7, 2011, survey and before, question read "...do you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree with the Tea Party movement..." In October 2010 and earlier, question was asked only of those who had heard or read a lot or a little about the Tea Party. In May 2010 through October 2010, it was described as: "the Tea Party movement that has been involved in campaigns and protests in the U.S. over the past year." In March 2010 it was described as "the Tea Party protests that have taken place in the U.S. over the past year."

