# Continuing Divide in Views of Islam and Violence 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

## Andrew Kohut

President, Pew Research Center
Carroll Doherty and Michael Dimock
Associate Directors
Scott Keeter
Director of Survey Research

1615 L St, N.W., Suite 700
Washington, D.C. 20036
Tel (202) 419-4350
Fax (202) 419-4399
www.people-press.org

## Continuing Divide in Views of Islam and Violence

The public remains divided over whether Islam is more likely than other religions to encourage violence among its believers. Currently, $40 \%$ say the Islamic religion is more likely than others to encourage violence while $42 \%$ say it is not.

These opinions have changed little in recent years. But in March 2002, just 25\% saw Islam as more likely to encourage violence while twice as many (51\%) disagreed.

The national survey by the Pew Research Center for the People \& the Press, conducted Feb. 22-March 1 among 1,504 adults, finds that most young people reject the idea that Islam is more likely than other religions to promote violence. Nearly six-in-ten (58\%) of those younger than 30 say Islam does not encourage violence more than other religions; $31 \%$ say it does. By contrast, a plurality of those 50 and older (45\%) say Islam is more likely to encourage violence.


Public Remains Split Over Whether Islam Is More Likely to Encourage Violence

|  | Mar <br> $\mathbf{2 0 0 2}$ | July <br> $\mathbf{2 0 0 3}$ | Aug <br> $\mathbf{2 0 0 7}$ | Aug <br> $\mathbf{2 0 0 9}$ | Aug <br> $\mathbf{2 0 1 0}$ | Mar <br> $\mathbf{2 0 1 1}$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Islamic religion ... | $\%$ | $\%$ | $\%$ | $\%$ | $\%$ | $\%$ |
| Is more likely than others <br> to encourage violence | 25 | 44 | 45 | 38 | 35 | 40 |
| Doesn't encourage violence <br> more than others | 51 | 41 | 39 | 45 | 42 | 42 |
| Other/Don't know | $\underline{24}$ | $\underline{15}$ | $\underline{16}$ | $\underline{16}$ | $\underline{24}$ | $\underline{18}$ |
|  | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |

PEW RESEARCH CENTER Feb. 22-Mar. 1, 2011. Figures may not add to $100 \%$ because of rounding.

Political and ideological divisions are even wider: By roughly three-to-one ( $66 \%$ to $21 \%$ ), conservative Republicans say Islam encourages violence more than other religions. Moderate and liberal Republicans are divided $-46 \%$ say Islam is more likely to encourage violence, $47 \%$ say it is not.

By more than two-to-one ( $61 \%$ to 29\%), liberal Democrats say that Islam is not more likely than other religions to promote violence. Conservative and moderate Democrats, by a smaller margin (48\% to $31 \%$ ), agree.

Fully $67 \%$ of those who agree with the Tea Party movement say Islam is more associated with violence than other religions. Among those who disagree with the Tea Party, the balance of opinion is nearly reversed $-62 \%$ say Islam is no more likely than other religions to promote violence while $24 \%$ say it is. Among the large share of the public that offers no opinion of the Tea Party, $38 \%$ say Islam is more likely to promote violence while about the same number (41\%) disagrees.

A clear majority of white evangelical Protestants (60\%) say that Islam is more likely to encourage violence than are other religions. Far fewer white mainline Protestants (42\%) and white Catholics ( $39 \%$ ) express this view. And by nearly two-to-one ( $56 \%$ to $30 \%$ ), the religiously unaffiliated say that the Islamic religion does not encourage violence more than others.

Most Conservatives, Tea Party Supporters Link Islam to Violence

| Is Islam more likely than other | More <br> likely <br> religions to encourage violence? | Not <br> more <br> likely |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| Total | 40 | 42 |
| White | 44 | 41 |
| Black | 24 | 53 |
| Hispanic | 36 | 38 |
| 18-29 | 31 | 58 |
| $30-49$ | 41 | 43 |
| 50-64 | 46 | 34 |
| 65+ | 42 | 35 |
| Conservative Republican | 66 | 21 |
| Mod/Lib Republican | 46 | 47 |
| Independent | 38 | 44 |
| Cons/Mod Democrat | 31 | 48 |
| Liberal Democrat | 29 | 61 |
| Protestant | 46 | 37 |
| White evangelical | 60 | 24 |
| White mainline | 42 | 42 |
| Catholic | 35 | 45 |
| White Catholic | 39 | 46 |
| Unaffiliated | 30 | 56 |
| Tea Party movement |  |  |
| Agree (20\%) | 67 | 24 |
| Disagree (25\%) | 24 | 62 |
| No opinion (52\%) | 38 | 41 |

PEW RESEARCH CENTER Feb. 22-Mar. 1, 2011. Whites and blacks include only those who are not Hispanic; Hispanics are of any race.

## About the Survey

The analysis in this report is based on telephone interviews conducted February 22-March 1, 2011 among a national sample of 1,504 adults 18 years of age or older living in the continental United States ( 1,021 respondents were interviewed on a landline telephone, and 483 were interviewed on a cell phone, including 213 who had no landline telephone). The survey was conducted by interviewers at Princeton Data Source under the direction of Princeton Survey Research Associates International. A combination of landline and cell phone random digit dial samples were used; both samples were provided by Survey Sampling International. Interviews were conducted in English and Spanish. Respondents in the landline sample were selected by randomly asking for the youngest adult male or female who is now at home. Interviews in the cell sample were conducted with the person who answered the phone, if that person was an adult 18 years of age or older. For detailed information about our survey methodology, see http://peoplepress.org/methodology/

The combined landline and cell phone sample are weighted using an iterative technique that matches gender, age, education, race, Hispanic origin, region, and population density to parameters from the March 2010 Census Bureau's Current Population Survey. The sample also is weighted to match current patterns of telephone status and relative usage of landline and cell phones (for those with both), based on extrapolations from the 2010 National Health Interview Survey. The weighting procedure also accounts for the fact that respondents with both landline and cell phones have a greater probability of being included in the combined sample and adjusts for household size within the landline sample. Sampling errors and statistical tests of significance take into account the effect of weighting. The following table shows the sample sizes and the error attributable to sampling that would be expected at the $95 \%$ level of confidence for different groups in the survey:

| Group | Sample Size | Plus or minus... |
| :--- | :---: | ---: |
| Total sample | 1,504 | 3.0 percentage points |
| Republicans | 393 | 6.0 percentage points |
| Democrats | 479 | 5.5 percentage points |
| Independents | 551 | 5.5 percentage points |
| Conservative Reps | 286 | 7.0 percentage points |
| Moderate/Liberal Reps | 101 | 12.0 percentage points |
| Conserv/Mod Dems | 276 | 7.5 percentage points |
| Liberal Dems | 186 | 9.0 percentage points |
| Tea party movement: |  |  |
| Agree with movement | 347 | 6.5 percentage points |
| Disagree/no opinion | 1,115 | 4.0 percentage points |
| White | 1,085 | 4.0 percentage points |
| Black | 144 | 10.0 percentage points |
| Hispanic | 127 | 10.5 percentage points |
| $18-29$ | 194 | 8.5 percentage points |
| $30-49$ | 456 | 6.0 percentage points |
| $50-64$ | 498 | 5.5 percentage points |
| $65+$ | 341 | 6.5 percentage points |

Sample sizes and sampling errors for other subgroups are available upon request.
In addition to sampling error, one should bear in mind that question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can introduce error or bias into the findings of opinion polls.

## About the Pew Research Center for the People \& the Press

The Pew Research Center for the People \& the Press is an independent opinion research group that studies attitudes toward the press, politics and public policy issues. We are sponsored by The Pew Charitable Trusts and are one of seven projects that make up the Pew Research Center, a nonpartisan "fact tank" that provides information on the issues, attitudes and trends shaping America and the world.

The Center's purpose is to serve as a forum for ideas on the media and public policy through public opinion research. In this role it serves as an important information resource for political leaders, journalists, scholars, and public interest organizations. All of our current survey results are made available free of charge.

All of the Center's research and reports are collaborative products based on the input and analysis of the entire Center staff consisting of:

Andrew Kohut, Director
Scott Keeter, Director of Survey Research
Carroll Doherty and Michael Dimock, Associate Directors
Michael Remez, Senior Writer
Leah Christian and Jocelyn Kiley, Senior Researchers
Robert Suls, Shawn Neidorf, and Alec Tyson, Research Associates
Jacob Poushter and Gabriel Velasco, Research Analysts
Danielle Gewurz, Research Assistant
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# PEW RESEARCH CENTER FOR THE PEOPLE \& THE PRESS 2011 MARCH POLITICAL TYPOLOGY SURVEY A <br> FINAL TOPLINE 

Survey A: February 22-March 1, 2011 N=1504

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QUESTIONS A1-A4c, A24-A25 PREVIOUSLY RELEASED
QUESTIONS A4d, 17, A18-A19, 36-37 HELD FOR FUTURE RELEASE
NO QUESTIONS 2-3, 5-16, 20-23, 26-35, 38-44
```

ASK ALL SURVEY A:
Q.A45 And which comes closer to your own views - even if neither is exactly right. [READ AND RANDOMIZE PAIRS BUT NOT STATEMENTS WITHIN EACH PAIR]
a.

| $\begin{gathered} \text { Feb } 22-M a r 1 \\ 2011 \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} \text { Aug 19-22 } \\ 2010 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { Aug 11-17 } \\ 2009 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { Aug } \\ 2007 \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { July } \\ \hline 005 \end{gathered}$ | July | Mid-July $2003$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { March } \end{aligned}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | The Islamic religion is more |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 40 | likely than others to encourage violence among its believers | 35 | 38 | 45 | 36 | 46 | 44 | 25 |
|  | [OR] |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | The Islamic religion does not encourage violence more than |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 42 | others | 42 | 45 | 39 | 47 | 37 | 41 | 51 |
| 3 | Neither (VOL.) | 6 | 1 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 3 | 3 |
| 15 | Don't know/Refused (VOL.) | 18 | 15 | 12 | 14 | 15 | 12 | 21 |

NO QUESTIONS 47-55, 68-88
QUESTIONS A46, A56-A59, A65-A67 HELD FOR FUTURE RELEASE
QUESTIONS A45b, A60-A64 PREVIOUSLY RELEASED
ASK ALL:
PARTY In politics TODAY, do you consider yourself a Republican, Democrat, or independent?
ASK IF INDEP/NO PREF/OTHER/DK/REF (PARTY=3,4,5,9):
PARTYLN As of today do you lean more to the Republican Party or more to the Democratic Party?
(VOL.) (VOL.)

|  | Republican | Democrat | Independent | (VOL.) <br> No preference | (VOL.) Other party | (VOL.) DK/Ref | Lean Rep | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Lean } \\ & \text { Dem } \end{aligned}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Feb 22-Mar 1, 2011 | 24 | 33 | 37 | 3 | , | 3 | 15 | 16 |
| Feb 2-7, 2011 | 24 | 31 | 39 | 3 | * | 2 | 16 | 16 |
| Jan 5-9, 2011 | 27 | 32 | 35 | 4 | * | 2 | 15 | 14 |
| Dec 1-5, 2010 | 25 | 33 | 34 | 5 | 1 | 2 | 13 | 14 |
| Nov 4-7, 2010 | 26 | 30 | 37 | 4 | * | 2 | 17 | 13 |
| Oct 27-30, 2010 | 25 | 34 | 31 | 6 | 1 | 4 | 13 | 11 |
| Oct 13-18, 2010 | 25 | 31 | 36 | 4 | * | 3 | 16 | 13 |
| Aug 25-Sep 6, 2010 | 24 | 32 | 39 | 2 | * | 2 | 15 | 17 |
| Jul 21-Aug 5, 2010 | 26 | 33 | 34 | 4 | * | 3 | 14 | 14 |
| Jun 16-20, 2010 | 27 | 34 | 34 | 3 | 1 | 2 | 15 | 15 |
| Apr 21-26, 2010 | 26 | 33 | 36 | 3 | 1 | 3 | 16 | 13 |
| Mar 11-21, 2010 | 28 | 34 | 32 | 3 | * | 3 | 13 | 12 |
| Mar 10-14, 2010 | 22 | 33 | 37 | 6 | * | 3 | 14 | 13 |
| Yearly Totals |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2010 | 25.2 | 32.7 | 35.2 | 3.6 | . 4 | 2.8 | 14.5 | 14.1 |
| 2009 | 23.9 | 34.4 | 35.1 | 3.4 | . 4 | 2.8 | 13.1 | 15.7 |
| 2008 | 25.7 | 36.0 | 31.5 | 3.6 | . 3 | 3.0 | 10.6 | 15.2 |
| 2007 | 25.3 | 32.9 | 34.1 | 4.3 | . 4 | 2.9 | 10.9 | 17.0 |

## PARTY/PARTYLN CONTINUED...

| (ear |  |  |  | (VOL.) | (VOL.) |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  | No | Other | (VOL.) | Lean | Lean |
|  | Republican | Democrat | Independent | preference | party | DK/Ref | Rep | Dem |
| 2006 | 27.8 | 33.1 | 30.9 | 4.4 | . 3 | 3.4 | 10.5 | 15.1 |
| 2005 | 29.3 | 32.8 | 30.2 | 4.5 | . 3 | 2.8 | 10.3 | 14.9 |
| 2004 | 30.0 | 33.5 | 29.5 | 3.8 | . 4 | 3.0 | 11.7 | 13.4 |
| 2003 | 30.3 | 31.5 | 30.5 | 4.8 | . 5 | 2.5 | 12.0 | 12.6 |
| 2002 | 30.4 | 31.4 | 29.8 | 5.0 | . 7 | 2.7 | 12.4 | 11.6 |
| 2001 | 29.0 | 33.2 | 29.5 | 5.2 | . 6 | 2.6 | 11.9 | 11.6 |
| 2001 Post-Sept 11 | 30.9 | 31.8 | 27.9 | 5.2 | . 6 | 3.6 | 11.7 | 9.4 |
| 2001 Pre-Sept 11 | 27.3 | 34.4 | 30.9 | 5.1 | . 6 | 1.7 | 12.1 | 13.5 |
| 2000 | 28.0 | 33.4 | 29.1 | 5.5 | . 5 | 3.6 | 11.6 | 11.7 |
| 1999 | 26.6 | 33.5 | 33.7 | 3.9 | . 5 | 1.9 | 13.0 | 14.5 |
| 1998 | 27.9 | 33.7 | 31.1 | 4.6 | . 4 | 2.3 | 11.6 | 13.1 |
| 1997 | 28.0 | 33.4 | 32.0 | 4.0 | . 4 | 2.3 | 12.2 | 14.1 |
| 1996 | 28.9 | 33.9 | 31.8 | 3.0 | . 4 | 2.0 | 12.1 | 14.9 |
| 1995 | 31.6 | 30.0 | 33.7 | 2.4 | . 6 | 1.3 | 15.1 | 13.5 |
| 1994 | 30.1 | 31.5 | 33.5 | 1.3 | -- | 3.6 | 13.7 | 12.2 |
| 1993 | 27.4 | 33.6 | 34.2 | 4.4 | 1.5 | 2.9 | 11.5 | 14.9 |
| 1992 | 27.6 | 33.7 | 34.7 | 1.5 | 0 | 2.5 | 12.6 | 16.5 |
| 1991 | 30.9 | 31.4 | 33.2 | 0 | 1.4 | 3.0 | 14.7 | 10.8 |
| 1990 | 30.9 | 33.2 | 29.3 | 1.2 | 1.9 | 3.4 | 12.4 | 11.3 |
| 1989 | 33 | 33 | 34 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 1987 | 26 | 35 | 39 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |

## ASK ALL: <br> TEAPARTY2

From what you know, do you agree or disagree with the Tea Party movement, or don't you have an opinion either way?

Feb 22-Mar 1, 2011
Feb 2-7, 2011 ${ }^{1}$

| $\frac{\text { Agree }}{}$ | $\frac{\text { Disagree }}{}$ | No opinion |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 20 | 25 | 52 |
| 22 | 22 | 53 |
| 24 | 22 | 50 |
| 22 | 26 | 49 |
| 27 | 22 | 49 |
| 29 | 25 | 32 |
| 28 | 24 | 30 |
| 29 | 26 | 32 |
| 22 | 18 | 37 |
| 24 | 18 | 30 |
| 25 | 18 | 31 |
| 24 | 14 | 29 |


| (VOL.) <br> Haven't <br> heard of | Not <br> (VOL.) | Nefused <br> heard of/ | DK |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  | -- |
| 2 | 2 | -- |  |
| 2 |  | 1 | -- |
| 2 |  | 2 | -- |
| 1 |  | 1 | -- |
| -- | 1 | 13 |  |
| -- | 1 | 16 |  |
| -- | 1 | 13 |  |
| -- | 1 | 21 |  |
| -- | $*$ | 27 |  |
| -- | 1 | 25 |  |
| -- | 1 | 31 |  |

[^0]
[^0]:    1
    In the February 2-7, 2011 survey and before, question read "...do you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree with the Tea Party movement..."In October 2010 and earlier, question was asked only of those who had heard or read a lot or a little about the Tea Party. In May through October, it was described as: "the Tea Party movement that has been involved in campaigns and protests in the U.S. over the past year." In March it was described as "the Tea Party Protests that have taken place in the U.S. over the past year."

