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Partisanship Colors Views of COVID-19 Handling Across Advanced Economies

Most see their society as more divided than prior to the pandemic – and this view is especially common in the U.S.

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How we did this

This Pew Research Center analysis focuses on attitudes toward the coronavirus pandemic in 19 advanced economies in North America, Europe, the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific region. Views of how each surveyed country has handled the pandemic and COVID-19's effect on national unity are examined in the context of long-term trend data. The report also explores views of how the political system has reacted to the coronavirus outbreak and the importance of getting a coronavirus vaccine.

For non-U.S. data, this report draws on nationally representative surveys of 20,944 adults from Feb. 14 to June 3, 2022. All surveys were conducted over the phone with adults in Canada, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Australia, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore and South Korea. Surveys were conducted face to face in Hungary, Poland and Israel.

In the United States, we surveyed 3,581 U.S. adults from March 21 to 27, 2022. Everyone who took part in this survey is a member of the Center's American Trends Panel (ATP), an online survey panel that is recruited through national, random sampling of residential addresses. This way nearly all U.S. adults have a chance of selection. The survey is weighted to be representative of the U.S. adult population by gender, race, ethnicity, partisan affiliation, education and other categories. Read more about the [ATP's methodology](#).

Here are the [questions](#) used for the report, along with responses, and the [survey methodology](#).

Partisanship Colors Views of COVID-19 Handling Across Advanced Economies


Most see their society as more divided than prior to the pandemic – and this view is especially common in the U.S.

Publics are increasingly satisfied with the way their country is dealing with the COVID-19 pandemic, according to a recent Pew Research Center survey in 19 countries. A median of 68% think their country has done a good job dealing with the coronavirus outbreak, with majorities saying this in every country surveyed except Japan. However, as the survey also highlights, most believe the pandemic has created greater divisions in their societies and exposed weaknesses in their political systems. And across these nations, partisan divisions play a key role in shaping attitudes toward the pandemic.

Overall, a median of 61% think their country is more divided now than it was prior to the outbreak of the pandemic, compared with a median of 32% who think their society is now more united. As was [also the case in 2021](#), the United States has the highest share who say the country is more divided than before the pandemic, with 81% holding that view. Around three-quarters or more also see disunity in the Netherlands, Germany, Canada and France. Only in Singapore, Sweden and Malaysia do majorities feel more *united* than before the pandemic.

Many also believe the pandemic has revealed weaknesses in their political systems. On balance, more people say their country is *failing* to handle the COVID-19 outbreak in ways that show the *weaknesses* of their political system (a median of 52%) than see their country *effectively* handling the pandemic in ways that show the *strengths* of their system (a median of 44%). In the U.S., around two-thirds see the country struggling in ways that reveal political weakness, and a majority also feels this way in the Netherlands, Greece, Germany, Japan, Australia and South Korea. Only in Singapore, Hungary, Israel and Sweden does a majority feel the opposite – that the way their country has handled the coronavirus outbreak highlights their country’s political strengths.

Many say pandemic reveals social divisions, political flaws in their country




Source: Spring 2022 Global Attitudes Survey. Q12&13.

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Government support closely tied to COVID-19 attitudes



Note: Statistically significant differences shown in **bold**. In the U.S., supporters of the governing party are Democrats and independents who lean Democratic and nonsupporters are Republicans and those who lean Republican. Governing party support is based on the political party or parties holding power at the time the survey was fielded. See Appendix A for more information on how governing party supporters are defined in other countries.

Source: Spring 2022 Global Attitudes Survey. Q11-13.

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All of these opinions about the COVID-19 pandemic and its effect on government and society are heavily colored by partisanship. In almost every country, supporters of the governing party are much more likely to say their government is handling the coronavirus outbreak well, to say their country is handling the pandemic effectively in ways that show the strengths of the political system and to say their country is more united compared with before the COVID-19 pandemic than people who do not support the governing party (for more on how the governing party in each country is defined, see [Appendix A](#)). In many cases, the differences are quite substantial. For example, Poles who support Law and Justice (PiS) are around twice as likely – or more – than those who do not support the governing party to say the government has done a good job (89% vs. 44%, respectively), to say the country is united (55% vs. 20%) and to believe the pandemic has illuminated the political system’s strengths (83% vs. 28%).

Views of the economy are also closely related to all of these opinions. Those who say their economy is in good shape are much more likely to approve of their government’s handling of the pandemic and to say their government’s response highlights the strengths of their political system than those who think the economy is in bad shape. People with rosy views of the economy also see the country as more united than those who have bleaker economic assessments.

The survey also asks about the relative importance of getting a coronavirus vaccine to be a good member of society.¹ In every country, around two-thirds or more say it’s at least somewhat important to do so. But the share who says it’s *very* important to get the COVID vaccine in order to be a good member of society varies widely, from around four-in-ten or fewer who say this in France, South Korea, Hungary and Poland to around seven-in-ten or more who feel this way in Singapore, Sweden and Spain. And, in this case, opinion is related to on-the-ground reality: Countries with higher shares of people who report that it’s very important to get vaccinated also have higher rates of vaccination across the population.


¹ This question was asked as part of a broader battery of issues that may be considered important for being a good member of society. These questions will be released separately at a later date.

Still, as with all other coronavirus-related attitudes explored here, the perceived importance of the vaccine is heavily partisan in nature. In every country surveyed, those who support the governing party or coalition are much more likely to say it's very important to be vaccinated than those who do not support the ruling party. In Canada, for example, 80% of those who support the governing Liberal Party think getting a vaccine is very important, compared with 51% of those who do not identify as Liberal partisans.

In many countries, those on the ideological left are significantly more likely than those on the right to say getting a coronavirus vaccine is very important. However, this pattern is reversed in Hungary, Poland and France.

Supporters of governing party more likely to think vaccines are very important

% who say getting a coronavirus vaccine is **very important** to be a good member of society



Note: All differences shown are statistically significant differences. In the U.S., supporters of the governing party are Democrats and those who lean Democratic and nonsupporters are Republicans and those who lean Republican. Governing party support is based on the political party or parties holding power at the time the survey was fielded. See Appendix A for more information on how governing party supporters are defined in other countries.

Source: Spring 2022 Global Attitudes Survey. Q23f.

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
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The U.S. is exceptionally divided on the pandemic

The U.S. is one of the most divided countries when it comes to attitudes about the coronavirus outbreak. For example, the partisan gap over the importance of getting a COVID-19 vaccine is 44 percentage points, with Democrats and independents who lean toward the Democratic Party far more likely than Republicans and GOP leaners to say getting a vaccine is *very* important. Relatedly, 68% of Americans on the ideological left (liberals, in American parlance) report that it's *very* important to get a coronavirus vaccine to be a good member of society, compared with 22% of those on the right (conservatives). This ideological divide is the largest among the 19 countries surveyed.

Americans most likely to say COVID-19 exposed political weaknesses, left them more divided

% who say their country is ...



Source: Spring 2022 Global Attitudes Survey. Q12 &13.
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And, indeed, Americans do stand out among all 19 countries surveyed for being the most likely to *perceive* division in the country and the most likely to say that the country's response to the pandemic has highlighted the failings of the political system. In fact, only in the U.S. does a majority of even the *governing party* supporters – Democrats, in this case – say the virus has laid bare the country's political failings. (For more on U.S. attitudes about the coronavirus pandemic, see ["Americans Reflect on Nation's COVID-19 Response"](#).)

These are among the major findings of a new Pew Research Center survey, conducted from Feb. 14 to June 3, 2022, among 24,525 adults in 19 countries. The survey also finds substantial age gaps in many countries across the four questions analyzed in this report. In most countries surveyed, adults over age 50 are much more likely than adults ages 18 to 29 to say the coronavirus outbreak has been handled well and to say that their country is effectively handling the outbreak in ways that show the strengths of the political system. In over half the surveyed countries, older people are also more likely to think their country is now more united than before the coronavirus outbreak. Finally, older adults are likelier to say that getting a coronavirus vaccine is important to being a good member of society in nearly every country surveyed.

Most look favorably upon their country's COVID-19 response

Even as [COVID-19 variants](#) have risen and fallen and [pandemic policies have ebbed and flowed](#), majorities in most places approve of their country's coronavirus response: A 19-country median of 68% say their government has done a good job dealing with the pandemic, while a median of 32% say their country has done a bad job.

Positive feelings are most common in Singapore, where nearly nine-in-ten adults say the city-state has done a good job dealing with the coronavirus outbreak. Singapore [abandoned its "zero COVID" policy last October](#), but it was largely [successful at suppressing the spread of the virus](#) prior to the development of effective vaccines.


Ratings are also very high in Sweden, where the government [bucked the international consensus](#) and [refused to implement mandatory restrictions](#) early on to reduce the spread of the virus. About eight-in-ten Swedes say their country has done a good job dealing with the coronavirus outbreak.

Opinions are least positive in Japan, where 52% say the government's response to the coronavirus outbreak has been good and 47% say it has been bad.

In many countries, adults are now happier with their government's COVID-19 response than they were last spring. Belgium, in particular, has seen an increase in the share who say the country has handled the coronavirus outbreak well. In 2021, half of Belgian adults thought their government had done a good job dealing with

At least half say their country has dealt with the pandemic well

% who say their country has done a ___ job dealing with the coronavirus outbreak



Note: Those who did not answer not shown.

Source: Spring 2022 Global Attitudes Survey. Q11.

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the pandemic. Now, nearly three-quarters of Belgians (73%) rate the response positively. Ratings have also significantly improved in Spain, Japan, the U.S., France, Italy, Sweden, Germany and Canada.

In three countries, however, coronavirus response assessments have become more critical. South Korea reports a 13-point decrease in the share who say that their country has done a good job responding to the coronavirus outbreak. Opinions in Singapore are down slightly, from 97% in 2021 to 88% in 2022. Australia, which in 2020 and 2021 had near unanimous agreement that the country had done a good job dealing with COVID-19, shows a 19-point decline in the share who say that in 2022. Since the question was last asked in 2021, [Australia ditched its “COVID zero” stance](#) after frequent mass lockdowns in many state capitals and the spread of the delta variant.

COVID-19 response assessments are more positive in many countries

% who say their country has done a **good** job dealing with the coronavirus outbreak

	Summer 2020	Fall 2020	Spring 2021	Spring 2022	2021-2022 change
	%	%	%	%	
Belgium	61	—	50	73	▲23
Spain	54	—	44	64	▲20
Japan	55	—	35	52	▲17
U.S.	47	41	42	58	▲16
France	59	54	47	62	▲15
Italy	74	—	59	74	▲15
Sweden	71	—	67	82	▲15
Germany	88	77	51	64	▲13
Canada	88	—	65	70	▲5
UK	46	48	64	68	▲4
Netherlands	87	—	58	61	▲3
Greece	—	—	60	61	▲1
Singapore	—	—	97	88	▼9
South Korea	86	—	70	57	▼13
Australia	97	—	95	76	▼19

Note: Statistically significant changes in **bold**. In 2020, U.S. surveys were conducted over the phone.

Source: Spring 2022 Global Attitudes Survey, Q11.

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
Pandemic response ratings are significantly more positive among supporters of the governing party or parties than nonsupporters in every country but Malaysia. For example, 72% of supporters of [German Chancellor Olaf Scholz's three-party "traffic light coalition"](#) say Germany's pandemic response has been good, while only 57% of nonsupporters hold that view – a difference of 15 percentage points.

Views of COVID-19 responses are also closely tied to assessments of the current economic situation. As many countries [grapple with rapid inflation, supply shocks from the Russian invasion of Ukraine](#) and the [threat of global growth slowdown](#), the economic recovery from the pandemic has been unsteady. Those who have positive views of the current economic situation in their country are more likely to think their country's coronavirus response has been good in every country surveyed. This includes double-digit differences in all countries surveyed and differences of 30 points or more in 9 countries.

Though there was a strong relationship between positive assessments of a country's handling of the pandemic and the number of virus-related deaths in that country [in 2021](#), the same is not true in 2022. In fact, views of a country's handling of the pandemic in 2022 are largely unrelated to the number of deaths in the country, the number of cases or the vaccination rates.

Economic assessments tied to views of how pandemic was handled

% who say their country has done a **good** job dealing with the coronavirus outbreak, among those who say the current economic situation in their country is ...



Note: All differences shown are statistically significant.
 Source: Spring 2022 Global Attitudes Survey, Q11.
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Most people say the pandemic has divided their society


Across the 19 countries surveyed, people largely feel their society is more divided now than before the coronavirus outbreak. A median of 61% feel the pandemic has divided their country, while only 32% think it has left their country more united than before. This includes majorities in 13 countries who say their country is more divided than before the pandemic.

Once again, the U.S. is the country with the [highest share who say that the country is more divided](#) than before the pandemic, with 81% holding that view. About eight-in-ten in the Netherlands and Germany also feel their respective countries have seen increased division since the coronavirus outbreak.

Singapore, Sweden and Malaysia stand out for having majorities say their country is now more *united* than before the pandemic. Views in Japan, Belgium and Italy are split, with some seeing increased division and others seeing increased unity.

Majorities in most places say coronavirus has been divisive

% who say their country is now more ___ than before the coronavirus outbreak



Note: Those who did not answer not shown.

Source: Spring 2022 Global Attitudes Survey. Q12.

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
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While perceptions of pandemic-related division continue to be common in many countries, they are nonetheless also significantly down from last year in several countries. For example, 59% of Japanese adults said their country was more divided than before the pandemic, when asked in 2021 [just ahead of the Tokyo Olympics](#). Today, only 40% in Japan say the country is more divided. Double-digit decreases in the share who say their country is more divided also appear in Belgium, Sweden, Spain and Italy.

In Canada and Australia, the opposite is true. The share of Canadians and Australians who say their country is more divided has steadily increased since the question was first asked in the summer of 2020.

Significant declines in perceptions of pandemic-related division in many places

% who say their country is now more *divided* than before the coronavirus outbreak



Note: Statistically significant changes shown in **bold**. 2020 U.S. survey was conducted by phone.

Source: Spring 2022 Global Attitudes Survey, Q12.


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Though majorities in many countries see increased social divisions, the question of the pandemic’s effect on national unity is itself divisive. One major divide is between those who support the governing party or parties in their country and those who do not. In every country but Germany and the Netherlands, those who do not support the governing party or parties are more likely to see increased division than those who support the party or parties in power. For instance, only three-in-ten Poles who support the ruling Law and Justice Party (PiS) say there has been increased division since the coronavirus outbreak; among those who do not support PiS, two-thirds say Poland is more divided.

Government detractors more likely to see pandemic-related division than government supporters

% who say their country is now more **divided** than before the coronavirus outbreak



Note: Only statistically significant differences shown. In the U.S., supporters of the governing party are Democrats and independents who lean Democratic and nonsupporters are Republicans and those who lean Republican. Governing party support is based on the political party or parties holding power at the time the survey was fielded. See Appendix A for more information on how governing party supporters are defined in other countries.
 Source: Spring 2022 Global Attitudes Survey, Q12.
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
More say COVID-19 exposed the weaknesses in their political system than the strengths

In most countries surveyed, half or more say their country is failing to effectively handle the pandemic in ways that show the weaknesses of their political system. Overall, a median of 52% across the 19 countries surveyed see their country struggling in a way that reveals their political weaknesses. While this opinion is highest in the U.S., where 66% feel that way, a majority share the sentiment in the Netherlands, Greece, Germany, Japan, Australia and South Korea.

Still, a median of 44% say the opposite – that their country is effectively handling the coronavirus outbreak in ways that show the strengths of their political system. This opinion is highest by far in Singapore, where around three-quarters hold this view, but a majority also feel this way in Hungary, Israel and Sweden.

Many say COVID-19 highlighted the weaknesses of their political system

% who say their country is ...




Note: Those who did not answer not shown.
 Source: Spring 2022 Global Attitudes Survey, Q13.
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People who support the current party or parties in power are much more likely to say their country is effectively handling the COVID-19 outbreak in ways that show the strengths of their political system than those who do not support those currently in office. In some countries, these differences are massive. For example, in Greece, 79% of those who support New Democracy (ND), the party currently in power, think that their country’s effective handling of COVID-19 highlights the strengths of the Greek political system, while only 20% of those who do not support ND feel the same.

Partisans differ over whether COVID-19 has revealed their country’s political strengths or weaknesses

% who say their country is *effectively handling* the coronavirus outbreak in ways that show the *strengths* of the political system



Note: Only statistically significant differences shown. In the U.S., supporters of the governing party are Democrats and independents who lean Democratic and nonsupporters are Republicans and those who lean Republican. Governing party support is based on the political party or parties holding power at the time the survey was fielded. See Appendix A for more information on how governing party supporters are defined in other countries. Source: Spring 2022 Global Attitudes Survey. Q13. “Partisanship Colors Views of COVID-19 Handling Across Advanced Economies”

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In Poland, too, the difference between Law and Justice supporters and others is 55 percentage points and in France, En Marche supporters differ from others by 45 points.²


While there is also a partisan gap in the U.S., the gap is somewhat smaller: 42% of Democrats and independents who lean toward the Democratic Party think how the U.S. has handled the pandemic demonstrates the strengths of the political system, compared with 19% of Republicans and GOP leaners. Notably, the U.S. is one of the only countries where a minority of those who support the governing party think their political system appears strong on the basis of its pandemic approach.

² After the survey was fielded, [French President Emmanuel Macron announced](#) that his party, “En Marche,” would be renamed “Renaissance.”

The same is true when it comes to whether people think their country is more united or divided now than it was before the pandemic. In every country, those who think the country is now more united than it was before are more likely to say COVID-19 highlighted the strengths of their political system than those who think their country is more divided. The magnitude of these differences is often quite sizable. For example, in Australia, 73% of those who think the country is now more united say they see the strengths in their political system thanks to the pandemic, compared with 32% of those who think the country is now more divided.

People who see their country as more united following COVID-19 more likely to say their political system has effectively handled the outbreak

% who say their country is *effectively handling* the coronavirus outbreak in ways that show the *strengths* of the political system, among those who say their country is now ___ than before the coronavirus outbreak



Note: All differences shown are statistically significant.
 Source: Spring 2022 Global Attitudes Survey, Q13.
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In most countries surveyed, older people are more likely than younger people to say that the way their country has handled the coronavirus outbreak shows the strengths of their political system. In the United Kingdom, for example, 58% of those ages 50 and older think this, compared with 44% of those ages 30 to 49 and only 29% of those under 30.


In every country surveyed, people who think the economy is in good shape are also more likely to say their system is effectively handling the coronavirus pandemic in ways that show their political strengths than those who think the economy is in bad shape.

Most see vaccines as at least somewhat important for being a good citizen

Around two-thirds or more in every country surveyed say it's at least somewhat important to get a coronavirus vaccine to be a good member of society. But, the share that describes it as *very* important varies substantially across the 19 nations, from around seven-in-ten who feel this way in Singapore, Sweden and Spain to around four-in-ten or fewer in France, South Korea, Hungary and Poland.

Majorities see vaccination as at least somewhat important for being a good member of society

% who say getting a coronavirus vaccine is ___ to be a good member of society



Source: Spring 2022 Global Attitudes Survey. Q23f.


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Across the 19 countries surveyed, there is a positive relationship between the share of the public who think it's very important to get a vaccine to be a good member of society and the actual population that was fully or partially vaccinated at the time that fieldwork began ($r=0.64$).

Vaccination rates globally reflect public opinion towards vaccines

% of population fully or partially vaccinated at the time fieldwork began



Source: COVID-19 vaccination data from Our World in Data, "Total COVID-19 vaccine doses administered per 100 people". Accessed June 21, 2022. Spring 2022 Global Attitudes Survey. Q23f.


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In almost every country, those ages 50 and older are more likely to say it's crucial to be vaccinated to be a good member of society than younger people – especially those under 30. Opinion across age groups often varies widely, too. In South Korea, for example, 54% of those 50 and older think it is very important, compared with around a third of those ages 30 to 49 and about one-in-five of younger adults.

Older people tend to see vaccines as more important for being a good citizen than younger people

% who say getting a coronavirus vaccine is **very important** to be a good member of society



Note: Only statistically significant differences shown.
 Source: Spring 2022 Global Attitudes Survey. Q23f.
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Partisan preferences also play a strong role in whether people think vaccination is crucial to be good members of society. In every nation, those who support the party or parties who are currently governing are much more likely to say it is very important to be vaccinated than those who do not support the ruling parties. This difference is largest in the U.S., where 64% of Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents think vaccines are very important, compared with 20% of Republicans and Republican-leaning independents.

Supporters of governing parties more likely to consider coronavirus vaccines important to being good citizen

% who say getting a coronavirus vaccine is **very important** to be a good member of society

	Does not support the governing party/parties	Supports the governing party/parties	Diff
	%	%	
U.S.	20	64	+44
Greece	38	72	+34
Poland	24	54	+30
Canada	51	80	+29
Israel	33	60	+27
Germany	46	70	+24
France	38	60	+22
Spain	63	84	+21
Hungary	32	52	+20
Sweden	66	86	+20
Netherlands	44	62	+18
Italy	60	73	+13
Singapore	65	78	+13
Australia	64	76	+12
UK	65	75	+10
Belgium	46	55	+9
Japan	57	64	+7
Malaysia	58	65	+7

Note: All differences shown are statistically significant. In the U.S., supporters of the governing party are Democrats and those who lean Democratic and nonsupporters are Republicans and those who lean Republican. Governing party support is based on the political party or parties holding power at the time the survey was fielded. See Appendix A for more information on how governing party supporters are defined in other countries.

Source: Spring 2022 Global Attitudes Survey. Q23f.

“Partisanship Colors Views of COVID-19 Handling Across Advanced Economies”


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There are also large ideological differences in nearly every country where left-right ideology is asked. In the U.S., South Korea, Canada, Italy, Israel and Spain those who place themselves on the left are more likely to call vaccination very important for being a good citizen than those on the right; however, the opposite is true in Hungary, Poland and France. In the U.S., again, the differences between people on either side of the ideological spectrum is greater than in any other country surveyed (46 percentage points).

In some cases, right-wing populist party supporters are less likely than nonsupporters to say it is very important to get a vaccine. For instance, only 24% of Germans with a favorable view of Alternative for Germany (AfD) say vaccination is very important, while 64% of those with an unfavorable view say getting a vaccine is very important. For more information on European populist parties, see [Appendix B](#).

Americans are the most ideologically divided about the importance of a COVID vaccine

% who say getting a coronavirus vaccine is **very important** to be a good member of society, among those on the ideological ...



Note: Statistically significant differences shown in **bold**. In the U.S., ideology is defined as conservative (right), moderate (center) and liberal (left).

Source: Spring 2022 Global Attitudes Survey, Q23f.

“Partisanship Colors Views of COVID-19 Handling Across Advanced Economies”

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CORRECTION (Oct. 31, 2022): The chart “Americans are the most ideologically divided about the importance of a COVID vaccine” and text related to ideological differences in views of the COVID-19 vaccine have been updated to correct a statistical significance labeling error for Germany and Greece. These changes did not affect the overall narrative of the analysis.

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Appendix A: Political categorization

For this report, we grouped people into two political categories: those who support the governing political party (or parties) and those who do not. These categories were coded based on the party or parties in power at the time the survey was fielded, and on respondents' answers to a question asking them which political party, if any, they identified with in their survey public.³

In publics where multiple political parties govern in coalition (as in many European countries), survey respondents who indicated support for any parties in the coalition were grouped together. In Germany, for example, where the SPD governed with the Alliance 90/The Greens and the FDP at the time of the survey, supporters of all three parties were grouped together. In publics where different political parties occupy the executive and legislative branches of government, the party holding the executive branch was considered the governing party.

Survey respondents who did not indicate support for any political party, or who refused to identify with one, were considered to be *not* supporting the government in power.

Below is a table that outlines the governing political parties in each survey public.

³ Governing parties were not updated to account for elections that occurred after the survey was fielded and resulted in a new party (or parties) serving in government. Language used to measure party identification varied public by public.

Political categorization

Public	Governing political party(ies)
Australia	Liberal-National Party/Country Liberal Party/Liberal, The Nationals
Belgium	Ecologists (Ecolo), Flemish Christian Democrats (CD&V), Green (Groen), Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats (Open VLD), Reformist Movement (MR), Socialist Party (PS), Vooruit
Canada	Liberal Party
France	En Marche
Germany	Alliance 90/The Greens, Free Democratic Party (FDP), Social Democratic Party (SPD)
Greece	New Democracy
Hungary	Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Alliance
Israel*	Blue-White, New Hope, Israel is Our Home, Labor Party, Meretz, Ra'am (United Arab List), Yesh Atid (There is a Future), Yamina
Italy	Democratic Party (PD), Five Star Movement (M5S), Forza Italia, Free and Equal (LEU), Lega
Japan	Komeito, Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)
Malaysia	Barisan Nasional (BN), United Malays National Organization (UMNO)
Netherlands	Christian Democratic Appeal, ChristianUnion, Democrats 66 (D66), People's Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD)
Poland	Law and Justice (PiS)
Singapore	People's Action Party
Spain	Podemos, Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE), United Left (IU)
Sweden	Swedish Social Democratic Party (SAP)
UK	Conservative Party
U.S.	Democratic Party

* In Israel, survey conducted March 16 – May 1, prior to the collapse of Prime Minister Naftali Bennett's governing coalition.

Note: South Korea was excluded from this analysis because party support is not asked. Only parties represented in the federal government are shown.

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Appendix B: Classifying European political parties

Classifying parties as populist

Although experts generally agree that populist political leaders or parties display high levels of anti-elitism, definitions of populism vary. We use three measures to classify populist parties: anti-elite ratings from the [2019 Chapel Hill Expert Survey \(CHES\)](#), Norris' [Global Party Survey](#) and [The PopuList](#). We define a party as populist when at least two of these three measures classify it as such.

CHES, which was conducted from February to May 2020, asked 421 political scientists specializing in political parties and European integration to evaluate the 2019 positions of 277 European political parties across all European Union member states. CHES results are regularly used by academics to classify parties with regard to their left-right ideological leanings, their key party platform positions and their degree of populism, among other things.

We measure anti-elitism using an average of two variables in the CHES data. First, we used “PEOPLE_VS_ELITE,” which asked the experts to measure the parties with regard to their position on direct vs. representative democracy, where 0 means that the parties support elected officeholders making the most important decisions and 10 means that “the people,” not politicians, should make the most important decisions. Second, we used “ANTI-ELITE_SALIENCY,” which is a measure of the salience of anti-establishment and anti-elite rhetoric for that particular party, with 0 meaning not at all salient and 10 meaning extremely salient. The average of these two measures is shown in the table below as “anti-elitism.” In all countries, we consider parties that score at or above a 7.0 as “populist.”

The [Global Party Survey](#), which was conducted from November to December 2019, asked 1,861 experts on political parties, public opinion, elections and legislative behavior to evaluate the ideological values, issue position and populist rhetoric of parties in countries on which they are an expert, classifying a total of 1,051 parties in 163 countries. We used “TYPE_POPULISM,” which categorizes populist rhetoric by parties. We added only “strongly populist” parties using this measure. In Italy, experts were asked to categorize the Center-Right coalition instead of individual parties within the coalition. The coalition includes Lega and Forza Italia. For both parties, we have used the coalition rating of “strongly populist.”

The PopuList is an ongoing project to classify European political parties as populist, far right, far left and/or euroskeptic. [The project](#) specifically looks at parties that “obtained at least 2% of the vote in at least one national parliamentary election since 1998.” It is based on collaboration

between academic experts and journalists. The PopuList classifies parties that emphasize the will of the people against the elite as populist.⁴

Reform UK, formerly the Brexit Party, is only classified as populist on one measure but is still included for analysis in the report. It is not included in the PopuList and does not meet our anti-elite CHES threshold of 7.0, but is considered a right-wing populist party by the Global Party Survey and [other experts](#).

Classifying parties as left, right or center

We can further classify these traditional and populist parties into three groups: left, right and center. When classifying parties based on ideology, we relied on the variable “LRGEN” in the CHES dataset, which asked experts to rate the positions of each party in terms of its overall ideological stance, with 0 meaning extreme left, 5 meaning center and 10 meaning extreme right. We define left parties as those that score below 4.5 and right parties as those above 5.5. Center parties have ratings between 4.5 and 5.5.

⁴ Mudde, Cas. 2004. “[The Populist Zeitgeist](#).” Government and Opposition.

European populist party classifications

Party	Country	2019 Left-right	2019 Anti-elitism	2019 Global Party Survey	The PopuList
Populist parties on the left					
La France Insoumise	France	1.3	8.3	Strongly populist	Populist
Podemos	Spain	1.9	7.7	--	Populist
Syriza	Greece	2.3	7.0	--	Populist
Populist parties in the center					
Five Star Movement (M5S)	Italy	4.8	9.2	Strongly populist	Populist
Populist parties on the right					
Forza Italia	Italy	6.9	4.1	Strongly populist	Populist
Law and Justice (PiS)	Poland	7.6	6.9	Strongly populist	Populist
Jobbik	Hungary	7.7	6.1	Strongly populist	Populist
Reform UK*	UK	8.2	5.3	Strongly populist	--
Fidesz	Hungary	8.3	6.5	Strongly populist	Populist
Sweden Democrats	Sweden	8.5	7.5	Strongly populist	Populist
Party for Freedom (PVV)	Netherlands	8.7	9.5	Strongly populist	Populist
Lega	Italy	8.8	7.6	Strongly populist	Populist
Greek Solution	Greece	9.0	7.6	--	Populist
Alternative for Germany (AfD)	Germany	9.2	9.0	Strongly populist	Populist
Forum for Democracy (FvD)	Netherlands	9.5	9.7	--	Populist
Flemish Interest	Belgium	9.6	8.5	Strongly populist	Populist
Vox	Spain	9.7	4.1	Strongly populist	Populist
National Rally	France	9.8	8.6	Strongly populist	Populist

*Previously named the Brexit Party

Notes: Left-right indicates the average score CHES experts gave each party on an 11-point left-right scale. Scores for anti-elitism are an average of party position on direct vs. representative democracy and the salience of anti-elite rhetoric within the party.

Source: CHES (2019). Global Party Survey (2019). The PopuList (2019).

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Methodology

Pew Research Center's Spring 2022 Global Attitudes Survey

Results for the survey are based on telephone and face-to-face interviews conducted under the direction of Gallup and Langer Research Associates. The results are based on national samples, unless otherwise noted. More details about our international survey methodology and country-specific sample designs are [available here](#). Results for the U.S. survey are based on data from the American Trends Panel.

The American Trends Panel survey methodology

Overview

The American Trends Panel (ATP), created by Pew Research Center, is a nationally representative panel of randomly selected U.S. adults. Panelists participate via self-administered web surveys. Panelists who do not have internet access at home are provided with a tablet and wireless internet connection. Interviews are conducted in both English and Spanish. The panel is being managed by Ipsos.

Data in this report is drawn from the panel wave conducted from March 21 to March 27, 2022. A total of 3,581 panelists responded out of 4,120 who were sampled, for a response rate of 87%. The cumulative response rate

accounting for nonresponse to the recruitment surveys and attrition is 3%. The break-off rate among panelists who logged on to the survey and completed at least one item is 1%. The margin of sampling error for the full sample of 3,581 respondents is plus or minus 2.3 percentage points.

Panel recruitment

The ATP was created in 2014, with the first cohort of panelists invited to join the panel at the end of a large, national, landline and

American Trends Panel recruitment surveys

Recruitment dates	Mode	Invited	Joined	Active panelists remaining
Jan. 23 to March 16, 2014	Landline/ cell RDD	9,809	5,338	1,598
Aug. 27 to Oct. 4, 2015	Landline/ cell RDD	6,004	2,976	938
April 25 to June 4, 2017	Landline/ cell RDD	3,905	1,628	470
Aug. 8 to Oct. 31, 2018	ABS	9,396	8,778	4,425
Aug. 19 to Nov. 30, 2019	ABS	5,900	4,720	1,625
June 1 to July 19, 2020; Feb. 10 to March 31, 2021	ABS	3,197	2,812	1,694
May 29 to July 7, 2021				
Sept. 16 to Nov. 1, 2021	ABS	1,329	1,162	935
	Total	39,540	27,414	11,685

Note: Approximately once per year, panelists who have not participated in multiple consecutive waves or who did not complete an annual profiling survey are removed from the panel. Panelists also become inactive if they ask to be removed from the panel.

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cellphone random-digit-dial survey that was conducted in both English and Spanish. Two additional recruitments were conducted using the same method in 2015 and 2017, respectively. Across these three surveys, a total of 19,718 adults were invited to join the ATP, of whom 9,942 (50%) agreed to participate.

In August 2018, the ATP switched from telephone to address-based recruitment. Invitations were sent to a stratified, random sample of households selected from the U.S. Postal Service's Delivery Sequence File. Sampled households receive mailings asking a randomly selected adult to complete a survey online. A question at the end of the survey asks if the respondent is willing to join the ATP. Starting in 2020, another stage was added to the recruitment. Households that do not respond to the online survey are sent a paper version of the questionnaire, \$5 and a postage-paid return envelope. A subset of the adults returning the paper version of the survey are invited to join the ATP. This subset of adults receive a follow-up mailing with a \$10 pre-incentive and invitation to join the ATP.

Across the four address-based recruitments, a total of 19,822 adults were invited to join the ATP, of whom 17,472 agreed to join the panel and completed an initial profile survey. In each household, the adult with the next birthday was asked to go online to complete a survey, at the end of which they were invited to join the panel. Of the 27,414 individuals who have ever joined the ATP, 11,685 remained active panelists and continued to receive survey invitations at the time this survey was conducted.

The U.S. Postal Service's Delivery Sequence File has been estimated to cover as much as 98% of the population, although some studies suggest that the coverage could be in the low 90% range.⁵ The American Trends Panel never uses breakout routers or chains that direct respondents to additional surveys.

Sample design

This study featured a stratified random sample from the ATP. The overall target population for this survey was non-institutionalized persons ages 18 and older, living in the U.S., including Alaska and Hawaii.

Questionnaire development and testing

The questionnaire was developed by Pew Research Center in consultation with Ipsos. The web program was rigorously tested on both PC and mobile devices by the Ipsos project management team and Center researchers. The Ipsos project management team also populated test data that

⁵ AAPOR Task Force on Address-based Sampling. 2016. "[AAPOR Report: Address-based Sampling](#)."

was analyzed in SPSS to ensure the logic and randomizations were working as intended before launching the survey.

Incentives

All respondents were offered a post-paid incentive for their participation. Respondents could choose to receive the post-paid incentive in the form of a check or a gift code to Amazon.com or could choose to decline the incentive. Incentive amounts ranged from \$5 to \$20 depending on whether the respondent belongs to a part of the population that is harder or easier to reach. Differential incentive amounts were designed to increase panel survey participation among groups that traditionally have low survey response propensities.

Data collection protocol

The data collection field period for this survey was March 21 to March 27, 2022. Postcard notifications were mailed to all ATP panelists with a known residential address on March 21, 2022.

Invitations were sent out in two separate launches: Soft Launch and Full Launch. Sixty panelists were included in the soft launch, which began with an initial invitation sent on March 21, 2022. The ATP panelists chosen for the initial soft launch were known responders who had completed previous ATP surveys within one day of receiving their invitation. All remaining English- and Spanish-speaking panelists were included in the full launch and were sent an invitation on March 22, 2022.

All panelists with an email address received an email invitation and up to two email reminders if they did not respond to the survey. All ATP panelists that consented to SMS messages received an SMS invitation and up to two SMS reminders.

Invitation and reminder dates

	Soft Launch	Full Launch
Initial invitation	March 21, 2022	March 22, 2022
First reminder	March 24, 2022	March 24, 2022
Final reminder	March 26, 2022	March 26, 2022

Data quality checks

To ensure high-quality data, the Center's researchers performed data quality checks to identify any respondents showing clear patterns of satisficing. This includes checking for very high rates of

leaving questions blank, as well as always selecting the first or last answer presented. As a result of this checking, four ATP respondents were removed from the survey dataset prior to weighting and analysis.

Weighting

The ATP data is weighted in a multistep process that accounts for multiple stages of sampling and nonresponse that occur at different points in the survey process. First, each panelist begins with a base weight that reflects their probability of selection for their initial recruitment survey. The base weights for panelists recruited in different years are scaled to be proportionate to the effective sample size for all active panelists in their cohort and then calibrated to align with the population benchmarks in the accompanying table to correct for nonresponse to recruitment surveys and panel attrition. If only a subsample of panelists was invited to participate in the wave, this weight is adjusted to account for any differential probabilities of selection.

Among the panelists who completed the survey, this weight is then calibrated again to align with the population benchmarks identified in the accompanying table and trimmed at the 1st and 99th percentiles to reduce the loss in precision stemming from variance in the weights. Sampling errors and tests of statistical significance take into account the effect of weighting.

Some of the population benchmarks used for weighting come from surveys conducted prior to the coronavirus outbreak that began in February 2020. However, the weighting variables for panelists recruited in 2021 were measured at the time they were recruited to the panel. Likewise, the profile variables for existing panelists were updated from panel surveys conducted in July or August 2021.

Weighting dimensions

Variable	Benchmark source
Age x Gender	2019 American Community Survey (ACS)
Education x Gender	
Education x Age	
Race/Ethnicity x Education	
Born inside vs. outside the U.S. among Hispanics and Asian Americans	
Years lived in the U.S.	
Census region x Metro/Non-metro	2020 CPS March Supplement
Volunteerism	2019 CPS Volunteering & Civic Life Supplement
Voter registration	2018 CPS Voting and Registration Supplement
Party affiliation	2021 National Public Opinion Reference Survey (NPORS)
Frequency of internet use	
Religious affiliation	

Note: Estimates from the ACS are based on non-institutionalized adults. Voter registration is calculated using procedures from Hur, Achen (2013) and rescaled to include the total U.S. adult population.

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This does not pose a problem for most of the variables used in the weighting, which are quite stable at both the population and individual levels. However, volunteerism may have changed over the intervening period in ways that made their 2021 measurements incompatible with the available (pre-pandemic) benchmarks. To address this, volunteerism is weighted using the profile variables that were measured in 2020. For all other weighting dimensions, the more recent panelist measurements from 2021 are used.

For panelists recruited in 2021, plausible values were imputed using the 2020 volunteerism values from existing panelists with similar characteristics. This ensures that any patterns of change that were observed in the existing panelists were also reflected in the new recruits when the weighting was performed.

The following table shows the unweighted sample sizes and the error attributable to sampling that would be expected at the 95% level of confidence for different groups in the survey.

Group	Unweighted sample size	Plus or minus ...
Total sample	3,581	2.3 percentage points
Half sample	At least 1,764	3.2 percentage points
Rep/Lean Rep	1,600	3.3 percentage points
Half sample	At least 790	4.6 percentage points
Dem/Lean Dem	1,881	3.1 percentage points
Half sample	At least 927	4.4 percentage points

Sample sizes and sampling errors for other subgroups are available upon request. In addition to sampling error, one should bear in mind that question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can introduce error or bias into the findings of opinion polls.

Dispositions and response rates

Final dispositions	AAPOR code	Total
Completed interview	1.1	3,581
Logged onto survey; broke-off	2.12	44
Logged onto survey; did not complete any items	2.1121	27
Never logged on (implicit refusal)	2.11	463
Survey completed after close of the field period	2.27	1
Completed interview but was removed for data quality		4
Screened out		0
Total panelists in the survey		4,120
Completed interviews	I	3,581
Partial interviews	P	0
Refusals	R	538
Non-contact	NC	1
Other	O	0
Unknown household	UH	0
Unknown other	UO	0
Not eligible	NE	0
Total		4,120
AAPOR RR1 = $I / (I+P+R+NC+O+UH+UO)$		87%

Cumulative response rate	Total
Weighted response rate to recruitment surveys	12%
% of recruitment survey respondents who agreed to join the panel, among those invited	69%
% of those agreeing to join who were active panelists at start of Wave 105	43%
Response rate to Wave 105 survey	87%
Cumulative response rate	3%

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Topline questionnaire

**Pew Research Center
Spring 2022 Global Attitudes Survey
August 11, 2022 Release**

Methodological notes:

- Survey results are based on national samples. For further details on sample designs, see Methodology section and our [international survey methods database](#).
- Due to rounding, percentages may not total 100%. The topline “total” columns show 100%, because they are based on unrounded numbers.
- Surveys in the U.S. and Australia were conducted online. The U.S. survey was conducted on Pew Research Center’s American Trends Panel. The Australia survey was conducted on the Social Research Centre’s Life in Australia Panel. In both countries, many questions have been asked in previous surveys on the phone. Phone trends for comparison are provided in separate tables throughout the topline. The extent of the mode differences varies across questions; while there are negligible differences on some questions, others have more pronounced differences. Caution should be taken when evaluating online and phone estimates.
- Questions that ask about the coronavirus use the most commonly used phrase in each country. In Australia and Canada, the question asked about “COVID-19 outbreak.” In Israel, “corona pandemic.” In Japan, “novel coronavirus outbreak.” In Malaysia and Singapore, “Covid-19 pandemic.” In South Korea, “Corona19 outbreak.” In Greece, Hungary, Italy and Poland, “coronavirus pandemic.” All other countries used the term “coronavirus outbreak.”
- Not all questions included in the Spring 2022 Global Attitudes Survey are presented in this topline. Omitted questions have either been previously released or will be released in future reports.

		Q11. Would you say that (survey country) has done a very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad, or very bad job dealing with the coronavirus outbreak?					
		Very good	Somewhat good	Somewhat bad	Very bad	DK/Refused	Total
United States	Spring, 2022	9	49	30	12	0	100
	Spring, 2021	7	35	33	25	1	100
Canada	Spring, 2022	23	47	17	12	1	100
	Spring, 2021	14	51	20	14	0	100
	Summer, 2020	35	53	8	3	0	100
Belgium	Spring, 2022	18	55	15	12	1	100
	Spring, 2021	7	43	32	18	0	100
	Summer, 2020	12	49	26	13	0	100
France	Spring, 2022	13	49	20	17	1	100
	Spring, 2021	5	42	31	22	0	100
	Fall, 2020	8	46	31	15	0	100
	Summer, 2020	6	53	26	15	0	100
Germany	Spring, 2022	11	53	21	15	0	100
	Spring, 2021	11	40	30	19	1	100
	Fall, 2020	20	57	15	8	1	100
	Summer, 2020	38	50	9	3	1	100
Greece	Spring, 2022	16	45	19	20	1	100
	Spring, 2021	19	41	21	19	0	100
Hungary	Spring, 2022	25	46	14	15	0	100
Italy	Spring, 2022	21	53	11	15	0	100
	Spring, 2021	13	46	21	20	0	100
	Summer, 2020	18	56	14	11	0	100
Netherlands	Spring, 2022	10	51	24	14	1	100
	Spring, 2021	10	48	27	14	0	100
	Summer, 2020	34	53	10	3	0	100
Poland	Spring, 2022	11	46	29	8	6	100
Spain	Spring, 2022	22	42	16	20	1	100
	Spring, 2021	10	34	25	30	1	100
	Summer, 2020	16	38	21	26	0	100
Sweden	Spring, 2022	21	61	15	3	0	100
	Spring, 2021	14	53	25	8	0	100
	Summer, 2020	18	53	18	11	1	100
UK	Spring, 2022	21	47	20	12	0	100
	Spring, 2021	25	39	21	15	0	100
	Fall, 2020	10	38	26	25	1	100
	Summer, 2020	11	35	30	24	0	100
Israel	Spring, 2022	27	44	18	8	3	100
Australia	Spring, 2022	20	56	17	6	0	100
	March, 2021	61	34	3	1	0	100
	June, 2020	59	38	3	0	0	100
Japan	Spring, 2022	5	47	37	10	1	100
	Spring, 2021	4	31	47	17	1	100
	Summer, 2020	5	50	37	6	2	100
Malaysia	Spring, 2022	36	41	15	8	0	100
Singapore	Spring, 2022	43	45	9	3	0	100
	Spring, 2021	71	26	2	1	0	100
South Korea	Spring, 2022	17	40	26	17	0	100
	Spring, 2021	23	47	21	9	1	100
	Summer, 2020	40	46	10	4	0	100

U.S. AND AUSTRALIA PHONE TRENDS FOR COMPARISON

		Q11. Would you say that (survey country) has done a very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad, or very bad job dealing with the coronavirus outbreak?					
		Very good	Somewhat good	Somewhat bad	Very bad	DK/Refused	Total
United States	Fall, 2020	14	27	18	40	1	100
	Summer, 2020	14	33	21	31	0	100
Australia	Spring, 2021	61	31	6	2	0	100
	Summer, 2020	53	41	5	1	0	100

		Q12. Thinking about (survey country) as a whole, do you think this country is now more UNITED or more DIVIDED than before the coronavirus outbreak?			
		More united	More divided	DK/Refused	Total
United States	Spring, 2022	17	81	1	100
	Spring, 2021	10	88	2	100
Canada	Spring, 2022	22	74	4	100
	Spring, 2021	36	61	3	100
	Summer, 2020	66	29	5	100
Belgium	Spring, 2022	45	48	7	100
	Spring, 2021	30	66	4	100
	Summer, 2020	40	55	5	100
France	Spring, 2022	22	72	6	100
	Spring, 2021	29	68	3	100
	Summer, 2020	39	49	12	100
Germany	Spring, 2022	21	78	1	100
	Spring, 2021	18	77	5	100
	Summer, 2020	39	54	7	100
Greece	Spring, 2022	28	68	4	100
	Spring, 2021	34	61	5	100
Hungary	Spring, 2022	25	66	9	100
Italy	Spring, 2022	42	53	4	100
	Spring, 2021	34	63	3	100
	Summer, 2020	45	54	2	100
Netherlands	Spring, 2022	17	80	2	100
	Spring, 2021	15	83	2	100
	Summer, 2020	44	53	3	100
Poland	Spring, 2022	30	56	14	100
Spain	Spring, 2022	34	61	5	100
	Spring, 2021	21	77	1	100
	Summer, 2020	39	59	2	100
Sweden	Spring, 2022	60	36	4	100
	Spring, 2021	43	53	3	100
	Summer, 2020	58	36	6	100
UK	Spring, 2022	40	59	2	100
	Spring, 2021	42	54	4	100
	Summer, 2020	46	46	8	100
Israel	Spring, 2022	36	56	8	100

		Q12. Thinking about (survey country) as a whole, do you think this country is now more UNITED or more DIVIDED than before the coronavirus outbreak?			
		More united	More divided	DK/Refused	Total
Australia	Spring, 2022	31	68	2	100
	March, 2021	48	49	3	100
	June, 2020	66	33	2	100
Japan	Spring, 2022	47	40	13	100
	Spring, 2021	29	59	12	100
	Summer, 2020	47	27	26	100
Malaysia	Spring, 2022	58	40	1	100
Singapore	Spring, 2022	75	22	3	100
	Spring, 2021	86	12	2	100
South Korea	Spring, 2022	32	65	3	100
	Spring, 2021	34	61	4	100
	Summer, 2020	56	36	8	100

U.S. AND AUSTRALIA PHONE TRENDS FOR COMPARISON

		Q12. Thinking about (survey country) as a whole, do you think this country is now more UNITED or more DIVIDED than before the coronavirus outbreak?			
		More united	More divided	DK/Refused	Total
United States	Summer, 2020	18	77	4	100
Australia	Spring, 2021	59	39	3	100
	Summer, 2020	54	40	6	100

		Q13. Which statement comes closer to your view, even if neither is exactly right?			
		Effectively handling the coronavirus outbreak in ways that show the STRENGTHS of the political system	Failing to effectively handle the coronavirus outbreak in ways that show the WEAKNESSES of the political system	DK/Refused	Total
United States	Spring, 2022	32	66	2	100
Canada	Spring, 2022	44	52	4	100
Belgium	Spring, 2022	47	49	4	100
France	Spring, 2022	43	53	4	100
Germany	Spring, 2022	41	57	2	100
Greece	Spring, 2022	36	62	2	100
Hungary	Spring, 2022	59	33	8	100
Italy	Spring, 2022	51	46	3	100
Netherlands	Spring, 2022	35	64	1	100
Poland	Spring, 2022	44	43	13	100
Spain	Spring, 2022	44	52	3	100
Sweden	Spring, 2022	58	39	2	100
UK	Spring, 2022	46	51	3	100
Israel	Spring, 2022	58	33	8	100
Australia	Spring, 2022	45	55	1	100
Japan	Spring, 2022	38	57	5	100
Malaysia	Spring, 2022	49	50	1	100
Singapore	Spring, 2022	74	24	2	100
South Korea	Spring, 2022	43	55	2	100

		Q23f. Thinking about what it means to be a good member of society, how important are the following aspects - very important, somewhat important, not too important or not at all important? f. Getting a coronavirus vaccine					
		Very important	Somewhat important	Not too important	Not at all important	DK/Refused	Total
United States	Spring, 2022	44	23	14	19	1	100
Canada	Spring, 2022	59	22	6	12	1	100
Belgium	Spring, 2022	50	27	9	13	1	100
France	Spring, 2022	41	24	13	20	2	100
Germany	Spring, 2022	57	18	12	12	1	100
Greece	Spring, 2022	47	23	14	14	1	100
Hungary	Spring, 2022	40	28	19	11	2	100
Italy	Spring, 2022	65	19	7	7	2	100
Netherlands	Spring, 2022	50	25	12	11	1	100
Poland	Spring, 2022	33	41	15	9	2	100
Spain	Spring, 2022	70	15	6	9	1	100
Sweden	Spring, 2022	71	19	5	4	1	100
UK	Spring, 2022	67	16	8	9	0	100
Israel	Spring, 2022	43	36	12	8	1	100
Australia	Spring, 2022	67	20	7	6	0	100
Japan	Spring, 2022	59	31	6	3	1	100
Malaysia	Spring, 2022	60	24	10	6	0	100
Singapore	Spring, 2022	72	21	6	2	0	100
South Korea	Spring, 2022	41	35	18	7	0	100