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# China's Partnership With Russia Seen as Serious Problem for the U.S.

*Americans see China as a growing superpower – and increasingly say it is the world's leading economy*

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## How we did this

Pew Research Center conducted this study to gauge American views of China. For this analysis, we surveyed 3,581 U.S. adults from March 21 to 27, 2022. Everyone who took part in this survey is a member of the Center's American Trends Panel (ATP), an online survey panel that is recruited through national, random sampling of residential addresses. This way nearly all U.S. adults have a chance of selection. The survey is weighted to be representative of the U.S. adult population by gender, race, ethnicity, partisan affiliation, education and other categories. Read more about the [ATP's methodology](#).

Here are the [questions](#) used for the report, along with responses and its [methodology](#).


# China's Partnership With Russia Seen as Serious Problem for the U.S.

*Americans see China as a growing superpower – and increasingly say it is the world's leading economy*

As war rages in Ukraine – [one which China thus far has refused to condemn](#) – Americans are acutely concerned about the partnership between China and Russia. Around nine-in-ten U.S. adults say it's at least a somewhat serious problem for the United States, and a 62% majority say it's a *very* serious problem – more than say the same about any of the other six problems asked about, including China's involvement in politics in the U.S., its policies on human rights and tensions between China and Taiwan, among others.

## Majority of Americans say relationship between China and Russia poses a very serious problem

% who say \_\_\_ is a **very serious** problem for the U.S.



Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 21-27, 2022. Q17a-g.

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
Alongside the specific concern about the China-Russia relationship is a sense that China is a world superpower. About two-thirds (66%) of U.S. adults say China's influence on the world stage has grown stronger in recent years. More Americans now also describe China as the world's leading economic power. Around four-in-ten (43%) call China the world's top economy – as many as say the same of the U.S. This marks a significant departure since 2020, when 32% of Americans said China was the world's top economy and 52% named the U.S. This double-digit increase returns the share of Americans who consider China the world's top economy to levels [last seen in 2014](#).

And while Americans still unambiguously consider the U.S. to be the world's leading military power – 70% say this, compared with 19% who name China and 9% who name Russia – the share naming China has more than doubled since 2020.

China's power and influence is also seen as a growing threat to the U.S. Today, two-thirds describe China as a major threat – up 5 percentage points since 2020 and 23 points since the question was first asked in 2013. Notably, despite the [conflict in Ukraine](#), this is similar to the share who describe [Russia's power and influence](#) as a major threat (64%) to the U.S.

## Americans increasingly see China as a superpower – and a threat

% who say ...



Note: All changes shown are statistically significant. Question on China's power and influence getting stronger not asked in 2020. Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 21-27, 2022. Q14b, 43a, 56 & 57.

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
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Negative views of China have also increased slightly over the past year. Around eight-in-ten (82%) have unfavorable opinions of China, including 40% who have *very* unfavorable views of the country. This is a 6-point increase in negative views from 2021 and a new high since the Center began asking this question on its American Trends Panel in 2020. The current reading is also a record reading of unfavorable opinions since 2005, although the mode shift from phone surveys to the online panel makes it [difficult to directly compare](#) today's numbers with data from before 2020.

But, even while negative views of China have grown, Americans increasingly see China as a competitor and not as an enemy. Currently, 62% identify China as a competitor and 25% an enemy, with 10% seeing China as a partner. In January, only 54% chose competitor while 35% said enemy, almost exactly the same shares as the year prior. In the same two months, after Russia's invasion of Ukraine, [the opposite shift occurred](#) in the shares of Americans who

### Negative views of China continue to grow in U.S.

% who say they have a(n) \_\_\_ opinion of China



Note: Those who did not answer not shown.


Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 21-27, 2022. Q5b.

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### Growing shares of Americans call China a competitor, Russia an enemy

% who say \_\_\_ is a(n) \_\_\_ of the U.S.



Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 21-27, 2022. Q60 & 61.

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call Russia an enemy or competitor.

As has consistently been the case in recent years,

Republicans and independents who lean toward the Republican Party tend to have more negative views of China than Democrats and independents who lean toward the Democratic Party – 89% vs. 79%, respectively. Republicans are also much more likely to call China an enemy than Democrats and to describe China’s power and influence as a major threat to the U.S.


Differences are particularly large when it comes to

economic issues: Republicans are more likely than Democrats to say the China-U.S. economic relationship is bad and to prioritize getting tough on China on economic issues. Views of the world’s leading economic power also differ by partisanship, with 49% of Republicans naming China as the top economic power and 39% of Democrats saying the same. But the share of Republicans naming China as the top economic power has almost doubled since 2020, while Democratic views on China’s economic dominance have remained largely unchanged.

These are among the key findings of a new survey conducted by Pew Research Center on the Center’s nationally representative American Trends Panel among 3,581 adults from March 21 to 27, 2022. The survey also finds major differences in views of China between older and younger Americans. Older Americans are more likely to have negative views of China, to say the China-U.S. relationship is bad and to describe China as an enemy. Older Americans are also more likely than younger adults to see nearly every issue in the bilateral relationship as a serious problem for the U.S. The age gap is most acute when it comes to tensions between China and Taiwan. While 52% of Americans ages 65 and older consider tensions between China and Taiwan a very serious

## Large partisan differences on many ratings of China and U.S.-China relationship

% who say/have \_\_\_\_, among ...



Note: All differences shown are statistically significant.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 21-27, 2022. Q5b, Q15N, Q43a, Q56 & Q59, Q60.

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problem, 26% of those ages 18 to 29 say the same. A 25-point gap is also present when Americans think about the partnership between China and Russia.


## Unfavorable views of China at new high

Today, 82% of Americans have unfavorable opinions of China, about half of which are *somewhat* unfavorable (42%) while the other half are *very* unfavorable (40%). This is a 6-point increase in negative views from 2021 and a new high since the Center began asking this question on its online American Trends Panel in 2020. The current point is also a record reading of unfavorable opinions compared with almost two decades of surveys conducted by phone.

While negative opinions are high across partisan and ideological groups, Republicans and Republican leaners are more likely than their Democratic counterparts to have unfavorable views of China. Notably, there are ideological distinctions within these partisan groups. Larger shares of conservative Republicans and liberal Democrats hold negative views than do those who are more moderate. Conservative Republicans are particularly likely to have *very* unfavorable views of China (64%) – about twice as much as the share of any other ideological group.

### Conservative Republicans have most unfavorable views of China

% who have *unfavorable* views of China



Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 21-27, 2022. Q5b.  
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The concentration of unfavorable views also varies between age groups: 90% of those ages 65 and older see China unfavorably, compared with 76% of adults under 30. Additionally, 86% of men view the country negatively, compared with 78% of women.

## China seen as competitor rather than enemy of the U.S.

Largely negative views of China are accompanied by negative views of the China-U.S. relationship. Seven-in-ten Americans say that relations between the U.S. and China are bad, including 58% who say the relationship is *somewhat* bad and 12% who say it is *very* bad. Alternatively, while 28% say it is somewhat good, fewer than 1% describe the current relationship as *very* good. Nearly four-in-ten adults under age 30 believe relations are good – at least 10 percentage points more than any other age group over 30.

From January to March of this year, the proportion of Americans who see China as a competitor or enemy of the U.S. changed significantly. Currently, 62% identify China as a competitor and 25% an enemy, while 10% see China as a partner. In January 2022, only 54% chose competitor, while 35% said enemy – almost exactly the same shares as the year prior. In the same two months, after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, [the opposite shift occurred](#) in the shares of Americans who call Russia an enemy or competitor.


There are clear partisan differences to this question: Democrats and Democratic leaners see China as a competitor at higher rates than Republicans, and Republicans are more likely to call China an enemy than Democrats.

Republicans are also about equally likely to say China is a competitor or enemy rather than a partner, a reversal from January when they were most likely to consider China an enemy.

Just as more adults under 30 say the China-U.S. relationship is good, they are also more likely to call China a partner: 17% say this, compared with just 4% of those ages 65 and older. At the same time, 36% of older adults think of China as an enemy, while just 16% of the youngest age group say the same.

### More Americans now say China is a competitor

% who say China is a(n) \_\_\_ of the U.S.



Note: Those who did not answer not shown.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 21-27, 2022. Q60. "China's Partnership With Russia Seen as Serious Problem for the U.S."

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
## Americans have a negative outlook on economic relationship with China

Americans also say that current economic relations between the U.S. and China are bad. Though the relationship is viewed negatively, more than half favor taking a tough stance with China on economic issues rather than strengthening the relationship. Only 28% say the U.S. should prioritize the economic relationship, even if it means ignoring human rights issues. These views have changed little in the last year.

Across each of these variables, there are major differences between partisan groups. Three-quarters of Republicans and GOP leaners say the China-U.S. economic relationship is bad, while just over half of Democrats and Democratic-leaning independents agree. When choosing between building a strong economic relationship and getting tough with China on economic issues, the majority of Democrats (54%) pick strong relations, while the majority of Republicans (67%) prioritize getting tough with China. Majorities in both parties favor promoting human rights, though Democrats do so at a slightly higher rate (71% vs. 66%).

### Many support human rights, tougher stance toward China, but few say economic relations are good

*% who say the U.S. should ...*



*% who say ...*



*% who say \_\_\_ is more important*



Note: Those who did not answer not shown.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 21-27, 2022. Q15N, Q16 & Q59.

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## Americans continue to view China's power and influence as a major threat


Americans also express concern over China's power and influence: Two-thirds consider China's power and influence a major threat, and about three-in-ten see it as a minor threat. The share who express major concern around China's stature has increased by 23 percentage points since the question was first asked in 2013, but remains generally unchanged since 2020.

Evaluations of China's power and influence as a major threat differ by demographic characteristics. Men are significantly more likely than women to consider the country's power and influence a major threat to the U.S. Americans ages 18 to 29 are much less likely than those 30 and older to see China's power and influence as a significant threat. Likewise, Americans who completed high school or less are less likely than those with more education to say China poses a major threat to the U.S.

Conservative Republicans and Republican-leaning independents are particularly likely to say China's power and influence is a major threat for the U.S. While about six-in-ten moderate or liberal Republicans and Democrats of all ideologies see the issue as a major threat, more than eight-in-ten conservative Republicans hold this opinion. The share of Republicans who say China's power is a major threat has also increased by 8 points since 2020, while opinions among Democrats remain relatively unchanged.

### Two-in-three Americans see China as a major threat to U.S.

*% who say China's power and influence are a \_\_\_ to the U.S.*



Note: "Not a threat" and those who did not answer not shown.  
Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 21-27, 2022. Q43a.  
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## Majority of Americans see China-Russia partnership as very serious problem

When asked to evaluate seven issues related to the U.S.-China relationship, more than seven-in-ten Americans label each issue very or somewhat serious. At least a quarter consider each of the seven topics a *very* serious problem.

The partnership between China and Russia, which the two nations recently described as a [limitless friendship](#), stands out as especially concerning to Americans. About six-in-ten say the relationship poses a *very* serious problem – 15 percentage points higher than the next-highest response. China [voted against removing Russia](#) from the United Nations Human Rights Council, and [state media](#) continues to refer to the Russian invasion of Ukraine as a “special military operation.”

About half in the U.S. also consider China’s involvement in U.S. politics a very serious concern, and roughly four-in-ten see China’s military power and China’s policies on human rights in the same light. This represents an 8-point decline from 2021 in the share who are very concerned about China’s human rights policies. Conversely, Americans have become more concerned about the relationship between China and Taiwan. While 28% saw the tensions as very serious in 2021, 35% now consider cross-strait tensions a very grave concern. Chinese President Xi Jinping [recently warned U.S. President Joe Biden](#) of the consequences of mishandling the cross-strait issue in a mid-March call.

Mainland China’s policies in Hong Kong elicit the lowest level of concern out of all of the items, with only about a quarter labeling them a very serious problem.

### Relationship between China and Russia troubles many in the U.S.

% who say the following would be a \_\_\_ problem for the U.S.

	Very serious	Somewhat serious	Total
The partnership between China and Russia	62%	30%	92%
China’s involvement in politics in the U.S.	47	37	84
China’s military power	43	42	85
China’s policies on human rights	42	40	82
Economic competition with China	35	47	82
Tensions between China and Taiwan	35	43	78
Mainland China’s policies in Hong Kong	26	47	73

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 21-27, 2022.


Q17a-g.

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## More concern about U.S.-China issues among older Americans

% who say \_\_\_ would be a **very serious** problem for the U.S.



Note: All differences shown are statistically significant.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 21-27, 2022. Q17a-g.  
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For all seven issues polled, older Americans are more likely than their youngest counterparts to say they would pose a very serious problem to the U.S. The age gap is greatest with regard to tensions between China and Taiwan. While 52% of Americans ages 65 and older consider tensions between China and Taiwan a very serious problem, 26% of those ages 18 to 29 say the same. A 25-point gap is also present when Americans think about the partnership between China and Russia as well as China's military power. Older and younger Americans are in most agreement with regard to China's policies on human rights.

A partisan gap also emerges regarding these issues. Republicans are more likely than Democrats to consider some possible issues in the United States' relationship with China as *very* serious problems. Partisans are least aligned when thinking about China's role in U.S. politics. A 57% majority of Republicans and Republican-leaning independents think China's involvement in politics is a very serious problem, compared with 39% of Democrats and Democrat-leaning independents. Double-digit differences in attitudes also occur around economic competition with China and China's military power. Bipartisan agreement is seen when asking about China's relationship with Russia and China's human rights policies.

## Americans see China's influence on world stage increasing


About two-thirds of U.S. adults say China's influence in the world is getting stronger.

Another 22% see China's influence as staying about the same, and 10% say China's influence is growing weaker.

A greater share of men than women see China's influence as getting stronger, and those with more education are more likely than those with less schooling to say China is becoming more influential. While Republicans and Republican leaners are more likely than Democrats and Democratic leaners to say China's influence is growing stronger, conservative Republicans and liberal Democrats are particularly likely to hold this view. Moderate and liberal Republicans and moderate and conservative Democrats are about as likely to say China's influence in the world in recent years has been getting stronger.

### Many say China's international influence is getting stronger

*% who say China's influence in the world in recent years has been **getting stronger***



Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 21-27, 2022. Q14b. "China's Partnership With Russia Seen as Serious Problem for the U.S."

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
## China and U.S. tied as world's leading economy, according to Americans

Americans are increasingly likely to see China as the world's leading economic power. Currently, 43% of Americans consider China the top economic power, with an equal share naming the U.S. In summer 2020, for comparison, 32% of Americans said China is the world's top economy, while 52% named the U.S. The double-digit increase returns the share of Americans who consider China the world's top economy to levels [last seen in 2014](#).

Older Americans are less likely to identify China as the world's leading economic power. While more than four-in-ten Americans in other age groups point to China, only about a third of Americans ages 65 and older express this view.

### Age and partisan differences in Americans' views of the world's top economy

*% who say \_\_\_ is the world's leading economic power*



Note: Data for "Japan" and "the countries of the European Union" not shown.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 21-27, 2022. Q56. "China's Partnership With Russia Seen as Serious Problem for the U.S."

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Views of the world’s leading economic power also differ by partisanship. Republicans are 10 points more likely than Democratic counterparts to see China as the world’s leading economic power. Republicans are also more likely than they were before to name China: While just 28% of Republicans considered China as the top economy in summer 2020, the share has increased by 21 points to 49% in 2022. Democratic views on China as the world’s foremost economy have remained largely unchanged.

Evaluations of the U.S. economy play a role in what entity Americans identify as the world’s top economic power. Americans who say the economic situation is good are more likely to say the U.S. is the world’s leading economy, while those who have a negative evaluation of the economic status quo are more inclined to label China the top economy.


Those who see economic competition with China as a very serious problem are also more likely to see China as the top economic power. About four-in-ten of those who say economic competition with China is no more than a somewhat serious problem choose China as the top economic power; 52% of Americans who consider the competition a *very* serious problem choose China.

## To Americans, U.S. remains the world’s preeminent military power

Americans clearly see the U.S. as the world’s top military power compared with China and Russia. Seven-in-ten say the U.S. is the world’s leading military power, compared with about two-in-ten who name China and one-in-ten who name Russia. Still, the share who say China is the highest since the question was first asked in 2016, and has more than tripled from 6% who held that view in 2020.

### Republicans increasingly likely to see China as foremost economic power

% who say **China** is the world’s leading economic power



Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 21-27, 2022. Q56. “China’s Partnership With Russia Seen as Serious Problem for the U.S.”

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### Americans see U.S. as leading militarily

% who say \_\_\_ is the world’s leading military power



Note: Those who did not answer not shown.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 21-27, 2022. Q57. “China’s Partnership With Russia Seen as Serious Problem for the U.S.”

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Men are more likely than women to identify the U.S. over China or Russia as the world's top military power. Americans ages 65 and older are more likely than their younger counterparts to hold this view. Partisanship also plays a role, with Democrats – especially liberal Democrats – being more likely than Republicans to say the U.S. is the top military on the world stage.

## Confidence in Xi low across many demographic groups


Similar to American views of China, ratings of Chinese President Xi Jinping are low among Americans, split almost equally between those with *not too much* confidence (42%) and those with *no* confidence at all (41%). Just 15% of Americans say they have confidence in Xi to do the right thing regarding world affairs.

Unlike patterns of confidence in [Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy](#), older Americans are more critical of Xi: 85% of adults ages 65 and older say they do not have confidence in Xi, significantly more than the 77% of adults under 30 who say the same.

Republicans and GOP leaners are more critical of Xi than Democrats and Democratic leaners (89% vs. 77% respectively). Conservative Republicans are especially critical, with 92% saying they have no or little confidence in Xi.

## Few Americans are confident in Xi as a leader on the world stage

*% who have \_\_\_ confidence in Chinese President Xi Jinping to do the right thing regarding world affairs*



Note: Those who did not answer not shown.

Source: Survey of U.S. adults conducted March 21-27, 2022. Q18b. "China's Partnership With Russia Seen as Serious Problem for the U.S."

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## Methodology

### The American Trends Panel survey methodology

#### Overview

The American Trends Panel (ATP), created by Pew Research Center, is a nationally representative panel of randomly selected U.S. adults. Panelists participate via self-administered web surveys. Panelists who do not have internet access at home are provided with a tablet and wireless internet connection. Interviews are conducted in both English and Spanish. The panel is being managed by Ipsos.

Data in this report is drawn from the panel wave conducted from March 21 to March 27, 2022. A total of 3,581 panelists responded out of 4,120 who were sampled, for a response rate of 87%. The cumulative response rate accounting for nonresponse to the recruitment surveys and attrition is 3%. The break-off rate among panelists who logged on to the survey and completed at least one item is 1%. The margin of sampling error for the full sample of 3,581 respondents is plus or minus 2.3 percentage points.

#### Panel recruitment

The ATP was created in 2014, with the first cohort of panelists invited to join the panel at the end of a large, national, landline and cellphone random-digit-dial survey that was conducted in both English and Spanish. Two additional recruitments were conducted using the same method in 2015 and 2017, respectively. Across these three surveys, a total of 19,718 adults were invited to join the ATP, of whom 9,942 (50%) agreed to participate.

In August 2018, the ATP switched from telephone to address-based recruitment. Invitations were sent to a stratified, random sample of

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#### American Trends Panel recruitment surveys

Recruitment dates	Mode	Invited	Joined	Active panelists remaining
Jan. 23 to March 16, 2014	Landline/ cell RDD	9,809	5,338	1,598
Aug. 27 to Oct. 4, 2015	Landline/ cell RDD	6,004	2,976	938
April 25 to June 4, 2017	Landline/ cell RDD	3,905	1,628	470
Aug. 8 to Oct. 31, 2018	ABS	9,396	8,778	4,425
Aug. 19 to Nov. 30, 2019	ABS	5,900	4,720	1,625
June 1 to July 19, 2020; Feb. 10 to March 31, 2021	ABS	3,197	2,812	1,694
May 29 to July 7, 2021				
Sept. 16 to Nov. 1, 2021	ABS	1,329	1,162	935
	<b>Total</b>	<b>39,540</b>	<b>27,414</b>	<b>11,685</b>

Note: Approximately once per year, panelists who have not participated in multiple consecutive waves or who did not complete an annual profiling survey are removed from the panel. Panelists also become inactive if they ask to be removed from the panel.

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households selected from the U.S. Postal Service’s Delivery Sequence File. Sampled households receive mailings asking a randomly selected adult to complete a survey online. A question at the end of the survey asks if the respondent is willing to join the ATP. Starting in 2020, another stage was added to the recruitment. Households that do not respond to the online survey are sent a paper version of the questionnaire, \$5 and a postage-paid return envelope. A subset of the adults returning the paper version of the survey are invited to join the ATP. This subset of adults receive a follow-up mailing with a \$10 pre-incentive and invitation to join the ATP.

Across the four address-based recruitments, a total of 19,822 adults were invited to join the ATP, of whom 17,472 agreed to join the panel and completed an initial profile survey. In each household, the adult with the next birthday was asked to go online to complete a survey, at the end of which they were invited to join the panel. Of the 27,414 individuals who have ever joined the ATP, 11,685 remained active panelists and continued to receive survey invitations at the time this survey was conducted.

The U.S. Postal Service’s Delivery Sequence File has been estimated to cover as much as 98% of the population, although some studies suggest that the coverage could be in the low 90% range.<sup>1</sup> The American Trends Panel never uses breakout routers or chains that direct respondents to additional surveys.

### **Sample design**

This study featured a stratified random sample from the ATP. The overall target population for this survey was non-institutionalized persons ages 18 and older, living in the U.S., including Alaska and Hawaii.

### **Questionnaire development and testing**

The questionnaire was developed by Pew Research Center in consultation with Ipsos. The web program was rigorously tested on both PC and mobile devices by the Ipsos project management team and Center researchers. The Ipsos project management team also populated test data that was analyzed in SPSS to ensure the logic and randomizations were working as intended before launching the survey.

### **Incentives**

All respondents were offered a post-paid incentive for their participation. Respondents could choose to receive the post-paid incentive in the form of a check or a gift code to Amazon.com or

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<sup>1</sup> AAPOR Task Force on Address-based Sampling. 2016. “[AAPOR Report: Address-based Sampling.](#)”

could choose to decline the incentive. Incentive amounts ranged from \$5 to \$20 depending on whether the respondent belongs to a part of the population that is harder or easier to reach. Differential incentive amounts were designed to increase panel survey participation among groups that traditionally have low survey response propensities.

### **Data collection protocol**

The data collection field period for this survey was March 21 to March 27, 2022. Postcard notifications were mailed to all ATP panelists with a known residential address on March 21, 2022.

Invitations were sent out in two separate launches: Soft Launch and Full Launch. Sixty panelists were included in the soft launch, which began with an initial invitation sent on March 21, 2022. The ATP panelists chosen for the initial soft launch were known responders who had completed previous ATP surveys within one day of receiving their invitation. All remaining English- and Spanish-speaking panelists were included in the full launch and were sent an invitation on March 22, 2022.

All panelists with an email address received an email invitation and up to two email reminders if they did not respond to the survey. All ATP panelists that consented to SMS messages received an SMS invitation and up to two SMS reminders.

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#### Invitation and reminder dates

	Soft Launch	Full Launch
Initial invitation	March 21, 2022	March 22, 2022
First reminder	March 24, 2022	March 24, 2022
Final reminder	March 26, 2022	March 26, 2022

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### **Data quality checks**

To ensure high-quality data, the Center's researchers performed data quality checks to identify any respondents showing clear patterns of satisficing. This includes checking for very high rates of leaving questions blank, as well as always selecting the first or last answer presented. As a result of this checking, four ATP respondents were removed from the survey dataset prior to weighting and analysis.

## Weighting

The ATP data is weighted in a multistep process that accounts for multiple stages of sampling and nonresponse that occur at different points in the survey process. First, each panelist begins with a base weight that reflects their probability of selection for their initial recruitment survey. The base weights for panelists recruited in different years are scaled to be proportionate to the effective sample size for all active panelists in their cohort and then calibrated to align with the population benchmarks in

the accompanying table to correct for nonresponse to recruitment surveys and panel attrition. If only a subsample of panelists was invited to participate in the wave, this weight is adjusted to account for any differential probabilities of selection.

Among the panelists who completed the survey, this weight is then calibrated again to align with the population benchmarks identified in the accompanying table and trimmed at the 1st and 99th percentiles to reduce the loss in precision stemming from variance in the weights. Sampling errors and tests of statistical significance take into account the effect of weighting.

Some of the population benchmarks used for weighting come from surveys conducted prior to the coronavirus outbreak that began in February 2020. However, the weighting variables for panelists recruited in 2021 were measured at the time they were recruited to the panel. Likewise, the profile variables for existing panelists were updated from panel surveys conducted in July or August 2021.

This does not pose a problem for most of the variables used in the weighting, which are quite stable at both the population and individual levels. However, volunteerism may have changed over the intervening period in ways that made their 2021 measurements incompatible with the

## Weighting dimensions

Variable	Benchmark source
Age x Gender	2019 American Community Survey (ACS)
Education x Gender	
Education x Age	
Race/Ethnicity x Education	
Born inside vs. outside the U.S. among Hispanics and Asian Americans	
Years lived in the U.S.	
Census region x Metro/Non-metro	2020 CPS March Supplement
Volunteerism	2019 CPS Volunteering & Civic Life Supplement
Voter registration	2018 CPS Voting and Registration Supplement
Party affiliation	2021 National Public Opinion Reference Survey (NPORS)
Frequency of internet use	
Religious affiliation	

Note: Estimates from the ACS are based on non-institutionalized adults. Voter registration is calculated using procedures from Hur, Achen (2013) and rescaled to include the total U.S. adult population.

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available (pre-pandemic) benchmarks. To address this, volunteerism is weighted using the profile variables that were measured in 2020. For all other weighting dimensions, the more recent panelist measurements from 2021 are used.

For panelists recruited in 2021, plausible values were imputed using the 2020 volunteerism values from existing panelists with similar characteristics. This ensures that any patterns of change that were observed in the existing panelists were also reflected in the new recruits when the weighting was performed.

The following table shows the unweighted sample sizes and the error attributable to sampling that would be expected at the 95% level of confidence for different groups in the survey.

<b>Group</b>	<b>Unweighted sample size</b>	<b>Plus or minus ...</b>
Total sample	3,581	2.3 percentage points
Half sample	At least 1,764	3.2 percentage points
Rep/Lean Rep	1,600	3.3 percentage points
Half sample	At least 790	4.6 percentage points
Dem/Lean Dem	1,881	3.1 percentage points
Half sample	At least 927	4.4 percentage points

Sample sizes and sampling errors for other subgroups are available upon request. In addition to sampling error, one should bear in mind that question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can introduce error or bias into the findings of opinion polls.

**Dispositions and response rates**

Final dispositions	AAPOR code	Total
Completed interview	1.1	3,581
Logged onto survey; broke-off	2.12	44
Logged onto survey; did not complete any items	2.1121	27
Never logged on (implicit refusal)	2.11	463
Survey completed after close of the field period	2.27	1
Completed interview but was removed for data quality		4
Screened out		0
<b>Total panelists in the survey</b>		<b>4,120</b>
Completed interviews	I	3,581
Partial interviews	P	0
Refusals	R	538
Non-contact	NC	1
Other	O	0
Unknown household	UH	0
Unknown other	UO	0
Not eligible	NE	0
<b>Total</b>		<b>4,120</b>
<b>AAPOR RR1 = I / (I+P+R+NC+O+UH+UO)</b>		<b>87%</b>

Cumulative response rate	Total
Weighted response rate to recruitment surveys	12%
% of recruitment survey respondents who agreed to join the panel, among those invited	69%
% of those agreeing to join who were active panelists at start of Wave 105	43%
Response rate to Wave 105 survey	87%
<b>Cumulative response rate</b>	<b>3%</b>

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## Topline questionnaire

**Pew Research Center**  
**Spring 2022 Global Attitudes Survey**  
**April 28, 2022 Release**

### Methodological notes:

- Survey results are based on national samples. For further details on sample designs, see Methodology section and our [international survey methods database](#).
- Due to rounding, percentages may not total 100%. The topline “total” columns show 100%, because they are based on unrounded numbers.
- Since 2007, Pew Research Center has used an automated process to generate toplines for its Global Attitudes surveys. As a result, numbers may differ slightly from those published prior to 2007.
- The U.S. survey was conducted on Pew Research Center’s American Trends Panel. Many questions have been asked in previous surveys on the phone. Phone trends for comparison are provided in separate tables throughout the topline. The extent of the mode differences varies across questions; while there are negligible differences on some questions, others have more pronounced differences. Caution should be taken when evaluating online and phone estimates.
- Not all questions included in the Spring 2022 Global Attitudes Survey are presented in this topline. Omitted questions have either been previously released or will be released in future reports.

		Q5b. Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable opinion of...? b. China					
		Very favorable	Somewhat favorable	Somewhat unfavorable	Very unfavorable	DK/Refused	Total
United States	Spring, 2022	2	14	42	40	2	100
	Spring, 2021	1	19	37	39	3	100
	March, 2020	2	17	44	35	2	100

**U.S. PHONE TRENDS FOR COMPARISON.**

		Q5b. Please tell me if you have a very favorable, somewhat favorable, somewhat unfavorable, or very unfavorable opinion of...? b. China					
		Very favorable	Somewhat favorable	Somewhat unfavorable	Very unfavorable	DK/Refused	Total
United States	Summer, 2020	3	19	31	42	6	100
	Spring, 2020	3	23	33	33	7	100
	Spring, 2019	4	22	37	23	13	100
	Spring, 2018	5	33	32	15	14	100
	Spring, 2017	5	39	33	14	10	100
	Spring, 2016	6	31	36	19	9	100
	Spring, 2015	4	34	33	21	8	100
	Spring, 2014	7	28	34	21	10	100
	Spring, 2013	7	30	32	20	12	100
	Spring, 2012	6	34	25	15	19	100
	Spring, 2011	12	39	22	14	12	100
	Spring, 2010	10	39	24	12	14	100
	Spring, 2009	9	41	25	13	13	100
	Spring, 2008	9	30	26	16	19	100
	Spring, 2007	8	34	25	14	18	100
Spring, 2006	12	40	19	10	19	100	
Spring, 2005	9	34	22	13	22	100	

		Q14b. Thinking about each of the following countries, would you say its influence in the world in recent years has been getting stronger, getting weaker, or staying about the same? b. China				
		Getting stronger	Getting weaker	Staying about the same	DK/Refused	Total
United States	Spring, 2022	66	10	22	2	100

		ASK FORM 1 ONLY: Q15. In general, how would you describe relations today between China and (survey country)? Would you say they are very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad or very bad?						
		Very good	Somewhat good	Somewhat bad	Very bad	DK/Refused	Total	N=
United States	Spring, 2022	0	28	58	12	1	100	1764

		ASK FORM 2 ONLY: Q15N. Overall, do you think current economic relations between the U.S. and China are very good, somewhat good, somewhat bad or very bad?						Total	N=
		Very good	Somewhat good	Somewhat bad	Very bad	DK/Refused			
United States	Spring, 2022	2	36	48	13	2	100	1817	
	Spring, 2021	1	33	50	14	2	100	2596	

		Q16. Which statement comes closer to your view, even if neither is exactly right?				DK/Refused	Total
		Try to promote human rights in China, even if it harms economic relations with China	Prioritize strengthening economic relations with China, even if it means not addressing human rights issues				
United States	Spring, 2022	68	28		3	100	
	Spring, 2021	70	26		4	100	

**U.S. PHONE TRENDS FOR COMPARISON.**

		Q16. Which statement comes closer to your view, even if neither is exactly right?				DK/Refused	Total
		Try to promote human rights in China, even if it harms economic relations with China	Prioritize strengthening economic relations with China, even if it means not addressing human rights issues				
United States	Summer, 2020	73	23		4	100	

		Q17a. I'm going to read you a list of things that may be problems for (survey country). Please indicate how much of a problem, if at all, each would be for (survey country). a. China's policies on human rights					
		Very serious	Somewhat serious	Not too serious	Not a problem at all	DK/Refused	Total
United States	Spring, 2022	42	40	13	2	2	100
	Spring, 2021	50	34	12	2	2	100
	March, 2020	43	37	15	4	1	100

**U.S. PHONE TRENDS FOR COMPARISON.**

		<b>Q17a. I'm going to read you a list of things that may be problems for (survey country). Please indicate how much of a problem, if at all, each would be for (survey country). a. China's policies on human rights</b>					
		<b>Very serious</b>	<b>Somewhat serious</b>	<b>Not too serious</b>	<b>Not a problem at all</b>	<b>DK/Refused</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>United States</b>	<b>Spring, 2020</b>	57	25	10	5	3	100
	<b>Spring, 2018</b>	49	30	9	5	7	100
	<b>Spring, 2017</b>	47	32	9	6	6	100
	<b>Spring, 2015</b>	53	32	6	4	5	100
	<b>May, 2012</b>	48	33	10	4	6	100

		<b>Q17b. I'm going to read you a list of things that may be problems for (survey country). Please indicate how much of a problem, if at all, each would be for (survey country). b. China's involvement in politics in (survey country)</b>					
		<b>Very serious problem</b>	<b>Somewhat serious problem</b>	<b>Not too serious of a problem</b>	<b>Not a problem at all</b>	<b>DK/Refused</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>United States</b>	<b>Spring, 2022</b>	47	37	12	2	2	100

		<b>Q17c. I'm going to read you a list of things that may be problems for (survey country). Please indicate how much of a problem, if at all, each would be for (survey country). c. Economic competition with China</b>					
		<b>Very serious problem</b>	<b>Somewhat serious problem</b>	<b>Not too serious of a problem</b>	<b>Not a problem at all</b>	<b>DK/Refused</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>United States</b>	<b>Spring, 2022</b>	35	47	14	2	2	100

		<b>Q17d. I'm going to read you a list of things that may be problems for (survey country). Please indicate how much of a problem, if at all, each would be for (survey country). d. China's military power</b>					
		<b>Very serious problem</b>	<b>Somewhat serious problem</b>	<b>Not too serious of a problem</b>	<b>Not a problem at all</b>	<b>DK/Refused</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>United States</b>	<b>Spring, 2022</b>	43	42	12	2	2	100

		<b>Q17e. I'm going to read you a list of things that may be problems for (survey country). Please indicate how much of a problem, if at all, each would be for (survey country). e. Tensions between China and Taiwan</b>					
		<b>Very serious</b>	<b>Somewhat serious</b>	<b>Not too serious</b>	<b>Not a problem</b>	<b>DK/Refused</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>United States</b>	<b>Spring, 2022</b>	35	43	17	2	3	100
	<b>Spring, 2021</b>	28	46	20	3	3	100

**U.S. PHONE TRENDS FOR COMPARISON.**

		<b>Q17e. I'm going to read you a list of things that may be problems for (survey country). Please indicate how much of a problem, if at all, each would be for (survey country). e. Tensions between China and Taiwan</b>					
		<b>Very serious</b>	<b>Somewhat serious</b>	<b>Not too serious</b>	<b>Not a problem</b>	<b>DK/Refused</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>United States</b>	<b>Spring, 2018</b>	22	41	17	7	12	100
	<b>Spring, 2017</b>	22	44	17	9	8	100
	<b>Spring, 2015</b>	21	45	17	7	10	100
	<b>May, 2012</b>	27	39	15	6	13	100

		<b>Q17f. I'm going to read you a list of things that may be problems for (survey country). Please indicate how much of a problem, if at all, each would be for (survey country). f. Mainland China's policies in Hong Kong</b>					
		<b>Very serious problem</b>	<b>Somewhat serious problem</b>	<b>Not too serious of a problem</b>	<b>Not a problem at all</b>	<b>DK/Refused</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>United States</b>	<b>Spring, 2022</b>	26	47	20	4	3	100

		<b>Q17g. I'm going to read you a list of things that may be problems for (survey country). Please indicate how much of a problem, if at all, each would be for (survey country). g. The partnership between China and Russia</b>					
		<b>Very serious problem</b>	<b>Somewhat serious problem</b>	<b>Not too serious of a problem</b>	<b>Not a problem at all</b>	<b>DK/Refused</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>United States</b>	<b>Spring, 2022</b>	62	30	5	1	1	100

		<b>Q18b. For each, tell me how much confidence you have in each leader to do the right thing regarding world affairs – a lot of confidence, some confidence, not too much confidence, or no confidence at all. b. Chinese President Xi Jinping</b>					
		<b>A lot of confidence</b>	<b>Some confidence</b>	<b>Not too much confidence</b>	<b>No confidence at all</b>	<b>DK/Refused</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>United States</b>	<b>Spring, 2022</b>	2	13	42	41	2	100
	<b>Spring, 2021</b>	2	13	39	43	3	100
	<b>March, 2020</b>	2	17	40	38	3	100

**U.S. PHONE TRENDS FOR COMPARISON.**

		<b>Q18b. For each, tell me how much confidence you have in each leader to do the right thing regarding world affairs – a lot of confidence, some confidence, not too much confidence, or no confidence at all. b. Chinese President Xi Jinping</b>					
		<b>A lot of confidence</b>	<b>Some confidence</b>	<b>Not too much confidence</b>	<b>No confidence at all</b>	<b>DK/Refused</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>United States</b>	<b>Summer, 2020</b>	2	16	22	55	5	100
	<b>Spring, 2020</b>	2	20	26	45	8	100
	<b>Spring, 2019</b>	2	35	27	23	13	100
	<b>Spring, 2018</b>	5	34	27	23	12	100
	<b>Spring, 2017</b>	2	29	29	31	9	100
	<b>Spring, 2014</b>	2	26	26	32	14	100

		Q43a. I'd like your opinion about some possible international concerns for (survey country). Do you think that each of the following is a major threat, a minor threat, or not a threat to (survey country)? a. China's power and influence				
		Major threat	Minor threat	Not a threat	DK/Refused	Total
United States	Spring, 2022	67	29	4	1	100
	March, 2020	63	31	5	1	100

**U.S. PHONE TRENDS FOR COMPARISON.**

		Q43a. I'd like your opinion about some possible international concerns for (survey country). Do you think that each of the following is a major threat, a minor threat, or not a threat to (survey country)? a. China's power and influence				
		Major threat	Minor threat	Not a threat	DK/Refused	Total
United States	Spring, 2020	62	29	7	2	100
	Spring, 2018	48	38	10	4	100
	Spring, 2017	41	45	11	3	100
	Spring, 2013	44	38	13	6	100

		Q56. Today, which one of the following do you think is the world's leading economic power?					
		The United States	China	Japan	The countries of the European Union	DK/Refused	Total
United States	Spring, 2022	43	43	3	7	3	100
	March, 2020	54	33	5	6	2	100

U.S. PHONE TRENDS FOR COMPARISON.

		Q56. Today, which one of the following do you think is the world's leading economic power?							Total
		The United States	China	Japan	The countries of the European Union	Other (DO NOT READ)	None/There is no leading economic power (DO NOT READ)	DK/Refused	
United States	Summer, 2020	52	32	5	6	0	0	4	100
	Spring, 2020	59	30	3	4	0	1	3	100
	Spring, 2019	50	32	7	6	1	1	4	100
	Spring, 2018	49	33	6	7	1	1	4	100
	Spring, 2017	51	35	5	5	0	0	2	100
	Spring, 2016	54	34	6	2	0	1	3	100
	Spring, 2015	46	36	7	7	0	1	3	100
	Spring, 2014	40	41	8	7	0	0	4	100
	Spring, 2013	39	44	7	4	0	1	6	100
	Spring, 2012	40	41	6	5	0	1	7	100
	Spring, 2011	38	43	6	6	0	0	6	100
	Spring, 2010	38	41	8	6	0	0	7	100
	Spring, 2009	48	33	7	5	0	1	6	100
Spring, 2008	46	26	10	10	0	1	7	100	

		Q57. Today, which one of the following do you think is the world's leading military power?				Total
		The United States	China	Russia	DK/Refused	
United States	Spring, 2022	70	19	9	3	100
	March, 2020	83	7	8	2	100

U.S. PHONE TRENDS FOR COMPARISON.

		Q57. Today, which one of the following do you think is the world's leading military power?						Total
		The United States	China	Russia	Other (DO NOT READ)	None/There is no leading military power (DO NOT READ)	DK/Refused	
United States	Spring, 2020	83	6	8	1	0	3	100
	Spring, 2016	72	12	10	3	0	3	100

In 2016, response options included "the countries of the European Union."

		Q59. Thinking about our economic and trade policy toward China, which is more important?				Total
		Building a strong relationship with China on economic issues	Getting tougher with China on economic issues	DK/Refused		
United States	Spring, 2022	44	53	3		100
	Spring, 2021	44	53	3		100

**U.S. PHONE TRENDS FOR COMPARISON.**

		<b>Q59. Thinking about our economic and trade policy toward China, which is more important?</b>			
		<b>Building a strong relationship with China on economic issues</b>	<b>Getting tougher with China on economic issues</b>	<b>DK/Refused</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>United States</b>	<b>Summer, 2020</b>	51	46	3	100

		<b>Q60. On balance, do you think of China as a partner of the U.S., a competitor of the U.S. or an enemy of the U.S.?</b>				
		<b>Partner</b>	<b>Competitor</b>	<b>Enemy</b>	<b>DK/Refused</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>United States</b>	<b>Spring, 2022</b>	10	62	25	2	100
	<b>January, 2022</b>	9	54	35	2	100
	<b>Spring, 2021</b>	9	55	34	2	100

**U.S. PHONE TRENDS FOR COMPARISON.**

		<b>Q60. On balance, do you think of China as a partner of the U.S., a competitor of the U.S. or an enemy of the U.S.?</b>				
		<b>Partner</b>	<b>Competitor</b>	<b>Enemy</b>	<b>DK/Refused</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>United States</b>	<b>Summer, 2020</b>	16	57	26	2	100
	<b>May, 2012</b>	16	66	15	3	100